Peacebuilding:
Evolution, Trends, Visions

Retreat synthesis for the White Paper on Peacebuilding

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Introduction

This report summarises a two-day informal retreat that occurred in the framework of the White Paper on Peacebuilding. The retreat was a stocktaking opportunity of the White Paper process and focused on contributions from peacebuilding professionals from the field and different sectors.

The synthesis presented in this report draws on the retreat's discussions and on several commissioned documents. These documents included: 9 draft regional peacebuilding analyses (Southern Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central America, South America, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, North Africa and Europe); a draft report on the past, present and future of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (prepared by the Centre on International Cooperation of New York University); reports on 4 White Paper consultations; and an analysis of 21 confidential interviews with peacebuilding professionals.

The retreat revealed many divergent perspectives, issues and trends. This report distils this substance into 23 themes as a contribution to reflections on the White Paper on Peacebuilding (see Table 1 for an overview). Overall, the report seeks to represent the full spectrum of views and focuses on overall trends and perceptions at the regional or sub-regional level.

This report is structured along the three objectives of the White Paper on Peacebuilding. The first section looks at the evolution and practice trends of the broader peacebuilding universe. The second section reports on the discussion on UN peacebuilding and its comparative advantage. The third section reflects on several visions for building peace in violent and fragile contexts. Annex 1 and 2 provide details on the programme and list of participants. This report has been drafted under Chatham House Rules.[1]

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[1] The retreat occurred under Chatham House Rules. Under this rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed as a source of this information.

The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is a joint project of four institutions:

Table 1: Overview of emerging themes

Broader peacebuilding universe	UN peacebuilding	Visions for the future
1. Building peace – a long tradition	9. Building peace – central to the UN's founding mandate	17. Rehabilitating the practice of building peace
2. 'Peacebuilding' – terminology	10. 'Peacebuilding' as UN vocabulary	18. Preparing the UN to address future risks to peace
3. Future risks to peace – the changing strategic landscape	11. A momentum for peacebuilding – the UN Peacebuilding Architecture	19. Bridging the gap between demand and supply for peacebuilding support
4. Peacebuilding practice – constant innovation	12. The UN and peacebuilding practice	20. Peacebuilding as accompaniment
5. Peacebuilding practice – no unified perception	13. Diplomatic accompaniment	21. Multi-stakeholder frameworks for inclusive peacebuilding
6. Field-level convergence – principles of building peace	14. The UN as convener	22. Representation and political parties
7. Securitisation – peacebuilding overpowered	15. Technical assistance and logistics	23. Peacebuilding financing
8. Political economy issues	16. Field-headquarters dynamics	24. Towards peacebuilding sensitivity

Evolution and practice trends of the broader peacebuilding universe

1. Building peace – a long tradition

The practice of building peace has long-established roots.[2] Peacebuilding often draws on traditional practices to resolve disputes and conflict, and to promote social harmony. While much of this practice does not use the word 'peacebuilding' to describe its activities, it nevertheless understands this practice to be about the use of dialogue, trust-building and consensus-seeking to resolve or manage conflict through non-violent means. In most regions of the world, there are significant capacities and relationships that manage violent and non-violent conflict. In some regions, such capacities and relationships are part of the traditional cultural heritage.

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[2] For two recent reviews on peacebuilding thought and practice see for instance V.Chetail and O. Jütersonke (2014) 'Introduction' in V.Chetail and O. Jütersonke (eds) *Peacebuilding: Critical Concept in Political Science - Volume 1*. Abingdon: Routledge; and R. Mac Ginty (2014) 'Introducing the SAGE Major Work on Peacebuilding' in R. Mac Ginty (ed) *Peacebuilding: Ideas and Foundations (Volume 1)*. London: Sage, pp. xxi-xxxvi.

2. 'Peacebuilding' – terminology

The terminology of 'peacebuilding' was initially associated with Peace Studies in the 1970s and 1980s.[3] In Peace Studies, the popular distinction between 'positive' peace (condition of good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships) and 'negative' peace (the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war) underlines that peacebuilding has been both about ending violent conflict and about building mature relationships to manage and mitigate violent or non-violent conflict.[4] In the UN system, the 1992 Agenda for Peace introduced the terminology of 'peacebuilding' more systematically into UN vocabulary. Prior to the Agenda for Peace, some retreat participants reported from their own experiences that in the early 1990s UN actors would look at 'peacebuilding' as something that would be mainly done by non-governmental organisations. But, at the time of the hand-over between Secretary-Generals Perez de Cuellar and Boutros Boutros Ghali, it was recognised that the UN could engage in certain 'peace inducing' activities that did not really fall into the UN's existing 'peacekeeping', 'peacemaking' or 'good offices' roles. Hence the need for a new term that would describe these activities.

3. Future risks to peace – the changing strategic landscape

Over the last few years, present knowledge about future risks to peace has become clearer.[5] Future risks to peace evolve from pressures on dispute resolution systems at all levels (local, national, regional, international). These pressures emerge, for instance, from demographic trends (more people, more old people, more people in cities), economic trends (more uneven growth and inequality), political shifts (diffusion of power, hybrid political orders, less control by states), environmental pressures (more natural disasters) and a changing nature of armed violence (more deaths associated with criminal or non-war violence).[6] These risk factors manifest themselves differently in different context and in some contexts they are already a present reality.

As part of the new strategic landscape there is also a significant diffusion of actors in conflict affected contexts ranging from a diverse array of foreign government departments (e.g. humanitarian, diplomatic, develop, military) or from different sectors (business, civil society, organised crime).[7] Retreat discussions highlighted, however, that the level of diffusion is different across and within regions with some contexts experiencing a high density of actors while others receive hardly any attention. The level of diffusion of actors within conflict-affected societies has made it more difficult to distinguish between who is an insider and who is an outsider. In many contexts, outside actors are so heavily integrated into national political systems that the distinction between insiders or outsiders has become blurred.

Discussions on future risk to peace and changing strategic landscapes also raised the question whether there is a potential gap between existing dispute resolution and peacebuilding capabilities, and future capacity needs to mitigate and manage conflict and risks to peace.

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[3] For a history of the peacebuilding terminology, see S. Ryan, 'The Evolution of Peacebuilding', in R. Mac Ginty (ed) *Peacebuilding: Ideas and Foundations (Volume 1)* (London: Sage, 2014) pp. 1-13.

[4] K.E. Boulding, *Stable Peace* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978) ; J. Galtung, 'Three Realistic Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding', *Impact of Science on Society* 26: pp. 103-115, 1978.

[5] See for instance J.C Glenn, T.J. Gordon and E. Florescu, *2013-2014 State of the Future* (Washington D.C: The Millennium Project, 2014).

[6] This analysis draws from E. Ferris, 'Megatrends and the Future of Humanitarian Action', *International Review of the Red Cross* 93: 884, pp. 915-938, 2011.

[7] National Intelligence Council (NIC), *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* (Washington D.C.: NIC, 2012).

More work may be needed to substantiate the nature of this gap and what specific types of dispute resolution or peacebuilding practice may need scaling efforts.

4. Peacebuilding practice – constant innovation

Innovation is critical to building peace because peacebuilding practice is constantly required to adapt to changing situations and context dynamics. Over the last decade, innovation in the broader peacebuilding field is illustrated by the practice of national dialogue frameworks, local peace committees, architectures for peace, constitutional review processes or urban safety strategies.[8] Participants noted that connecting practice across contexts and continents can foster important innovation. However, the emphasis is on translating practice that worked elsewhere into a specific local context, and not on the export of 'blue print' solutions.

The broader peacebuilding practice has been driven by a diverse set of actors ranging from different government departments, non-governmental organisations, religious groups, companies or local community leaders. Within the UN, peacebuilding practice has been advanced by operational departments or programmes relating to peacekeeping, political affairs, development or operations. In business, focus on non-securitised risk management has become more prominent as part of the strategies to protect key investment assets. The role of the Catholic Church has been particularly important in some Latin American settings. Different faith-based organisations distinguish themselves through their network of grassroots peacebuilders. Retreat participants also highlighted that civil society has played key roles in contexts where the UN has not been able to operate because of capacity or political constraints.

5. Peacebuilding practice – no unified perception

There is a large spectrum of views about what constitutes action that is called 'peacebuilding'.[9] Peacebuilding can be understood as an umbrella term that shelters various other activities and concepts. It can also be understood as a label for a concrete activity with an associated theory of change. Finally, peacebuilding can be understood as a way of working – meaning specific activities that take account of several key principles.

Peacebuilding practice can mean something different to different policy communities. While perceptions are never uniform in any specific community, there is a tendency that state representatives and officials from international organisations associate peacebuilding practice with the UN, its peacebuilding architecture or operational departments. Retreat participants also underline that many peacebuilding professionals with strong field experience (including many from the UN) distinguish between the community-level, cross-sectorial and bottom-up nature of peacebuilding practice and the politics within the UN related to UN activities that are labelled 'peacebuilding'.

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[8] See for instance A. Odendaal, *Local Peace Committees and National Peacebuilding* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2013); M.Brandt, J. Cottrell, Y. Ghai and A. Regan, *Constitution-making and Reform Options for the Process* (Geneva: Interpeace, 2011); K. Pappagianni, *National Dialogue Processes in Political Transition*, Civil Society Dialogue Network Discussion Paper No.3. (Geneva and Brussels: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2014); C. Kumar, 'Building National Infrastructures for Peace: UN Assistance for Internally Negotiated Solutions to Violent Conflict' in S. Allen Nan Z. Mampilly and A. Bartoli (eds) *Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011) pp. 384-399; R. Ricigliano, *Making Peace Last: A Toolbox for Sustainable Peacebuilding* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012).

[9] See Alliance for Peacebuilding, *Peacebuilding 2.0: Mapping the Boundaries of an Expanding Field* (Washington D.C. Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2011).

The perceptions about the nature of peacebuilding practice also vary between and within regions. For instance, many UN activities and programmes in Africa occur under the label 'peacebuilding', while that label is hardly ever used for UN activities in Latin America. Retreat discussions noted that some Latin America governments have reservations about labelling specific UN activities as 'peacebuilding', due to fears of outside intervention and internationalising problems related to criminal violence and insecurity. Retreat participants highlighted that in the case of Latin America, the absence of activities labelled 'peacebuilding' does not mean that there is no dynamic peacebuilding community in Latin America. In some contexts, this community originated in civil society mobilisation against political and social exclusion and injustice, and violence reduction and prevention, especially in urban environments.

6. Field-level convergence – principles of building peace

Discussions at the retreat suggest that there is some level of convergence about key principles of building peace. Peacebuilding is a profoundly local and a locally-owned effort, is driven largely by national or sub-national actors, networks or institutions, and is something political and multi-dimensional. Peacebuilding cannot be delegated entirely to any specific local, national or international actor – it is a multi-stakeholder and cross-sectorial process that unfolds over sometimes long periods of time. Peacebuilding can also involve targeted international accompaniment – outsiders lending expertise and advice to locally shaped and guided plans and processes. Participants also highlight that the need for dealing with the past and the need for setting the foundations for a better future are often inextricably intertwined, but are addressed differently across contexts. Key issues include the importance of creating jobs to move on after violence and of understanding and recognising the past so as to provide opportunities for community and individual healing.

7. Securitisation – peacebuilding overpowered

In many regions of the world, peacebuilding practice has been overpowered by the discourse and practices of securitised approaches to manage violent and non-violent conflict. This is a significant concern for peacebuilders, who are seeing securitised strategies as a limited way for dealing with underlying risks to peace. While there is a strong evidence base in Latin America that securitised responses have not had the desired effect for armed violence reduction and prevention,[10] retreat participants observed that some of the same type of responses are currently used in different African contexts with potentially similar results of feeding spirals of violence, especially in urban centres.

Some retreat participants also saw that advocacy for non-violent and peaceful responses to crises and conflict is largely overpowered by many government or commercial actors pushing for violent or securitised responses. This is evidenced in many of the fluid conflict and transformation settings in the Middle East and North and West Africa where the export of small arms and military hardware has completely overshadowed investments in non-violent dispute resolution.

The reason for the advocacy asymmetry between the securitisation and peacebuilding practice may be related to the fact that securitised approaches receive a much more consistent lobbying support, backed by political and commercial interests in the defence sector. In comparison, the peacebuilding field has no consistent government or private sector lobby

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[10] United Nations Development Programme, *Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America* (New York: UNDP, 2013).

support. This has led to arguments that there should be a more serious effort to privatise peacebuilding (especially through actors based in conflict- and violence-affected contexts) as a means to scale peacebuilding efforts and increase the diffusion of peacebuilding practice in government and business sectors.

Despite the rise of securitised responses, there are defence or military departments of some states that have become more interested in peacebuilding approaches. This has partly been related to the negative experience of an over-reliance on military or securitised strategies and the importance to establish long-term relationships with local communities, especially as part of anti-terror strategies. There is not necessarily a dichotomy between the approaches; rather, it is important to better understand how peacebuilding approaches can or should be integrated into securitised responses. In pursuing closer collaboration, it is important that peacebuilding actors (particularly when they are coming from outside a specific setting) do not become inadvertently associated with groups that espouse overtly securitised responses. This may in turn limit entry points for supporting peacebuilding.

8. Political economy issues

In response to a funding crunch for many country-level programmes, for-profit motives have played a more dominant role for organisations, especially in conflict and post-conflict contexts with significant donor interests. Key trends include the artificial inflation of the range of interventions from local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or UN programmes, and prioritised resource mobilisation to cover overhead costs over delivering on needs and ensuring local ownership. Some participants have also highlighted that some organisations started trying to establish monopolistic control over specific concepts (e.g. peacebuilding, conflict prevention, mediation, resilience) as a means to control an operational space and its associated funding streams.

As a result of these developments, discussions during the retreat suggests that many UN programmes or departments found themselves in the competitive market for the implementation of national or international programmes. In some settings UN actors mobilised their special relationships with donor and host governments to become the 'partner of choice' with criteria to award contracts to be mainly dominated by politics. Some retreat participants related stories of the increase of collusion in some contexts, especially between national governments and UN actors to convince donors to fund specific national programmes mainly to assure funding for cash-strapped national government departments and local UN Offices. In a similar way, NGOs have been said to collude with foreign donor agendas by responding to narrow funding incentives, even if these are not necessarily aligned with local peacebuilding needs.

During the retreat, participants questioned the long-term sustainability of UN agencies in the competitive market for programme implementation in the peacebuilding field. They argued that the UN provides services that could be provided by local actors much more cost-effectively, that many UN actors lack a context- and conflict- sensitivity, and that UN actors are too closely aligned with host or donor government interests and thereby distort the peacebuilding space.

2. UN peacebuilding and its comparative advantage

9. Building peace – central to the UN's founding mandate

Building peace is central to the United Nations and has been one of the principle founding rationales of the UN system. The Preamble of the 1945 UN Charter provides an unequivocal mandate to the United Nations to build peace, especially in order to 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war', 'to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small' and 'to promote social progress and better standards of life'. While the terminology of 'peacebuilding' was not used in the Charter, the founding of the UN in the aftermath of the Second World War was a principle reason for its creation, as well as for the creation of many specialised agencies and other international organisations.

10. 'Peacebuilding' as UN vocabulary

In 1990s, 'peacebuilding' became more systematically integrated into UN vocabulary. The 1992 Agenda for Peace defined peacebuilding as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'. The Agenda for Peace conceived peacebuilding as part of a sequence of conflict stages that spans from pre-conflict preventive diplomacy to peacemaking to peacekeeping and, ultimately, to 'post-conflict' peacebuilding.

The Agenda for Peace had the tendency to relate peacebuilding practice to the aftermath of inter-state and civil wars and to an intellectual tradition of liberal internationalism. For some retreat participants, the association of peacebuilding to liberal internationalism illustrates the deviation of UN peacebuilding from peacebuilding practices at the community level and the historical record of managing violent and non-violent conflict. The association of peacebuilding to liberal internationalism has also led to the perception of some that 'peacebuilding' is about outside intervention in their sovereign affairs by the UN or other states.

11. A momentum for peacebuilding – the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

There was momentum for peacebuilding at the time of the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA). This momentum evolved between 2003 and 2005, and was strong with respect to a UN response to build synergies and coherence on peacebuilding, to act as a knowledge hub, and to help facilitate resource mobilisation, strategy and advocacy for specific post-conflict countries. The PBA was also considered a solution for the lack of rapidly available funds that would respond to peacebuilding crises and opportunities, and to promote the coherence of UN and donor performance on the ground.

Support and interest in the PBA declined over time. The CIC-NYU study found that 'a steady decline in PBC [Peacebuilding Commission] ambition and countries' interest in it and a growth in prominence of other UN and international actors who are charged with forging international coherence, coupled with low consensus on the strategic vision, objectives and ambition of the PBA within the PBC and the UN system, have become significant factors preventing the PBC and the PBSO [Peacebuilding Support Office] from evolving into a more significant institutional force

beyond the recognised efforts of the individual chairs of the CSCs [Country-Specific Configurations] and the PBF [Peacebuilding Fund]'.[11]

The PBA also mainly focused on the coherence of peacebuilding within the UN system and in relation to the interests of UN member states, and thereby became increasingly dissociated from broader non-state practice to build peace. As the role of civil society has grown and come to constitute a group of major actors in the peacebuilding field, and no modalities for exchange between the PBA and civil society was included in the design of the PBA, some retreat participants report a disconnect between civil society and UN efforts in the peacebuilding field.

12. The UN and peacebuilding practice

Over the last two decades, peacebuilding has become increasingly integrated into a diversity of UN departments. While the PBA was intended to act in an advisory role for the UN Security Council, the operational dimension of peacebuilding remained under control of the operational departments related to peacekeeping, political affairs and good offices, development and field operations. On the operational front, therefore, peacebuilding has been mainly driven by different UN Departments.

Retreat discussion noted that UN peacebuilding practice relates to the dimensions of the UN as a diplomatic forum of members states and as a body that mobilises member state support 'to get things done somewhere'. With respect to the operational dimensions, many 'peace operations' have been limited to few countries and faces challenges to scaling-up activities. Deployment has also been subject to the consent of key member states leading to inaction in different situations. In some situation this has led to the operational space to be filled by other actors. Some retreat participants also relate stories about the UN's struggle to remain an accepted peacebuilding actor in many parts of the world, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. What is more, they highlight the vulnerability of UN programmes and agencies to host government consent to activities, which can be particularly sensitive for playing peacebuilding roles. In some contexts, UN agencies adapted to constraints.

Over the last two decades, peacebuilding practice within the UN has evolved. Many activities in the field did not use the label 'peacebuilding', but this does not mean that 'peacebuilding' practice has stalled within the UN. For instance, retreat participants pointed to the fact that the UN has strengthened its support capacities, especially for governments, regional organisations and a specific constellation of conflict parties. Most of such assistance occurs discretely and is illustrated by the PBC Country Configuration Chairs, the growing number of peace and development advisory, the expert teams of the Mediation Support Unit of the Department of Political Affairs, as well as a whole series of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. The UN has also embarked on new partnerships with civil society, such as with the International Peacebuilding Advisory Team. One question the retreat discussions posed is how the UN would need to scale and adjust these capacities in order to better respond to the changing nature of conflict and the future risks to peace.

13. Diplomatic accompaniment

As the world's foremost diplomatic forum of states, the UN can play an important contribution to national political transformation especially through diplomatic accompaniment – similar to the one provided currently by the Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission. Such diplomatic

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[11] S. Hearn, A. Kubitschek Bujones and A. Kugel, *United Nations "Peacebuilding Architecture": Past Present Future* (New York: Centre on International Cooperation of New York University, 2014) p.7.

accompaniment can include mediation functions between specific governments and donors, especially to convince governments to adhere to a reform plan and to convince donors to deliver on pledge support. The UN can also serve as a conduit for discrete contacts at the state-level on peacebuilding issues.

14. The UN as convener

Due to its recognition as a representative body of member states, the UN enjoys a certain degree of authority in some contexts when it comes to carrying out peacebuilding roles. In many conflict-affected societies, the UN is seen as a bridge between civil society and the state, often bringing together actors that would not otherwise sit together. But there is also an observable trend in some regions – notably in North Africa and the Middle East – where the UN is struggling to remain perceived as an acceptable partner. This is especially an issue with the large youth populations in these countries. In some South American contexts, the convening role of the United Nations has been limited due to the perception that it was too close to the interests of certain member states – hence underlining the strategic tension between the UN Secretary-General's Good Offices mandate and the interests of key UN member states. In contexts where the UN's convening capacity is limited, other non-state actors without an apparent agenda in a specific conflict have frequently acted as conveners.

15. Technical assistance and logistical support

Over the last decade the UN has also developed specific technical assistance capacities to assist countries and societies to address their own peacebuilding challenges. For instance and joint efforts of UNDP and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) can deploy Peace and Development Advisors, and DPA's Mediation Support Unit represents a standing technical capacity for peace processes. Through, its governance work, UNDP has provided critical support to national and sub-national institutions by providing technical assistance for infrastructures for peace. It has also assisted local actors in designing, implementing and monitoring armed violence reduction and prevention programmes. UNHABITAT has increasingly networked its urban safety experience with city administrations, for example through the Global Network on Safer Cities. By supporting regional and sub-regional actors to engage with different national partners, the UN can help strengthen the sustainability and coherence of peacebuilding efforts. An often overlooked fact is that in many countries with major infrastructure or communication challenges, the UN has been providing critical transport and logistical support for a range of peacebuilding efforts. A critical challenge for the UN's peace-inducing activities is their ability to scale-up and therefore approximate capacity more closely to the needs for assistance.

16. Field-headquarters dynamics

There has also been a large difference on the UN's peacebuilding role among headquarters and field office staff. More independence from headquarters for country offices meant a much more flexible approach to peacebuilding challenges and the possibility to think outside the UN box to devise ingenuous strategies. Some retreat participants noted that many peacebuilding professionals frequently observe that the UN is most successful when there was initiative on the part of local UN leadership, even if this meant operating outside the bounds of a country plan. But, some participants also felt that there was a trend to discourage leadership towards more bureaucratic disciplining.

3. Visions for building peace

17. Rehabilitating the practice of building peace

One of the outcomes of the retreat has been a shared feeling that there is a need to rehabilitate the practice of building peace. There are many practitioner stories about a gap between the local needs for building peace and what international organisations and donors supply to build peace.[12] The practice of peacebuilding within the UN system has also led to a perception of peacebuilding as an 'outside intervention' through 'missions' or 'programmes', and that peacebuilding mainly occurs at the level of states and international organisations. This perception does not coincide with large parts of peacebuilding practice, including its community-based, multi-stakeholder, context-sensitive, inclusive and bottom-up nature. One way to advance a rehabilitation of peacebuilding practice could be to develop key principles of building peace that clarify the key attributes of peacebuilding practice, as well as the different roles of actors in peacebuilding processes.

18. Preparing the UN to address future risks to peace

Is the UN 'fit for purpose' in the peacebuilding field? Is it fit to address future risks to peace? What will be its specific role in addressing future risks to peace? Given the current tensions between major UN member states, no significant structural reforms are likely to be forthcoming soon. In previous decades, it was possible to advance major reforms in periods of a relative convergence of interests among UN members states, as illustrated by the 1992 Agenda for Peace, which remains the cornerstone for the UN's present day institutional design.

Since 1992, the world around the UN has changed and the risks to peace are largely different from those over 20 years ago.[13] The retreat highlighted that other international organisations – notably the World Bank – are showing that major institutional adjustments are necessary and possible. Given the significance of the changing future risks to peace, a limited discussion on the reforms of the UN's peacebuilding architecture may miss the point to address the organisational barriers within the UN to becoming better prepared to face the future landscape of conflict and insecurity.

Some retreat participants highlighted that without institutional change, the UN may become increasingly less important in helping others strengthen their capacities and relationships to building peace, and less connected to the practical cutting edge in this field. Without institutional change, the UN may also become more associated with merely occupying a bureaucratic space in the peacebuilding field, rather than with performing the functions for

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[12] See for instance M. Bradbury and S. Healy (eds.), *Whose Peace is it Anyway: Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking*, Accord No.21)London: Conciliation Resources in collaboration with Interpeace, 2010); M. B. Anderson, D. Brown and I. Jean, *Time to Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid* (Cambridge: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2013); A. Donini, L. Minear, I. Smillie, T. van Baarda and A. C. Welch, *Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the Perceptions of Local Communities, Peace Support Organizations and External Aid Agencies*, (Medford: Feinstein International Famine Centre, 2005); S. Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); P.Uvin, *Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi* (London: Zed Books, 2009).

[13] A. Wennmann (ed), *20 Years of 'An Agenda for Peace': A New Vision for Conflict Prevention?* Paper 5 (Geneva: Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2012).

which it has been created – a tendency that has been well documented in scholarship about the UN.[14]

19. Bridging the gap between demand and supply for peacebuilding support

A recurring story of peacebuilding professionals is that the supply of international peacebuilding assistance does not necessarily coincide with what is really needed for sustainable local peacebuilding.[15] They also report that much official peacebuilding assistance has been captured by national political elites or by UN funds and programmes, especially assistance focused on institution or statebuilding. Support for strengthening relationships between key states, civil society or political parties has been much needed in many contexts, but much less frequently supported. For instance, the 'statebuilding' focus in peacebuilding has largely focused on institutional designs – sometimes ill-suited to managing existing political orders – but has neglected the support of political parties as broad based, participatory political platforms that can contribute to a more inclusive representation in domestic politics.

20. Peacebuilding as accompaniment

Building peace is a local effort driven through processes that are locally-owned and determined by the constellation of actors, power and dynamics unique to a specific context. What practice over the last 25 years has shown is that a wholesale export of a specific outside model of peacebuilding or statebuilding has not always been conducive to establishing sustainable peace – on the contrary, in some contexts foreign dominated reform agendas have increased risks to peace. Some actors in peacebuilding contexts are becoming tired of 'post-colonial' attitudes of UN actors and donors.

Assistance to building peace is much more about accompaniment of local actors building peace – lending expertise and advice to locally-shaped and guided plans and processes. More work is necessary to understand the workings of accompaniment, especially with respect to differentiated roles and responsibilities. For instance, diplomatic accompaniment of governments could be channelled via the PBC, but accompaniment of discrete processes is mainly the domain of private mediators. Moreover, professional networks have been more flexible and independent than state-based institutions to provide accompaniment with expertise.

Another question is 'who will be accompanied?' with a possible answer pointing to strengthen accompaniment of local change-makers. These are individuals with a strong risk-taking and leadership profile, who are networked across political, social or commercial stakeholders.

21. Multi-stakeholder frameworks for inclusive peacebuilding

Building peace is a multi-dimensional and multi-sectorial challenge, but most UN peacebuilding support has focused on the state-level and the UN system. To enhance the inclusiveness and sustainability of peace, there needs to be much stronger cross-sectorial working modalities. At present, the PBA has remained largely closed to participation from actors outside the UN system. For instance, there are no formal mechanisms for inclusion of civil society or business actors. In comparison, the Human Rights Council – created around the same time as the PBA – has much more inclusive ways of working.

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[14] M. N. Barnett and M. Finnmore, 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', *International Organization*, 53: 4, 1999 pp. 699-732.
[15] See for instance S. Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and Everyday Politics of International Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Also in the field, more work is needed to test the working modalities of multi-stakeholder action frameworks for inclusive peacebuilding. Such action frameworks connect to the rational of the broader peacebuilding space to be composed of multiple and sometimes overlapping political processes with different constituencies. Multi-stakeholder design allows for inclusive peacebuilding reaching out to all-important stakeholders, which can include difficult actors. They can also include politically or economically marginalised segments of society. While important progress has been made in practice of national dialogues, architectures for peace, or constitutional reviews, more work is needed to develop a better understanding of roles and responsibilities of different actors.

22. Representation and political parties

Retreat participants highlighted that there are hardly any visions for the development of political parties that can participate in more consensual and representative domestic politics and political institutions. Channelling outside peacebuilding assistance to a mosaic of local governmental or non-governmental organisations has, in most cases, not been conducive to the development of new political parties that can consistently participate in a political arena and negotiate political transitions. In Latin America, peacebuilding professionals observe a feeling of an ever more reduced participatory political space and that mainstream political parties are no longer related to representing the will or interests of different segments of society, but about protecting vested interest in a state's major financial or natural resource assets.

23. Peacebuilding financing

At present, there is no integrated analysis and monitoring of patterns and flows of peacebuilding funding. While such an effort would involve a significant methodological and data collection effort, it would be important to identify current trends and gaps. Key questions could be: What are the key trends and patters of peacebuilding funding? What is peacebuilding funding globally? Who pays for what in peacebuilding? What range of activities fall under 'peacebuilding' from a funding perspective? What is the ratio of funding of peacebuilding within the UN system *versus* outside the UN system?

This effort could be inspired by the efforts in the humanitarian field on 'preparedness funding' or by the annual statistics on the flows of development aid. A better understanding of the spectrum of peacebuilding support could also be to establish a baseline as a reference for assessments on trends in peacebuilding financing.

There is also more innovation in peacebuilding financing needed. The retreat found that many peacebuilding professionals think that the model of funding peacebuilding through external donor support or funds will become increasingly unsustainable in the future. Not only may foreign funds dry up in times of budget constraints, they also contribute to a distortion of the peacebuilding space, especially by providing incentives for specific peacebuilding approaches that may be ill-suited for a specific context. The reliance on outside support can also reduce the long-term prospects of a peacebuilding, prevention and violence reduction efforts, because it tends to reduce the ownership of these efforts by local actors. Issues of control of financing mechanisms are extremely context specific and require a good understanding of the political economy of a specific context.

24. Towards peacebuilding sensitivity

There is no shortage of conflict analysis tools for peacebuilding contexts. But there seems to be a tendency that these tools focus more on the conflict than on opportunities for building peace.

As a result there is more emphasis on structured responses to conflict prevention or violence reduction, than on drivers for peace and needs for capacity and relationship-building. While in the development sector, 'conflict sensitivity' has become a standard part of the analytical inventory, more work may be necessary to identify what 'peacebuilding sensitivity' would mean – perhaps a shorthand for the principles to consider for national or international programmes that occur in the context of (violent) political transformations or transitions. Better understanding of 'peacebuilding sensitivity' could have a potential impact in many different sectors, including for instance trade, labour, humanitarian assistance or human rights.

Annex 1: Programme

Sunday, 4 May 2014

Afternoon – arrival of participants
19.00 – Welcome Dinner

Monday, 5 May 2014

10.00 Introductions & scene setting
10.30 Session 1: Group work on key retreat objectives
12.00 Lunch
14.00 Session 2: The broader peacebuilding universe
15.30 Break
16.00 Session 3: Situating UN peacebuilding within this broader peacebuilding universe
17.30 Free time
19.00 Dinner

Tuesday, 6 May 2014

9.00 Session 4: Visions for building peace
10.30 Break
11.00 Session 5: The 10 year review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture: Past, present, future
12.30 Lunch
14.00 Session 6: Review, gaps, next steps
16.00 Departure

Annex 2: Participants

1. Andrea Aeby, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to UN, Geneva, Switzerland
2. Souhail Belhadj, Research Associate, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland
3. Antonio Bernales, Executive Director, Futuro Sostenible, Lima, Perú
4. Susanna Campbell, Post-Doctoral Researcher, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland
5. Nicolás Cisneros, Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding, United Nations Environment Programme, International Environment House, Geneva, Switzerland
6. Caty Clément, Senior Programme Advisor and Senior Fellow, Leadership, Crisis and Conflict Management Programme, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Geneva, Switzerland
7. Brian Ganson, Centre of African Dispute Settlement, Stellenbosch Business School, Cape Town, South Africa
8. Rita Grünenfelder, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations and International Organisations Division, Directorate of Political Affairs, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

9. Diane Hendrick, Representative Peace and Disarmament, Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, Switzerland
10. Jok Madut Jok, Co-founder, The Sudd Institute (South Sudan), Los Angeles, USA
11. Anne Kahl, Programme Specialist, Conflict Prevention, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme, New York, USA
12. Donato Kiniger-Passigli, Coordinator, Fragile States and Disaster Response, ILO, Geneva Switzerland
13. Alejandra Kubitschek Bujones, Program Officer, NYU Center on International Cooperation, New York, USA
14. Lawrence Lachmansingh, Peace and Governance Advisor, UNDP Accra, Ghana
15. Renée Larivière, Deputy Director-General for Development and Learning, Interpeace, Geneva, Switzerland
16. Miriam Maluwa, Chief-Office of Security & Humanitarian Affairs (SHUA), UNAIDS, Geneva, Switzerland
17. Sabine Meitzel, Trade Development Consultant, horizon2030, Switzerland
18. Angela Rivas, Coordinador, Private Sector, Conflict and Peacebuilding, Fundación Ideas para la Paz, Bogota, Colombia
19. Julian Schweitzer, Consultant, Fragile States and Disaster Response, ILO, Geneva, Switzerland.
20. Mirjana Spoljaric, Deputy Head of United Nations and International Organizations Division, Directorate of Political Affairs, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland
21. Caroline Tissot, Programme Manager, Post-Conflict Transition (Recovery and Peacebuilding), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC, Global Institutions Division, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland
22. Andrew Tomlinson, Director & Quaker UN Representative, Quaker United Nations Office, New York, USA
23. Achim Wennmann, Executive Coordinator, Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, Geneva, Switzerland