

Responses to Conflict that Work

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Achim Wennmann and Brian Ganson

This paper reviews the existing state of knowledge about the key building blocks for sub-set of conflict resolution and peacebuilding practice directed particularly towards cross-cutting efforts to manage destructive conflict and violence in a variety of contexts, such as post-conflict situations, remote borderland or urban settings, or large-scale investment sites. It proposes several principles to guide policy in its quest to sustain peace in different contexts. The paper finds that successful peacebuilding practice has evolved from aligning several strategic building blocks, including trustworthy data, collaborative analysis, progressively expanded coalitions for change, targeted interventions that address the most acute risk factors of conflict and violence, and sustained institutional support by an honest broker. The paper also shows that successful peacebuilding has also evolved from the application of several principles which include to:

- Relentless prioritisation of the prevention and reduction of violence and conflict;
- Engagement of the conflict parties on their partisan interests;
- Ensuring vertical linkages within the conflict system;
- Work within the de-facto political economy; and
- Accompaniment by outside actors.

The research presented in this paper has been conducted as part of a project on business and conflict in fragile states (Ganson and Wennmann 2016). While the authors reviewed a significant amount of material, given the breadth and amount of work in this field what follows is merely a sketch for which the need for more systematic quantitative and qualitative analysis seems apparent. Overall, the authors approached their work on the basis that necessarily broad generalities be grounded in real experience, with a focus on pragmatic and workable solutions.

Effective responses to conflict have evolved from aligning several strategic building blocks and when a limited number of principles guide policy-making.

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The broadening optic on peacebuilding

Practices of resolving conflict and building peace have long-established roots in many societies (Chetail and Jütersonke 2015; Sow 2015). They often draw on traditional practices to resolve disputes, and to promote social harmony. While much of this practice does not use the label 'peacebuilding', professionals working in this field underline that much of this practice is about "the use of dialogue, trust-building and consensus-seeking to resolve or manage conflict through non-violent means" (GPP 2015: 3). In all societies, there are usually significant capacities and relationships at different levels that manage violent and non-violent conflict. In some regions, such capacities and relationships are part of the traditional cultural heritage.

The terminology of 'peacebuilding' was initially associated with the academic discipline of Peace Studies in the 1970s and 1980s (Ryan 2014). This discipline also coined the terms 'positive' peace (condition of good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships) and 'negative' peace (the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war) (Boulding 1978; Galtung 1978). From this perspective, building peace is both about ending violence and about building mature relationships to manage and mitigate violent or non-violent conflict. It is also a perspective that provides the basis for a broader approach to peacebuilding in the fields of armed violence reduction and all stages of conflict, be they violent or non-violent.

From its broader origins, the terminology 'peacebuilding' became increasingly associated with United Nations (UN) efforts in the aftermath of conflict. The 1992 Agenda for Peace introduced the terminology of 'peacebuilding' more systematically into UN vocabulary. Prior to the Agenda for Peace, UN actors would look at 'peacebuilding' as something that would be mainly advanced by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). But, at the time, it was recognised that the UN could engage in certain 'peace inducing' activities that did not fall neatly into the UN's existing 'peacekeeping', 'peacemaking' or 'good offices' roles (Wennmann 2015). The Agenda for Peace, therefore, positioned peacebuilding within the logics of a linear conflict cycle in which preventive diplomacy occurred prior to the conflict, peacemaking and peacekeeping during the conflict, and 'post-conflict peacebuilding'— defined as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (UNGA 1992).

Over 20 years later, the post-conflict framing of peacebuilding has been largely overtaken by the evolution of violent conflict and the ensuing adaptation of the response. Peacebuilding practice today is conducted by a range of actors and occurs in a wider variety of contexts ranging from fluid political transitions to regions under increased stress due to climate change, rapid urbanization, or contentious large-scale investments (GPP 2015). This evolution has been broadly recognized by the 10-year review of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture that repositions peacebuilding as activity across all stages of conflict and as a priority for the entire UN system. The UN Security Council Resolution 2282 of 27 April 2016 provides a degree of evidence that UN peacebuilding practice is reconnecting to the broad origins of this field of practice outside the UN through the lens of 'sustaining peace', which the Resolution defines as

a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development, and

emphasizing that sustaining peace is a shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by the government and all other national stakeholders... (UNSC 2016, 1-2).

While there are many open questions how such a broader approach will be implemented as a UN systems approach, fact is that the 10-year review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture opens many new opportunities to advance peacebuilding and conflict prevention in many contexts that desperately need more systematic attention, and provides the backdrop for a review of the existing state of knowledge about the key building blocks for peacebuilding practice.

Building blocks for building peace

This section sketches key building block for effective conflict resolution and peacebuilding practice. These include trustworthy data, collaborative analysis, progressively expanded coalitions for change, targeted interventions that address the most acute risk factors of conflict and violence, and sustained institutional support by an honest broker.

Trust-worthy data

Effective conflict management builds first and foremost from a precise analysis and understanding of local conflict dynamics. A major research programme on the micro-dynamics of conflict, violence and development, funded by the European Commission, underlines the essentially local nature of violence: "The outbreak, the continuation, the end, and the consequences of violent conflict are closely interrelated with how people behave, make choices, and interact with their immediate surroundings, and how all these factors may shape the lives and livelihoods of those exposed to conflict and violence" (Justino et al. 2013: 5). This work underlines the fact that individuals, households, local groups and communities are central to an understanding of conflict dynamics and emphasizes the importance of a granular and localised understanding of a conflict context (Justino 2013).

Interventions that understand and prioritise local dimensions of conflict appear to have a higher chance of effectiveness. The city of Diadema in Brazil, for instance, reduced violence levels by around 44% from 2002 to 2004 after careful study of local patterns of violence, which among other insights revealed that 65% of murders were alcohol related. The city did so by combining controls on alcohol and gun sales, initiatives for non-violent conflict resolution, and public education programmes on crime and violence prevention (Duailibi et al 2007).

Yet making sense of the local context and conflict dynamics is challenging in rumour-rich and information-poor environments. This is in part because data generation does not occur in a political vacuum; controlling information is an expression of political power that in turn favours or disfavours different interest groups. Increasingly, conflict management practice is overcoming these barriers through the use of institutionalised mechanisms or networks for monitoring the local context. Often called 'observatories', they function to generate data, provide analysis or give advice to decision-makers to strengthen policymaking (Gilgen and Tracey 2011). Their primary role is to help all actors to broaden their perspectives and confront the realities of their environment. This has a technical aspect, for instance, through the application of more rigorous qualitative and quantitative methods.

But observatories also serve a political function. For instance, between 2009 and 2012, the Crime and Risk Mapping Analysis (CRMA) programme in South Sudan mapped 1,500 villages and collected more than 10,000 data points, becoming the most systematic data collection and mapping effort in any conflict-affected or fragile country. Through its mapping programme, it was able to identify areas of high need for malaria prevention efforts and priority areas for school infrastructure programmes, and also informed conflict prevention around community competition for access to water (UNDP 2012). The CRMA programme initially faced substantial opposition from local officials because they feared the political consequences of transparency. The programme overcame this challenge by separating the data collection and data analysis from each other. International actors led on the data collection and systematisation – the largely technical exercise – while local actors took the lead on the data analysis. This provided political support for the continuation of data collection as decision-makers recognised its value to them, as well as time for local political dynamics to adapt to a more structured discussion of data and evidence (GDS 2013). This CRMA programme illustrates that events or seminars on preliminary results of data gathering or analysis organised by an observatory can be the first opportunity for actors from diverse sectors and perspectives to challenge each other's thinking. Moderated conversations uncover gaps in information and understanding, potentially faulty assumptions regarding cause and effect, and biases in both data collection and data reporting. Repeating such interactions over time allows stakeholders to collectively test assumptions underlying decision-making processes and strategies (Svensson 2013).

Collaborative analysis

Taking collaborative approaches to data gathering and analysis to the next level, an increasingly well-developed body of practice has grown around community-based monitoring systems (CBMS). A typical CBMS trains local researchers to collect data at a level of detail and precision difficult to match by outsider-driven assessments; in the social arena, for example, it is not uncommon for a CBMS to collect data on every household in its defined area. Such approaches have been found to increase the validity, reliability, accuracy and legitimacy of data through its collection by those closest to it. It may also achieve real cost savings through the deployment of lower-cost local resources. And it can reduce disputes over data and analysis as different actors with a stake in a conflict and its resolution understand the assessments that underlie them (Ibid.).

As a result of their practical and political value, observatories are widely used in Latin America: there are at least 95 in Mexico, 33 in Colombia, 26 in Argentina, 21 in Brazil and more than 270 in the whole region (Fundación Este País 2008). One of the most ambitious is a private sector-led initiative, the Operations Centre of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Designed by IBM at the request of Rio's mayor, the Operations Centre is a city-wide system that integrates data from some 30 agencies, all under a single roof. Part of IBM's 'Smarter Cities Initiatives', the Operations Centre capitalizes on new technologies and insights to transform city systems, operations and service delivery. It builds on the idea that city leaders can maximise transformative possibilities by using big data and analytics for deeper insights and better policies (Singer 2012).

Progressively expanded coalitions for change

The rallying of diverse and sometimes conflicting local stakeholders around higher-quality data and more trustworthy analysis often lays the foundation for a further step in conflict prevention and conflict resolution practice, namely, the building of sufficient consensus for action. In

practice, this means progressively enlarging the circle of actors aligned around a concrete vision for the future, ensuring that it be consensual, that it be as broadly owned as possible, and there be no major gap between the vision and the capacities of local or international stakeholders to deliver that vision.

For example, a starting point for the move from conflict to greater stability in turbulent countries is often in the form of national dialogue processes, which are “negotiating mechanisms intended to expand participation in political transitions beyond the political and military elites. Their ambition is to move away from elite-level deal making by allowing diverse interests to influence the transitional negotiations” (Papagianni 2014). Recognising that transitional mechanisms must be put in place to compensate for those of the formal government that lack sufficient legitimacy, they nurture “a shared understanding among key political actors on principles” (Ibid., 11). Their success rests at least in part on rigorous stakeholder mapping, as well as on an expanded understanding of ‘who counts’ in conflict resolution.

Explicit consideration of the political economy of conflict and its resolution leads towards a perspective that any party with a stake in the outcome – which at the city level include gangs, disenfranchised populations or de-facto power holders – must somehow be included in the process of building consensus around new political institutions and vision for society (Wennmann 2011). Thankfully, not every party needs to be directly at a negotiation table. Research drawing on the insights of more than 100 senior peace mediators suggests that a variety of options for inclusion are available. These range from direct representation or observation in negotiations, to consultative forums run in parallel to negotiations, to informal outreach to key stakeholders, to inclusive post-agreement mechanisms, to public participation through media events, town-hall or mass meetings, or information campaigns (Paffenholz 2014). As a major study on legitimacy and peace processes that reviewed 12 specific cases concluded, what is critical for a process to be legitimate is popular consent – that is, that social and political agreements be accepted in the broadest possible way (Wennmann and Ramsbotham 2014).

Targeted interventions

Data gathering and analysis functions performed by observatories can also underpin proactive conflict resolution interventions, which prove particularly important to conflict management practice. Systems capable of preventing the escalation of conflict or violence may take a variety of innovative forms. In Kenya, for instance, a group of technologists and civic activists built the Ushahidi platform in 2008 in response to election violence, allowing the public to report eyewitness accounts in real time and enable swifter responses. The platform has since been deployed in hundreds of different contexts around the world to support early warning. Recognising that “calls to violent action spread faster over mobile phones and the internet”, local groups in Kenya counter violence using these same tools. For example, the PeaceTXT programme of the NGO *Sisi Ni Amani* uses community informants who report as instigations to violence spread, triggering a targeted SMS with a positive message to people in high-risk areas that interrupts conflict escalation (Puig Larrauri et al. 2015). In other parts of the world, similar projects that incorporate crowd-sourced reporting on violence abound. Additionally, a new strand of early warning systems integrates ‘big data’ feeds – whether from social media or from digital media repositories such as Global Database on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) – to gather opinions and concerns that are not directly solicited (Ibid.).

But effective conflict resolution can be decidedly low-tech as well. Increasing numbers of initiatives draw inspiration from the insight of public health experts, who have noted that violence spreads like a disease, and that it is therefore amenable to strategic interruption points. Programmes deploy trusted members of a local community – from ex-drug runners or gang leaders to religious figures or elders – as ‘violence interrupters’. These community members are trained to intervene in crises, mediate disputes between individuals, and intercede in group disputes to prevent violent events (Slutkin et al. 2014). The role of interrupters in detecting and diffusing conflicts, identifying and treating the highest-risk individuals, and changing social norms is well documented in evaluations showing a measurable reduction in violence due to interrupter programmes (Skogan et al. 2009). The experience of peace mediation similarly underlines the value of ‘insider mediators’ – leaders of civil society organisations, churches, trade unions or business councils who leverage trust, respect and deep knowledge of the dynamics and context of the conflict in conjunction with a high level of legitimacy that is rooted in their social position, personality and skills. The fact that local leaders acting as mediators are connected to, and trusted by, important local constituencies has been found to build trust in processes and outcomes where the state is too weak or illegitimate to do so, de-escalating and managing conflict risks (Mason 2009).

Institutional support

The interdependent facets of conflict management systems – improving conflict-related data and analysis, providing platforms on which to convene diverse stakeholders and build sufficient consensus for action, and intervening to prevent or de-escalate acute conflict risks – will often require professional and institutionalized support to coordinate and sustain them. Ad hoc processes convened directly by stakeholders can die from the exhaustion of planning and managing complex collaborative initiatives that are outside the core mandate or expertise of any participant; as stated the G20 High Level Panel on Infrastructure, partnerships that bring diverse actors together “require their own infrastructure” (c.f. World Bank 2014: 3). Ad hoc processes may also fall prey to wrangling among the players as one or another is perceived to be manipulating the process to achieve its preferred outcome. In the resolution of conflict in particular, companies may face resistance from aggrieved parties until they “relinquish some measure of control over decision-making” (Laplante and Spears 2008: 115). This is because communities must believe that their consent is “enduring, enforceable, and meaningful” before they move “out of their current defensive positions” (Ibid., 69). This also argues for independent institutional support.

Whether under the rubric of ‘mediation support’ or another name, neutral assistance provides important expertise and plays a variety of vital roles. United Nations guidance on effective mediation suggests that, in situations of conflict, it may be necessary to help build relationships of confidence where they do not sufficiently exist among local actors themselves; to facilitate across a variety of actors the participatory analysis of conflict dynamics as well as local strengths and challenges faced in dealing with them; to ensure the careful evaluation of strategic and tactical options for introducing new thinking and new modes of action for conflict prevention into the fragile environment; to provide expert support for the design, management and evaluation of conflict prevention systems; and to engage in consistent outreach to the full range of stakeholders nationally and internationally for coherent action (UN 2012; UNDP and UNEP 2015). A ‘backbone support organization’ that provides services such as neutral facilitation or mediation, technology and communication, data collection and reporting, and administrative

support is therefore increasingly seen as a critical enabler of complex collaborative efforts (Kania and Kramer 2011).

An example of such an institutionalised approach to understanding conflict drivers and acting to prevent conflict escalation can be found in Ghana. There, local Peace Councils operate within a national legislative and institutional framework. They provide a mandate to, and support for, individuals widely considered as eminent personalities in their mediation of local conflicts ranging from land, labour or chieftaincy disputes to differences between and within political parties, backed up with an analysis of the root causes of conflict and capacity building at local and national levels (National Peace Council 2013).

Principles for action

When strategically aligned, the building blocks of peacebuilding practice described above have proven remarkably effective in preventing or de-escalating conflict in a wide range of settings. In reviewing the evidence about why such approaches work several principles stand out.

Prioritise the prevention and reduction of violence and conflict

One key success factor appears to be the relentless focus on the reduction of conflict and violence that follows from these combined approaches. In Colombia in the mid-1990s, for example, the mayors of Medellín and Bogotá represented new political coalitions for anti-violence with a degree of political independence from traditional parties. A broad coalition across left and right, the media and a large part of the business community enabled policies for solving critical problems to take priority over the partisan interests of certain economic elites or municipal bureaucracies. In Cali, by contrast, traditional party politics and competing partisan interests limited violence reduction efforts (Gutierrez et al 2013).

Prioritisation appears to enable another key success factor of conflict and violence reduction, namely the building of will and capacity for integrated approaches. In the Dominican Republic, for example, a programme to address crime and drug trafficking in the Capotillo neighbourhood of Santo Domingo in 2005 simultaneously increased the number of patrols by specially trained police in high-crime areas; provided new street lighting and new public recreational areas; invested in young people by providing new classrooms in schools, cultural workshops and sports clinics; and reached out to the general public with literacy and civic education initiatives. The programme recorded an 85% decline in assaults and robberies during its first two months, and a 70% reduction in homicides over eight months (UNODC and World Bank 2007: 124).

Engage parties on their partisan interests

Successful initiatives in fragile states begin by engaging parties on the basis of their partisan interests. In Kenya, for example, the business community remained peripheral to efforts to contain election violence until it became apparent that brutal and widespread conflict impacted its members, as businesses, directly. In 2008, one year after the contested elections, conflict had contributed to a 24% reduction in flower exports and at least a 40% decline in tourism, costing the tourism industry alone at least US\$270m in lost revenue and more than 140,000 lost jobs. Export losses from the tea industry amounted to US\$2m per day, and tea

estates became a deliberate target of post-election violence (Rukavina de Vidovgrad 2015: 5). Consequently, in the run-up to the elections in 2013, fraught with similar tensions, the business community made an affirmative choice to contribute to conflict prevention initiatives.

Local communities also make choices between conflict and peace based on partisan perceptions. A major study on local strategies for opting out of violent conflict found a rational calculation taking place, even among those who “had fought in other wars”. People would “fight if they felt a war were justified”, yet would opt out if “they simply calculated that the present war made no sense to them” (Anderson and Wallace 2013: 10-11). Pointedly, many actors do not engage in conflict prevention efforts because they have an agenda for peace, but because conflict interferes with their more important priorities.

In urban contexts, a rallying point may be that all stakeholders face risks to their own agendas from conflict and violence. These may jeopardise a mayor's revenue and development plans; a company's operational continuity and reputation; a local NGO's agenda for good governance and human rights; and, most directly, the health, security and economic opportunity of people who are living in the city. As much as these stakeholders may see themselves in opposition to each other on important issues, or fail to agree on a single vision for peaceful development, they share common interests in the effective management of conflict risks that can undermine the achievement of their own goals. Thus, in Kenya, it was possible to rally and organise business, government and civil society actors in collaborative initiatives to ensure the relative peacefulness of the 2013 election. These actors constituted more than 130 district peace committees that played an important role in conflict early warning and preventive action, even as critical political divides between them persisted (Akpedonu 2013: 11-12).

Ensure vertical linkages within the conflict system

Party interests related to conflict and its management play out differently and at the various levels within socio-political system. It is therefore necessary to create vertical linkages – that is, relationships and channels of communication between different levels – in order to manage manifestations of conflict that present locally but can only be managed at a regional, national or international level.

A variety of approaches to institutionalising such vertical linkages are described as ‘infrastructures for peace’ (Odendaal 2013; Kumar and De la Haye 2011). While these approaches predominantly work at the local level, they have connections and operating arrangements at the municipal, provincial or national level. Their main objective is to promote mutual understanding, build trust, solve problems and prevent violence. Positive examples include the National Reconciliation Commission in Nicaragua and the Policing Board in Northern Ireland. At each level of the system, representatives “from within the conflict settings who as individuals enjoy the trust and confidence of one side in the conflict but who as a team provide balance and equity” analyse conflict risk factors and agree on strategies for intervention (Odendaal 2013: 70).

These infrastructures for peace often draw inspiration from the experience of South Africa's National Peace Secretariat, established to supervise the implementation of the 1991 Peace Accord. The national secretariat established eleven regional and more than 260 local peace committees uniting representatives from political organizations, trade unions, business, churches, police and security forces, allowing issues to be managed locally if possible but be quickly

escalated to another level of influence if necessary. It is considered “a major breakthrough that helped to create the space for parties to engage in negotiations to decide the political future of South Africa” (Spies 2002: 20).

Also in the field of armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP), there is evidence of the value of vertically integrated programmes. Most promising approaches are those that “bring together a range of violence prevention and reduction strategies across a number of sectors and purposefully target the key risk factors” of conflict and violence, and that “integrate AVRP objectives and actions into regional, national, and sub-national development plans and programmes” (Eavis 2011: 57-58).

Work within the de-facto political economy

Successfully managing conflict and violence amidst fragility also requires recognition of the existing social and political capital from which effective efforts can be built (Wennmann 2010; Leonard 2008). A typical international intervention may begin with a gap analysis, leading to the familiar litany in descriptions of corrupt governments, divided communities and failed institutions. Yet the absence of functioning government institutions should not be mistaken for the absence of governance mechanisms or public service delivery, especially at sub-national levels. In a rural area where there are no state courts, justice may be delivered through a chieftaincy system that has endured for centuries. In an urban township where the police are unwilling or unable to act, neighbourhood committees may chase down suspects, try them in informal courts and mete out punishment.

Even in the most difficult places, networks of trust and obligation help to ensure that informal taxi drivers keep their vans on the road and that bustling commercial centres thrive in the middle of ‘failed’ states. These locally legitimate structures and institutions, although different from the formal state towards which development agencies are typically oriented, all the same represent “a different and genuine political order” from which conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts can evolve (Boege et al 2009: 606).

Enable accompaniment by outside actors

Many parties are increasingly unwilling to tolerate peacebuilding directed by external interveners, yet they may at the same time be open to accepting such limited but influential roles of external actors who accompany rather than direct them in their efforts to resolve conflict (GPP 2015: 8). In the Philippines, an International Contact Group, comprising both foreign government and international NGOs, supported the peace processes between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Among other services, they provided technical inputs such as meeting design and resources for the parties to draw on in developing framework agreements, and engaged with a wide range of actors to explore new ideas (Conciliation Resources 2015).

Facilitating learning from one conflict context to another may be one accompaniment role of particular importance. In many circumstances, parties fall hostage to their own beliefs that conflict and violence are inevitable (Kohlrieser 2006). They become “unable to communicate with each other, unable to think of a solution that could be attractive to the other side as well as themselves, unable to conceive any side payments or enticements to turn the zero-sum conflict into a positive-sum solution, and unable to turn from commitment and a winning mentality to

problem solving and solutions to grievances" (Zartman 1995: 20). In such cases, accompaniment by outside actors can help to address the narrowed perspectives and broken relationships underpinning fragility. Additionally, offering only advice and experience that the parties themselves will filter and apply in light of their superior understanding of local dynamics helps to protect against the all-too common failure of international interventions that are disconnected from local social and political realities (Anderson et al. 2013; Donini et al. 2005).

Conclusion

This survey illustrates the broad reach of practice available to manage conflict and violence and sustain peace. But it also underlines the important of strategic alignment of many different actors working across institutions and sectors, and from the local to international levels, thereby underlining the inherent characteristic of peacebuilding as collective action process. Whether this is a curse or a blessing is surely deserving of a more systematic analysis, but what this paper suggests in its overall conclusion are three specific aspects of peacebuilding practice:

- Peacebuilding succeeds despite a complex socio-political environment, be that defined by social divisions, legacies of grievance, weak institutions, lack of trust in government, pressing socio-economic challenges, or the presence of spoilers content to exploit or tolerate conflict to meet their narrowly defined interests.
- Positive results emerge from stepping outside of formal, top-down approaches. They build from outreach to atypical actors (and without labelling them), and building systems and institutions on the foundations of those functioning parts of society that are found in even the most fragile contexts.
- The nature of the vast majority of conflict and violence, combined with its purposeful underpinnings, underlines the fact that violence has a strong local dimension. This is why positive results emerge from addressing conflict and violence deliberately and on their own terms in specific local contexts.

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About the authors

Dr Achim Wennmann is Senior Researcher at the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and Executive Coordinator of the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform. **Brian Ganson**, JD, is Head, Africa Centre for Dispute Settlement and Extraordinary Associate Professor, University of Stellenbosch Business School, Cape Town, South Africa. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily reflect the perspectives of the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform or the Technical Working Group.

About the Technical Working Group

The Technical Working Group on the Confluence of Urban Safety and Peacebuilding Practice brings together focal points on urban safety of cities with peacebuilding, peace mediation and conflict prevention practitioners in order to help craft solutions to the rapidly increasing risk of conflict & insecurity in urban settings. It is co-facilitated by the United Nations Office at Geneva, UN-Habitat's Safer Cities Programme and the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform. For more information, see: <http://www.gpplatform.ch/pb-city>.

About the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform

The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is an inter-agency network that connects the critical mass of peacebuilding actors, resources, and expertise in Geneva and worldwide. Founded in 2008, the Platform has a mandate to facilitate interaction on peacebuilding between different institutions and sectors, and to advance new knowledge and understanding of peacebuilding issues and contexts. It also plays a creative role in building bridges between International Geneva, the United Nations peacebuilding architecture in New York, and peacebuilding activities in the field. The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is a joint project of four institutions: The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies; the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP); Interpeace; and the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva (QUNO).