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

Conceptions of Peace and Security in Contemporary Europe

Probing possibilities for peacebuilding in 2020 and beyond

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CAPSTONE GLOBAL SECURITY TRACK: Academic Research

Conceptions of Peace and Security in Contemporary Europe: probing possibilities for peacebuilding in 2020 and beyond.

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Executive Summary

As Europe has observed many preoccupant events unfolding in the last decade – the Russian annexation of Crimea and parallel wars in the Donbas since 2014, the migration crisis that hit most southern European nations, and recent inter-state military conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh – many experts and peacebuilders have shifted their attention to the European continent. In this contribution, we study the different conceptions of "peace" and "security" in six case studies – Germany, France, Sweden, Spain, Ukraine and the UK – linking them with European security institutions such as: the OSCE, NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe, etc. By coupling academic literature of international relations and strategic studies with interviews of policymakers, experts and practitioners of the field, we give a comprehensive picture of the state of affairs of "peace" and "security" for these case studies, while drawing inferences to Europe as a whole.

Concerning the cases of study, our findings concluded that:

Germany works intensively to rethink its strategy by seeking to keep a balance between Washington and Moscow, by incorporating "human security" dimensions such as the SDGs and by collaborating closely with France in the creation of a European Defense Force.

France continues to advocate for Europeanization while giving priority to its national interests, by affirming its "great power" status in using its expeditionary capacity in the MENA and the Mediterranean regions.

Sweden plans to increase its defense spending by 40% citing the Russian threat in the Baltic Sea, and despite its traditional non-involvement in European affairs, will increase its institutional cooperation with the EU and NATO.

Spain continues to securitize migration in Europe with the establishment of tightened border security and partnership with Morocco to stem flows of migrants. It will use its position in the Mediterranean and MENA region to follow these objectives, while collaborating with its EU and NATO partners, calling into question the rights and securities of migrants themselves.

Ukraine, Europe's warzone, should work to include IDPs and those affected by the conflict in multi-track peacebuilding efforts. Multilateral formats such as the Normandy Format will be of great importance for a resolution of the conflict, but Ukraine must address IDP issues, especially the vulnerabilities the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated, to find a lasting peace.

The United Kingdom desires a world order where it can act unilaterally, thereby forcing the British to act in cooperation with the very union it chose to leave. Arguably, the UK might also be forced to turn inwards in the coming years to deal with its security concerns.

The institutional security framework of Europe is undoubtedly the densest in the world. Whereas the EU is an institution focused on human development, empowerment of the rule of law and establishment of democratic and juridical accountability, NATO is usually seen as a complementary organization with its concentration on hard and military security of members. Hence a certain complementarity between these institutions is sometimes assumed, that is largely put into questions by differing agendas, notably because of the leadership of the United States within NATO and the persistent primacy of member nations' interests in the EU. Studying the interactions between these organizations and others like the OSCE that implement numerous forums, dialogues, and codes of conduct are crucial to understand the defense architecture that frames European states' perceptions of "peace" and "security".

In addition, the current trends of defense are greatly affecting the way we understand the notions of "peace" and "security". Concepts of cyber warfare, terrorism, shared intelligence challenges, racism and migrations issues are all factors that contribute in complexifying the

field of European "peace" and "security". Add to this the ongoing crisis of COVID-19, and one can see a strain on European collective action institutions and on its ideals of cooperation. If history records the 2020 decade as the one which saw the resurgence of direct conflict within Europe, we will also have to remember the elements of relative stability in the continent: the lack of threat of inter-state conflict between its main members and the ongoing political and economic integration of these powers; the successfulness of Europe's security institutions such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE; and the desirability of its model of governance.

II: Study description

1. Background and Context

In recent decades, most of Europe's international peacebuilding sector has focused its attention on conflict-affected countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, providing project and policy support to peace-making, and post-conflict support efforts. However, it is evident that European countries are now confronting rising peace and security challenges at home, thus requiring new reflexivity on what peacebuilding means at regional, national and local levels. The rise of nationalism, populist politics and extremism are calling into question the foundations of Western liberal democracy, while deepening inequality, economic hardships and everyday violence raise questions about how inclusive notions of "peace" actually are. The influx of migration from conflict-affected and "fragile" states since 2015 has further challenged notions of "peace" and "security". Further, Europe continues to face the asymmetric risks of terrorism. On the other hand, the rise of Euroscepticism has led to a broader rethinking of the role of the European Union and a reassertion of national sovereignty within Europe.[1] Furthermore, the ongoing COVID-19 crisis is forcing leaders to rethink assumptions about the frontiers of contemporary "Europe", including through securitized approaches.

Through this project, we aim to analyze how perceptions of peace and security vary across the continent, taking into consideration how different practitioners in the different national settings define these concepts. In doing so, we hope to illuminate the particular challenges this may create while also noting potential inroads for a more harmonized peacebuilding architecture for practitioners. With these guiding objectives, we have created a methodology,

[1] "Europe" here is conceptualized as the geographical unit of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) plus Ukraine, Finland and the Balkans.

data collection methods, literature review, and case analysis to appropriately answer these questions with the resources afforded to us. Our study seeks to answer the following research questions:

- What are the main tendencies and challenges in the framework of European "peace" and "security" and how are they likely to evolve in the foreseeable future?
- What are the main conceptions of "peace" and "security" among the European nations, how do they relate to a larger European and Western security framework?
- To what extent do the new trends in "peace" and "security" - such as "human security" dimension, terrorism, shared intelligence challenges influence the state of affairs of security policies in Europe?

III. Methodology and cases of studies

We use a cross-disciplinary literature review, notably in the fields of political science, political sociology, history, security studies and European studies. We add review of policy papers, government communiqués and media presentations relating to "peace" and "security" in Europe. We will primarily focus on six case studies: Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. The literature review will be divided in two parts: firstly, a review of the literature that treats Europe as a whole; and secondly, literature discussing individual countries' behaviors in regard of their foreign and security policies. This methodology was designed to flexibly meet the requirements of the resources of both academic literature and interviews, that we have conducted with a dozen of experts.

In contemporary European security literature, issues such as climate change and migration are often securitised and placed in the same category as issues like terrorism. Multiple diverse issues are clubbed under the category of 'security challenge' by national governments and Europe and treated as such.[2] Understanding these national imperatives is important in the European context, since threat assessments and actions are so deeply interconnected and coordinated. Further, how a country navigates world politics depends on how its people, usually the elites, understand threats in the first place.[3] Through this study we attempt to look at national security prerogatives of our cases and how they impact European security more broadly.

[2] Jonas Hagmann. *(In)Security and the Production of International Relations: The Politics of Securitisation in Europe*. Routledge Critical Security Studies. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015)., p.13-16.
[3] *Ibid*.

Figure 1 - Visual representation of the logic of securitisation based on (In)Security and the Production of International Relations: The Politics of Securitisation in Europe by Hagmann (2015). Source: *(In)Security and the Production of International Relations: The Politics of Securitisation in Europe. Routledge Critical Security Studies. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p.3*

We choose to study several countries, to compare the results of such inquiries of the conceptions of "peace" and "security" in the whole continent. Each case is important because it enjoys a particular understanding of these questions and is representative of other states, and put together, they provide an insight of the state of affairs of Europe. We could divide our cases across a diverse selection of countries:



Figure 2 - Case studies selected for analysis (L to R: Spain, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Ukraine). Source: mapchart.net, see https://cutt.ly/WgIE9EN

1) *the traditional "great powers"*, with a unique conception of peace and security: **France, Germany,** and **the UK**;
2) *the middle powers* such as **Spain** and **Sweden**, which are not strong enough to follow the path of great powers *per se*, but are important actors of the game because of their maneuverability in European affairs;
3) *the smaller powers* such as **Ukraine**, which is either in a difficult position because of economic or security issues, or/and dependent on NATO and the European Union for both its security and economic well-being. Ukraine serves as a fruitful study due to its uniqueness as a breakaway territory in the post-soviet space. This last group will require a closer look to the "soft" and civilian sides of "peace" and "security".

While nation-states and their respective security and foreign policies are the basic unit of analysis of our study, we also take into account other actors active on the security and peacebuilding fields such as NGOs, IOs, multinational firms, civil societies, etc. We take these actors into account through interviews and literature review. Special attention to the implementation of the UN's Sustainable Development Goal 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) by these states will be given to evaluate their involvement in "human security". Ideally, the range of cases selected would have been much larger, but due to practical limitations, we have strategically and geographically limited ourselves to these cases. We attempt to provide a jump-off point for a potentially much larger study of this nature, encompassing other security actors within the continent.

IV. Research:

a. Empirically analysing the European project

Robert Kagan interestingly argues that "For Europe, the fall of the Soviet Union did not just eliminate a strategic adversary; in a sense, it eliminated the need for geopolitics."[4] Arguably, it is true that Europe, as a whole, has not considered security as a main imperative since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Significant in Kagan's argument is that Europe has enjoyed a relative pacification of its environment since the end of the Cold War, until recently.[5] Hence, there is an intrinsic and growing misunderstanding between the two parts of the Atlantic in terms of security issues: the Americans, from Mars, still conceive the world in terms of power and influence; while the Europeans, from Venus, saw the fall of the Soviets as the beginning of Kant's *ewigen Frieden.*[6] This reading grid (figure 2) is quite representative of the school of realism that is best expressed by Mearsheimer's stance on the question of "peace" and "security" in Europe.[7]

[4] Robert Kagan, *Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage Book, 2004), p.25.
[5] Robert Kagan, *The return of history and the end of dreams*. (New York: Vintage Book, 2009), p.36.
[6] *Ewigen Frieden* means "perpetual" or "continuous" peace
[7] John Mearsheimer, "Why is Europe Peaceful Today?" *European Political Science,* 9, no. 3 (2010): p.387-397.

Kagan's argument	**"Americans from Mars"**	**"Europeans from Venus"**
School of thought	*Realism*: principally sees international relations in terms of competition and power. U.S. hegemonic military and diplomatic might is the best guarantee for peace (*Pax Americana* argument) Mars = Roman god of war, violence and competitiveness. *Philosophical tradition*: Thucydides, Machiavelli, Chanakya, Morgenthau, Mearsheimer, Waltz	*Internationalism-liberalism*: considers IR in terms of cooperation between actors that share the same progressive values of democracy and liberalism. Military might is less important than political integration and multilateral cooperation. Venus = Roman god of peace, procreation and fertility *Philosophical tradition*: Aristotle, La Boétie, Locke, Kant, Rousseau, Keohane, Nye
Geopolitical understanding since the end of the Cold War	Ideological and political win for the West, especially for the U.S., that can rightfully push eastwards its "liberal-democratic" zone of influence. Resurgence of a strategic competition with Russia for the primacy in Europe, especially after 2008 and 2014 with the Ukrainian crisis. Need to return to a sort of "containment strategy", involving the Europeans and former NATO allies.	End of strategic competition on the European continent between the great powers. Emergence of a peaceful security environment based on "liberal-democratic" values that will make peace last. Geopolitics as outdated, realization of Kant's "community of nations" on the European space. The U.S. is seen as "hard" security guarantor, the EU as "soft" and civil security provider.
Forecasts for the foreseeable future	Rise of competition, especially in the eastern part of Europe coupled with the rise of illiberalism in Hungary, Poland, etc. Tendencies that will worsen if the West does not fix them. Necessity for the U.S. to deter Russia with both "hard" and "soft" capabilities, to strengthen the Atlantic alliance and to help liberal democracy where it is endangered (the exact opposite of the Trump Administration's record)	Success of the EU in accommodating the continental adversities, without bidding on the escalation of tensions. Successes of NATO and OSCE in implementing a security framework in Europe. Division between the "old" Europe that wants to ease tensions with Russia, and the "new", eastern Europe, that fear a resurgence of Russia as a security threat. Strengthening the EU and its civilian capabilities, rather than NATO.

Figure 3 - Summary of Robert Kagan's argument in "The return of history and the end of dreams." Robert Kagan, *Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Vintage Book, 2004), p.*6

Questions also emerge about the consensus and unanimity of the European project itself. A study by the Chatham House points out that the history of the European Union is, "punctuated by the tensions between the plans of the elites and the extent of popular consent."[8] The clearest indication of this is the emergence of multiple populist Eurosceptic parties in nearly all of the cases in our study. The European integration project is largely driven by regional and national elites, who tend to be notably more liberal than the general public.[9] Our research affirms this theory, with a majority of our respondents (who are primarily policymakers or professionals), subscribing to the notion of 'European Values' being at the center of the integration project.

b. Supranational Institutions: The EU and NATO

Other schools of thought such as the internationalist, liberals and institutionalists consider that Europe has worked quite intensively in designing and implementing legislation to structure its security framework. Central to this matter is the political and institutional relation between NATO and the EU's CSDP[10] and the behaviors of the states that are part of both of them.[11] NATO is the main security institution operating in Europe. Moreover, its role as the "world's greatest army" makes the establishment of a "hard" security framework by the EU less necessary and plausible. Studies on the subject have highlighted the institutional and material superposition of the two institutions, and have also shown a high degree of collaboration between them on central issues, such as Ukraine.[12] In addition, the fact that the EU and NATO have 22 common members logically leads analysts to think that they share certain common inclinations.[13] Theoretically and legally speaking, the two institutions are tied together by the Berlin Plus Agreement of 2003, allowing the EU to use NATO's capabilities in crisis management operations.[14] However, the reality is quite different, because if the two institutions surely share a set of values and objectives, their collaboration is limited by different strategic approaches and agendas, which reduces their association to an *ad hoc* basis.[15]

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[8] Thomas Raines, Matthew Goodwin and David Cutts, "The Future of Europe: Comparing Public and Elite Attitudes", *Chatham House,* (2017), p.9-12.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] Common Security and Defense Policy
[11] Jolyon Howorth, "ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock? *Cooperation and Conflict",* 38, no. 3 (2003): p.235-254.
[12] Arthur Lusenti, "L'Ukraine : théâtre de compétition entre l'OTAN et la PSDC?*"* (IA101 - European Security, Final Paper, The Graduate Institute of International and Development studies, 2019), p.1-18.
[13] Stephanie Hofmann, "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 1 (2009): p.45-52.
[14] Tinatin Aghniashvili, "Towards More Effective Cooperation? The Role of States in Shaping NATO-EU Interaction and Cooperation." *Connections* 15, no. 4 (2016)., p.68.
[15] *Ibid.*

As certain liberal scholars – that see a complementarity between the military tasks of NATO and the political integration of the EU - point out, "[...] the EU and NATO cannot afford being divided politically."[16] This perspective emphasizes the idea that peace and security are indistinguishable components: peace is not a given, it is reachable through close institutional and international collaboration.[17] While the EU has a "soft power" emphasis, with tools like sanctions and security cooperation, NATO focuses on "hard power" dimensions that involve direct military action and foreign force deployment.[18] These two components of security are tied together for security experts, hence it is no coincidence that most of the recent new members of the European Union (enlargement rounds of 2004, 2007 and 2013) have previously joined NATO (enlargement rounds of 1999, 2004 and 2009).



Figure 4 - Steps toward EU and NATO Membership. Source: ETH, Center for Security Studies (CSS), https://cutt.ly/5glQU1D

Interestingly, a few ex-satellites countries of the USSR have joined NATO, ensuring their military security a few years prior to being co-opted in the European Union, thus safeguarding their "soft", economic and political security. The best examples of this phenomenon are Romania and Croatia, which joined NATO respectively in 2004 and 2009 and the EU in 2009 and 2013.[19] Viewed from outside the West, the collaboration between NATO and the EU is seen as much more than a mere share of values. Russia, under Yeltsin and Putin, has regarded suspiciously the enlargement of NATO, premise of the EU's aggrandizement.[20] As

[16] Sebastian Mayer, "The EU and NATO in Georgia: Complementary and overlapping security strategies in a precarious environment." *European Security* 26, no. 3 (2017)., p.446.
[17] Nina Græger. "Grasping the everyday and extraordinary in EU–NATO relations: The added value of practice approaches." *European Security* 26 no. 3 (2017)., p.348
[18] Anand Menon, "European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya." *Survival* 53, no. 3 (2011)., p.79.
[19] NATO Enlargement & Open Door, Fact sheet," NATO, (July 2016), Accessed on October 17, 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-enlargement-eng.pdf
[20] Andrei Tsygankov, *Russia's foreign policy: change and continuity in national identity*. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), p.75

such, a certain unity between the two institutions is sometimes assumed by foreign chancelleries.[21]

Despite NATO's enlargement policies and deepening cooperation with European institutions, the security alliance is in a period of redefinition. The intersection of NATO and peacebuilding came at the end of the Cold War, a period that brought an onset of fundamental questions as to the purpose and viability of NATO as an organization. NATO structured itself to be able to perform a multitude of unconventional security functions, with a particular emphasis on externalised peacebuilding.[22] Its "humanitarian" war in Kosovo and stabilization efforts through Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan demonstrate the organizations blending of traditional means of counterinsurgency while also promoting assistance programs to local populations. It is reflective of a larger shift in the field of security, one that has taken a more nuanced understanding of peace and the ways in which to ensure its survival.[23]

c. Conceptions of peacebuilding within Europe

In the last three decades the concept of peacebuilding has become more widely accepted however, with a hard fought understanding of the complexities of building a *sustainable* peace.[24] Nuanced and yet critical differences between working definitions associated with peace building activities, including peacemaking and peace enforcement, caused confusion amongst practitioners and doctrinal sources in the 1990s.[25] This led most international actors to focus on *sustainable* peace practices, taking into consideration a more varied understanding of peace that recognizes longer term change accompanied by reconciling the demands of multiple peacebuilding functions.

However, this raises practical questions of institutional capabilities as well as fundamental questions of the means and acceptable norms of international involvement.[26] This debate is ongoing and one in which the intersection of traditional security apparatuses like NATO and peacebuilding practitioners are still trying to reconcile. Parallelly, even if Europeans have been used to outsource their security to the U.S. for almost eight decades, there have been attempts to "Europeanize" the security of the continent: the Franco-British Saint Malo Summit of 1998,

[21] Interview with a Professor of the Graduate Institute, conducted by the authors, August 20, 2020.
[22] Alexandra Gheciu and Roland Paris, "NATO and the Challenge of Sustainable Peacebuilding." *Global Governance* 17, no. 1 (2011)., p.76.
[23] *Ibid.*, p.77.
[24] Interview with a Swiss diplomat, conducted by the authors, June 12, 2020.
[25] *Ibid.*, p.75
[26] *Ibid.*, p.76

paving the way for the CFSP and the creation of PESCO[27] in 2007.[28] Moreover, the debates about the necessity for Europe to recover a strategic autonomy are fed by the current American Administration which calls on NATO members to spend more on their defense.[29] These elements represent the current stumbling blocks of the transatlantic alliance and, if they are not insurmountable, resolving them will require tangible political will from both sides of the Atlantic, from declarations of goodwill to the imaginable release of a new Atlantic Charter.[30]

Another interesting point when it comes to "security" and "peace" in Europe is the fact that the EU, albeit a supranational institution, is not a centralized federation of states. Indeed, "Coherence has been a problem for EU security policies." [31] Certain experts of world politics see in Europe a united superpower, in envisioning Brussels as capable of transcending nation-states' preferences and interests, thereby paving a way for non-alignment with great powers.[32] While interesting, this claim is contested by the recent refugee crisis and COVID-19 crisis, that have shown how much nation-states continue to be the preeminent actors.[33] Additionally, the general consensus among European members against a common European nuclear deterrent shows that national members keep a firm hand on the making of security and defense policies.[34]

It is then relevant to analyze representative European countries individually, while keeping this link with the whole unit of Europe constantly. Despite this relative fragmentation, the member states of the European Union have never been so close in terms of political and economic integration.[35] As a symbol, the foreign policy strategy of the EU, emitted by the European External Action Service (EEAS) was labelled the "European Global Strategy", marking its worldwide aspirations.[36] The establishment of PESCO by the Lisbon Treaty is a "hard" security

[27] Permanent Structured Cooperation, comprising the strengthening of the operational capabilities of the member states

[28] Daniel Fiott. *Strategic Autonomy: towards 'European Sovereignty' in Defence?* European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), (2018)., p.1

[29] *Ibid.,* p.6

[30] David McKean and Bart M. J. Szewczyk, "The World Still Needs a United West: How Europe and the United States Can Renew Their Alliance", *Foreign Affairs* 99, no. 5 (2020).

[31] Alexandra Gheciu and Roland Paris, "NATO and the Challenge of Sustainable Peacebuilding." *Global Governance* 17, no. 1 (2011)., p.76.

[32] Andrew Moravcsik" Europe: The quiet superpower," *French Politics* 7, no. 3-4 (2009): p.403-422.

[33] Fabrizio Tassinari, "The Disintegration of European Security: Lessons from the Refugee Crisis," *PRISM* 6, no. 2 (2016)., p.71.

[34] Daniel Fiott. *Strategic Autonomy: towards 'European Sovereignty' in Defence?* European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), (2018)., p.7

[35] Interview with a Swiss diplomat, conducted by the authors, June 12, 2020.

[36] "European Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action, A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy," European External Action Service, (June 2016, Accessed on July 29, 2020, Brussels: EEAS., http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf., p.7

capability designed to associate 25 European countries in a joint task force, also marks the geopolitical ambitions of the EU. This also challenges the traditional NATO/military - EU/Civil security division discussed earlier, and it opens the way to interesting future developments in the direction of a common European defense.[37]

d. Organising for common security: The OSCE

In the field of European "peace" and "security", other institutions than NATO and the EU are of uttermost importance: the OSCE, that gathers 57 members states and that has a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects (respectively in its Basket I, II & III); or the Council of Europe that is committed to protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the Eurasian space. The role of the OSCE notably deserves to be re-examined, especially in relation to and in comparison, with the EU and NATO. The OSCE, born in 1975 after the Helsinki Final Act, is today a central institution in the field of European security. Marked in its principles by Kissinger's and Brezhnev's *realpolitik*[38], the OSCE is nevertheless the only comprehensive security institution "[...] reflecting Europe's political relationship with both Northern America and the Eurasian part of the former USSR."[39] Its "soft" security focus as well as its expertise in conflict prevention makes it an inevitable actor in the field: its doctrine of "common security" (a threat on one member is a threat to all members, to be solved diplomatically) makes it very different from NATO. Notably, the OSCE has been successful in releasing documents that serve as "codes of conducts" for the Eurasian and North American countries such as the Vienna Document, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Open Skies Treaty.[40]

Critics argue that the OSCE is founded on political agreements rather than legal obligations, thus minimizing the political meanings of such agreements.[41] Hence, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, perform core activities and their influence is notable on the general framework of "peace" and "security" in Europe, as well as they represent additional layers of this framework. As such, we endeavour to involve them in our discussion, while giving priority

[37] Daniel Fiott. *EU Defence Capability Development: Plans, Priorities, Projects.* Report. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), (2018).
[38] Jussi Hanhimäki. *The flawed architect: Henry Kissinger and American foreign policy*. (New York: Oxford University Press,2004).
[39] Victor-Yves Ghebali, *The OSCE and European Security: Essential or Superfluous?* A Europeaeum Lecture delivered at St. Anne's College University of Oxford, (18 February 2005)., p.1
[40] Łukasz Kulesa. "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe". *Survival* 60, nº 4 (4 July 2018): p.75-90.
[41] Victor-Yves Ghebali, *The OSCE and European Security: Essential or Superfluous?* A Europeaeum Lecture delivered at St. Anne's College University of Oxford, (18 February 2005)., p.4

to NATO, the EU and nation states in our study. Through our report, we attempt to understand how certain contemporary trends of security are affecting our case studies. Some of these trends are:

- Asymmetric battlespaces and cyber warfare
- Terrorism and counterterrorism
- Shared border control challenges
- Deployment of forces abroad
- Racism and xenophobia, through the lens of migration and refugee crises

e. Cases study

Germany

As a symbol, Germany's chairmanship in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 2016 was introduced by the motto "renewing dialogue, rebuilding trust, restoring security."[42] Indeed, the country sees its role as a bridge between the "West" and Russia. In terms of material power, most of the security experts agree that "German prosperity, political stability, population size and geostrategic location should make it the preeminent leader in Europe [...]"[43] The fact that the reality is different from the theoretical expectation can be explained by several factors.

An important component of the German understanding of the notions of "security" and "peace" in the recent past was the widespread belief that conflicts and wars in Europe were outdated. The wars in the Balkans in the 1990s represented a wake-up call to Germany, as was the more recent Russian annexation of Crimea.[44] Thus, *Bundespresiden*t Gauck and *Kanzlerin* Merkel called for a more ambitious role in international affairs for Germany, at the 2014 Munich Security Conference.[45] If most of the German establishment agree on the deterioration of Germany's security environment - with an intrusive Russia, an isolationist United States and a divided European Union - the German population remains opposed to any shift in security policy. Indeed, the German public is largely pacifist, around 82% of the population is in favor

[42] Leonie Munk, "Germany's OSCE Chairmanship 2016: The Need for "Contagement," *Federal Academy for Security Policy*, (2015)., p.1.
[43] Patrick Keller and al., "Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defense in an Age of Turbulence and Competition," *Atlantic Council*, (2016)., p.19.
[44] Interview with a Swiss diplomat, conducted by the authors, June 30, 2020.
[45] Markus Kaim, "Germany: A Lynchpin Ally? Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century," *ANU Press, Australia*, (2017): p.31–44.

of cutting back on German military expenditures, with large chunks of the left, mainly the SPD, who is openly pacifist or/and anti-militarist.[46] This phenomenon can partly be explained by Germany's history, but more importantly by the public's opinion that Germany's well-being is mainly due to its industrious economy, its mediation role and its internal political stability, rather than military capability.[47]

Internal security factors, such as the fight against terrorism and political and religious radicalization have gradually been more strongly included within the German security apparatus, as highlighted by the creation of a federal counter-terrorism bureau (*Gemeinsam Terrorismusabwehrzentrums, GTAZ)*.[48] For the German state, combatting religious fundamentalism and political extremism, such as far-right neo-nazi groups is vital to establish its credibility at the domestic and international levels, as these groups (*Reichsbürger*, for example) question the federal state's authority.[49] Such measures have also included the establishment of programs to integrate the population coming from immigration, and has been successful since 2015 according to an expert.[50] Furthermore, the German police has intensified its participation in police cooperation projects within the EU and with its neighbours, on a whole spectrum of issues: from transparent criminal police to transnational drug enforcement and joint intelligence programs.[51] Parallelly, Germany's commitment to implement the UN's SDGs has also large implications for its conception of "peace" and "security". Essentially, Germany has increasingly seen environmental matters as related to its internal security, as its ambitious energetic transition (*Energiewende,* initiated in the early 2010s) was linked to a political will to limit the country's energy dependence on Russia and the Middle East for geopolitical reasons.[52] From the use of chemicals to the respect of mining regulations and the process of rethinking its transport policy, Germany intends to reach the 2°C warming objective that was established by the G8 countries in 2009.[53] In a nutshell, Germany's renewed aversion to "great power politics" should not obliterate the country's important focus on internal and "human security".

[46] *Ibid.,* p.37
[47] *Ibid.,* p.38
[48] Ian Anthony. "Preventing Violent Extremism in Germany: Coherence and Cooperation in a Decentralized System" (SIPRI: Stockholm, August 2020)., p.7
[49] Deutsche Bundesrepublik, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016*.Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin, 2016., p.110
[50] Interview with a Professor of the Graduate Institute, conducted by the authors, October 1, 2020.
[51] *Ibid*., p.12
[52] Gideon Rachman,. *Multilateralism in One Country: The Isolation of Merkel's Germany*. Report. German Marshall Fund of the United States, (2017)., p.11
[53] Germany: Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. *German Federal Republic,* (March 2010), Accessed on October 5, 2020 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/germany

In addition, Germany has got into the habit of acting in foreign and security spheres through the canal of the multilateral security institutions, rather than to take action unilaterally. This pattern goes back to Germany's re-emergence as a European great power after WWII under the U.S. patronization, and the need for Germany to prove to its neighbors that a vigorous Germany was an asset for Europe, rather than a threat for Europeans.[54] Or as Thomas Mann said : "[...] what was needed was to Europeanize Germany rather than Germanize Europe."[55] Hence, generations of German policymakers advocated to act through the EU, NATO and OSCE frameworks to enable peaceful solutions to conflicts and allow Germany to take part in solidarity missions, without risking damaging its relations with its European colleagues.[56] Thus, the German conception of security can be summed up in Karl Deutsch's concept of *Sicherheitsgemeinschaft*.[57] The same goes for peace, because German officials recognize that peace is a collective effort, and cannot solely be reached by Germany. To these extents, Germany has a preference for leadership through Europe and the ESDP (for example, by its commitment in the "Enhance and Enable I" Mission in the EUTM in Mali) and through the Atlantic Alliance and NATO ("Enhance and Enable II" in Iraq against ISIS) when it comes to security matters.[58]

Figure 5 - Bundeskanzlerin Merkel addressing German special forces (DSK) during a joint U.S-Germany military, in Munster, on the 20th of May 2020. Source: The Times of Israel: *https://cutt.ly/5gAJuqK*

Strategically, Germany has shook off its passivity, assuming larger shares of the "transatlantic burden" and preparing for a progressive withdrawal of

[54] David Calleo. *The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present*. (Cambridge: Univ. Pr, 1978).
[55] John Brady, Beverly Crawford, and Sarah Elise Wiliarty, *The postwar transformation of Germany: democracy, prosperity, and nationhood*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999)., p.488
[56] Eva Gross, "Germany and European Security and Defence Cooperation: The Europeanization of National Crisis M*anagement Policies?" Security Dialogue* 38, no. 4 (2009)., p.509.
[57] Karl W. Deutsch, *Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969). "Sicherheitsgemeinschaft" means "community of security."
[58] Gross, "Germany and European Security," p.511.

American forces.[59] Germany has, after the 2014 Munich Security Conference, endorsed the image of a regional actor, active in its direct neighborhood. In the Baltic for example, Germany openly defends a policy of accommodation with Russia, with whom it has planned an ambitious pipeline project, the Nord Stream 2, while claiming greater military arrangements with partners such as Lithuania and Latvia on a variety of issues.[60] In Ukraine, Germany has been the instigator of a comprehensive dialogue to resolve peacefully the conflict, the "Normandie format", a quadrilateral meeting associating the French, German, Ukrainian and Russian heads of states since 2014.[61] In addition, Germany's political class has engaged in a revision process of its foreign and defense policy, that culminated in the publication of the *2016 Weissbuch.*[62] The creation of an European Army, advocated by the then Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen is one long-term objective of this document, as well as a deeper integration in NATO, notably through the "Framework Nations Concept".[63] All these elements demonstrate the intensity of the ongoing debate on the subjects of "peace" and "security" in Germany, which the country has not experienced since its reunification.

France

France's foreign and security policies are today at a crossroad.[64] Indeed, France still enjoys many attributes of a great power: a permanent membership in the UNSC, the nuclear capability, one of the largest diplomatic representations in the world and military bases in a dozen countries worldwide.[65] Despite this, France's actual weight on world affairs has been in decline since the 1930s.[66] Additionally, France is today one of the most indebted countries of the "West", with a public debt that amounts to around 120% of its GDP.[67] These attributes of

[59] *What hurts NATO the most is not the troop reductions. It's the divisive approach to Europe*. (July 29, 2020), Accessed on October 3, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-hurts-nato-the-most-is-not-the-troop-reductions-its-the-divisive-approach-to-europe/

[60] Andris Sprūds and Elizabete Vizgunova. "Perceptions of Germany in the Security of the Baltic Sea Region", *Latvian Institute of International Affairs*, (2018)., p.210

[61] Claudia Major, Christian Mölling. *Zwischen Krisen und Verantwortung: Eine erste Bilanz der neuen deutschen Verteidigungspolitik.* Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Comité d'études des relations franco-allemandes,(2015)., p.25

[62] *Weissbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik and zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, Bundesregierung Deutschland, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Berlin,(2016).

[63] Major and Mölling. "*Zwischen Krisen und Verantwortung".,* p.16

[64] Roy C. Macridis, *De Gaulle, Implacable Ally* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966)., p. 133.

[65] Jennifer D.P. Moroney et al., "France's Approach to Security Cooperation. Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries: The Cases of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom," *RAND Corporation,* (2011): p.29–56.

[66] Dominique Moïsi, "The Trouble with France," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 3 (1998): p.91-94.

[67] "General government debt (indicator)," OECD, Accessed on June 8, 2020, https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-debt.htm

great power and these elements of decline are the prism through which we will apprehend France's conception of "peace" and "security".

France's traditional conception of security in Europe can be labelled as "realist" for most of its history, especially after WWII, when President De Gaulle solemnly declared that it is "[...] indispensable that France defend herself by herself, for herself, and in her own way."[68] Interestingly, if today the country is a true supporter of European integration, it is not willing to give up its great power status. Rather, France has engaged in a complex search of keeping its status with an Europeanization of its objectives and imperatives.[69] Primarily focused on the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Sub Saharan regions, France is capable of quick and efficient military projections, as shown by the appeasement of the Greek-Turkish dispute by the French Marine in the Eastern Mediterranean.[70] To sum up, France will secure its traditional spheres of influence in the MENA and Sub Saharan Africa, using soft-power tools such as the *Organisation mondiale de la Francophonie* or military arrangements, as it is already the case with 11 African countries.[71]

The French public seems not to oppose France's ambitious and costly foreign policy: "[...] France enjoys the unusual situation of not being overly constrained in its defense policy and military spending by an unwilling electorate or stingy taxpayers."[72] The French public tends to trust its government when it comes to foreign and security policy: for example, the intervention in Libya in 2011 to overthrow Gaddafi was seen positively by some 63% of the population.[73] In practical terms, it means that the French government is relatively free in designing ambitious policies. This phenomenon is certainly due to France's conception summarized in the Elysée's White Paper of 2008 stating "[...] that ensuring the stability of partner countries is crucial, as is expanding France's influence worldwide."[74] This shows the general conception in France,

[68] Roy C. Macridis, *De Gaulle, Implacable Ally* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966)., p.133.
[69] Jennifer D.P. Moroney et al., "France's Approach to Security Cooperation. Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries: The Cases of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom," *RAND Corporation,* (2011)., p.52.
[70] Hugo Decis. "La Méditerranée Dans L'environnement Stratégique Français". *Institut Français de Relations Internationales*, (2020).
[71] David E. Johnson et al., *France: Preparing and Training for the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges: Insights from the Experiences of China, France, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel 1st ed.,* (Santa Monica, CA; Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2009), p.59–122.
[72] Patrick Keller and al., "Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defense in an Age of Turbulence and Competition," *Atlantic Council*, (2016)., p.11
[73] Institut Français d'Opinion publique (IFOP), "Les Français et la légitimité d'une intervention militaire en Libye," (2011).
[74] République Française., *Défense et sécurité nationale: le Livre blanc*. Paris: O. Jacob : Documentation française, (2008)., p.157

shared by both the elites and the population, that in an increasingly multipolar world, force and deterrence remain preeminent tools of statecraft.

Domestically, France has reacted dynamically to the November 2015 Daesh's *Bataclan* attacks, by designing a Strategy on Fight Against Terrorism.[75] This strategy comprises a wide array of measures such as the prevention of radicalism by awareness-raising campaigns within the education system; fight against terrorism's funding (notably by the organisation of the Paris Ministerial Conference on Counter-terrorism Financing, chaired by President Macron); and a close collaboration with European police agencies such as EUROPOL[76]. Undoubtedly, France has recently realized the growing interdependence between external and internal security policies: years of mismanagement of the Libyan and Syrian crises materialized in terrorist attacks on French soil. Hence, France's conception of "peace" and "security" is overshadowed by the current understanding of the *durcissement* of its domestic and external environment, and it is plausible that France will increasingly see peace as conditional to a greater security apparatus, be it Europeanized or nationalized.[77]

Figure 6 - French and Egyptian marines conducting a joint military exercise in the South Mediterranean Sea, on the 25th of July 2020, amid increasing tensions with Turkey in the region. Source: Egypt Today, https://cutt.ly/CglQFJr

At the 2016 Paris Conference on Climate Change, France's pressures for tougher global climate measures were highlighted as a sign of the country's growing sensibility to "human security" dimensions. Before this, France was already a participant in the first round of assessment since the adoption of the SDGs in

[75] Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères. "Terrorisme : L'action Internationale De La France." *France Diplomatie - Ministère De L'Europe Et Des Affaires Étrangères*, (August 2020), Accessed on October 6 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/securite-desarmement-et-non-proliferation/crises-et-conflits/l-action-de-la-france-au-sahel/

[76] "European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2020." *Europol*, (2020).

[77] Patrick Keller and al., "Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defense in an Age of Turbulence and Competition," *Atlantic Council*, (2016)., p.14.

September 2015.[78] From the development of urban environments conducive to well-being to management of waste and the security of raw materials extraction for its industry, France has largely incorporated the SDGs and a "human security" conception to its understanding of "peace" and "security". A telling example of such a process is probably the case of civilian nuclear power. At the beginning of the French civilian nuclear program in 1974, the matter was purely seen by the higher spheres of the state as a way to "[...] increase France's energy independence and military capability."[79] Today a focus to the security of local communities, environmental components, issues of modernization of the infrastructure, *etc.* is given. This incorporation of "human security" is nevertheless diluted by the country's highly centralized system and administrative monolithic ineffectiveness.[80]

France's engagement in European defense takes shape through the enhancement of Franco-German collaboration that led to the ratification of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in January 2020. This bilateral security arrangement plans to integrate further the two countries in the whole spectrum of foreign and security policies, from diplomatic representations abroad to direct military cooperation.[81] Beside the controversy of a potential shared use of France's nuclear *Force de frappe* that was quickly discarded, this treaty shows reciprocal willingness form the part of both Berlin and Paris in making the Franco-German couple as the main vector of the creation of a EU defense force.[82] Symbolically as well as politically, it also highlights the continuity in the Franco-German collaboration in the security realm, that lasts since the Elysée Treaty of 1963. Materially, it also paves the way for a greater collaboration in the field of defense industry, as the development project of a Franco-German tank "MGCS" shows.[83] On the international stage, and even if France and Germany do not share the same strategic culture, it enhances the strength of their voice in the world: Germany's economic vigor, experience of mediation and peacebuilding expertise naturally complete France's expeditionary tradition, its nuclear might and its international visibility.

[78] Laura Brimont. "Implementation of the SDGs: Where Does France Stand?" *ID4D*, (February 27, 2017), Accessed on October 8 2020, ideas4development.org/en/implementation-sdgs-france/.
[79] Sarah Elise Wiliarty. "Nuclear Power in Germany and France." *Polity*, vol. 45, no. 2,(2013)., p.283
[80] *Ibid.*
[81] Hans Stark, Xavier Pacreau. *Le traité sur la coopération et l'intégration franco-allemande d'Aix-La-Chapelle,* Annuaire français de relations internationales 2020, Volume XXI, Université Panthéon-Assas, Centre Thucydide, (2020)., p.356
[82] Interview with a Professor of the Graduate Institute, conducted by the authors, August 21, 2020.
[83] Jean-Dominique Merchet. "Panzer Franco-Allemand: La Moitié Pour L'un Et Deux Tiers Pour L'autre." *L'Opinion*, (October 8, 2019), Accessed on September 27 2020, https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/international/panzer-franco-allemand-moitie-l-deux-tiers-l-autre-199832

Spain

Spain integrated into the European framework and ascended to membership of the European community in 1986.[84] It would later join NATO in 1992, fully integrating into the NATO military structure in 1999.[85] These two organizations still form the core elements of Spanish security policy.[86] Certainly, Spain's notions of "peace" and "security" are greatly framed by the interactions between these two institutions and other trans-Atlantic partnerships, giving Spain a strong Euro-Atlantic centered approach to these issues.[87]

Strategically, Spain relies on two main policies to ensure security and peace within its borders and a broader Europe. Firstly, like other Southern-European border countries, stability in neighboring regions is of absolute importance. The Spanish government has embraced the 'Projecting Stability' initiative conducted by NATO as well as the EU Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Security and Defense to promote European capabilities in the region.[88] This additionally speaks to Spain's 'resilient' security policy or the concept of an "advanced frontier" for Europe within the MENA region and the Sahel. The Spanish government therefore has engaged bilaterally with numerous countries on migration and insecurity as a means of "early prevention."[89]

Spain has reason to look beyond Europe for its security concerns, due to the Spanish cities of Melilla and Ceuta. These cities represent Spain's last remaining territorial holdings in Northern-African and thus hold a crucial geopolitical significance for Spain and the EU, particularly in terms of irregular migration.[90] Spain experienced its migration "crisis" later than

[84] "The Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Union," European Council, last modified December 23, 2015. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/library/library-blog/posts/the-accession-of-portugal-and-spain-to-the-european-union/

[85] "Spain and NATO," Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. Accessed July 13, 2016, http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/ProyeccionAtlantica/Paginas/EspLaOTAN.aspx

[86] *Ibid.*

[87] Aurora Mejia, "Spain's contribution to Euro-Atlantic security," *Real Instituto Elcano* (2017), (Accessed on November 2, 2020), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari60-2017-mejia-spain-contribution-euro-atlantic-security

[88] Aurora Mejia, "Spain's contribution to Euro-Atlantic security," *Real Instituto Elcano* (2017), (Accessed on November 2, 2020), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari60-2017-mejia-spain-contribution-euro-atlantic-security

[89] *Ibid.*

[90] María Isolda Perelló Carrascosa, "Migration and Border Politics in The South of United States and Spain," *Migration and Diasporas: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 2, no. 1 (2019)., p. 76.

that of Italy or Greece, seeing the largest spike in arrivals in 2017 and 2018.[91] This is in large part due to numerous EU and member states contributions to third state actors to limit migrant flows including Turkey and Libya.[92] Although the number of migrants entering Spain was relatively small in comparison to what the EU received years before, it was able to generate anxiety within the Spanish public leading to the far-right party, Vox, capitalizing on this phenomenon with xenophobic rhetoric and calls against rescue missions.[93] To move forward with clarity, this paper defines a migrant as someone who changes its country of residence regardless of reason.[94]

However, the question of migration and security is not a particularly new phenomenon for Spain. After Spain implemented the Schengen Treaty in 1995, a securitization of the border occurred with fences and advanced technology installed across the land borders between Spain and Morocco. This action was also met with the EU-Morocco Partnership enforced in 2000, solidifying a partnership with the North African country in limiting international terrorism and drug trafficking.[95] This was also not Spain's first "migration crisis" as in 2006 the Canary Islands experienced an influx of migrants as a result of increased scrutiny and closure of traditional routes to mainland Spain.[96] These series of events would come to be known as the "Cayuco Boat Crisis," with roughly 32,000 people entering the Islands shores through irregular means[97] eventually subsiding due to numerous factors including the global economic downturn and efforts by EU and Spanish border patrols.[98]

[91] Shoshana Fine and José Ignacio Torreblanca, "Border Games: Has Spain found an answer to the populist challenge on migration?" *European Council on Foreign Relations* (2019), p.3-4.
[92] *Ibid.,* p.3-4.
[93] *Ibid.,* p.4.
[94] "Definitions," Compact for Migration Resources, United Nations, Accessed October 20, 2020, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/definitions
[95] María Isolda Perelló Carrascosa, "Migration and Border Politics in The South of United States and Spain," *Migration and Diasporas: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 2, no. 1 (2019)., p.77.
[96] Ruben Anderson, "Hardwiring the frontier? The politics of security technology in Europe's 'fight against illegal migration'," *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 1 (2016)., p.25-26.
[97] María Isolda Perelló Carrascosa, "Migration and Border Politics in The South of United States and Spain," *Migration and Diasporas: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 2, no. 1 (2019).," p.84.
[98] Ruben Anderson, "Hardwiring the frontier? The politics of security technology in Europe's 'fight against illegal migration'," *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 1 (2016)., p. 25-26.



Figure 7 - The three tier six-meter high barrier separating Melilla from Morocco. Source: CBC, https://cutt.ly/ThrPd44

Despite increased security, Spain saw dramatic displays of Sub-Saharan migrants storming the fences of its enclaves in 2005, resulting in the deaths of at least 14 individuals and calls for renewed border strength. With EU aid, Spain would invest in *vallas* or barriers between its two enclaves, installing six meter triple wired fencing in Melilla and double fencing in Ceuta.[99] The images of these borders can be particularly jarring as one notes that these fences are not meant to guard from traditional security threats but rather that of "transnational threats" namely in the form of migrants and asylum-seekers, a tactic to be found across Europe including Greece, Bulgaria, and Hungary.[100] Migrants have consistently found ways to subvert new additions of the fences, using organized methods that can be thought of as resembling military operation in their own right.[101] The reliance on fencing has also put a reliance on the bilateral and multilateral relations with Morocco, a key partner to restrain flows of migrants.[102] In 2019 alone, Moroccan officials have prevented nearly 74,000 attempts of irregular migration to Spain, rescued 19,554 migrants at sea, and have played a key role in halving the arrivals of migrants to Spain from the previous high of 64,298 in 2018 to 32,513 in 2019.[103] In order to solidify cooperation on the border with Morocco, Spain and the EU have deepened their own commitment to trade and aid toward the country.[104] EU officials have labeled the country as a

[99] *Ibid*., p.29-30.
[100] *Ibid.*
[101] *Ibid,* p.31-32.
[102] *Ibid*.
[103] Francisco Peregil, "Morocco says it prevented 70,000 attempts at irregular migration in 2019". (February 04, 2020), Accessed on October 18, 2020, https://english.elpais.com/international/2020-02-04/morocco-says-it-prevented-70000-attempts-at-irregular-migration-in-2019.html
[104] Ruben Anderson, "Hardwiring the frontier? The politics of security technology in Europe's 'fight against illegal migration'," *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 1 (2016)., p.31-32.

"strategic partner" and have invested €140 million in aid, 70 millions of which was given directly with the other half investing specifically in border infrastructure.[105]

This system, however, has been criticized for repressive measures that often further endanger and worsen the living conditions of migrants. Spain's securitization of its borders, particularly in Ceuta and Melilla, have opened migrants to harassment and danger from Moroccan forces while increasing the use of irregular and oftentimes dangerous routes of migration.[106] The idea of European borders has extended itself to signify not just the control of persons across international borders but social discrimination between developed and developing countries. A migrant's "illegality" often has broader effects that influence an individual's material, physical, and mental health.[107] It has also been brought to attention that in some cases, migrants are financed by their families to travel to Europe, leading to questions of the nexus between irregular migration and development in sub-Saharan Africa, a topic that ought to be researched further.[108] The extension of European border security outside of the continent ensures this issue to be invisible to European masses.[109] To combat this issue will require a fundamental shift in belief of what security entails for Europe, one in which the movement of people is not an issue of peace at home but rather the creation of legal and safe means of migration, a feat easier said than done.

Sweden

Sweden has maintained a historically unique position of 'Non-Alignment' in European affairs which has arguably helped it evade warfare and act as a peace arbitrator.[110] On the outside, Sweden constructed a security policy based on three-pronged principles: military non-alignment, independence and neutrality, seeing itself as a buffer between NATO and Warsaw.[111] Meanwhile, it expanded military cooperation with NATO members, while not officially joining the organization, for fears of retaliation from the Soviets. Both left-leaning

[105] Francisco Peregil, "Morocco says it prevented 70,000 attempts at irregular migration in 2019". (February 04, 2020), Accessed on October 18, 2020, https://english.elpais.com/international/2020-02-04/morocco-says-it-prevented-70000-attempts-at-irregular-migration-in-2019.html

[106] María Isolda Perelló Carrascosa, "Migration and Border Politics in The South of United States and Spain," *Migration and Diasporas: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 2, no. 1 (2019)., p.77.

[107] Albia Diez et al. "Derechos Humanos en la Frontera Sur 2020", *Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía*, (2020)., p.69-74.

[108] *Ibid.,* p.79.

[109] *Ibid.*

[110] Douglas Brommesson, "Non-allied states in a changing Europe: Sweden and its bilateral relationship with Finland in a new security context" *Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI)* (2016).

[111] Christine Nissen, & Peter Albrecht, "The Willing, the Hesitant and the Late-Comer: Converging stabilisation efforts" *Danish Institute for International Studies* (2018).

Social Democrats and right-wing coalitions within the country have led rapprochement efforts with Western Europe while maintaining military isolation with the East.[112] This, while Sweden established an activist presence in the Global South, often supporting anti-American regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua and Vietnam.[113] Even though Sweden continues to not be a member of NATO, its own security policy is often in-line with the NATO security framework.[114] Support for joining NATO remains high within the Swedish population. According to a security expert based in Stockholm, "[Sweden's] current relationship with NATO, while not ideal, is working. The country has an enhanced partnership with NATO and participates whole-heartedly in NATO and US joint exercises. Sweden has also assured the Baltic states that if they are ever attacked, Sweden will work with NATO to protect them."[115]

With the end of the Cold War, Sweden began to develop an 'outside-in' perspective of national security. It shrank its armed forces, as the Soviet threat dissipated, and more of it was directed to peacebuilding missions abroad.[116] The Swedes began actively getting involved in internationally mandated conflict management.[117] This era was also recognizable for the advent of the EU. While initially, the Swedes expressed skepticism about the multilateral organization, since joining the EU in 1995, Sweden has shown particular appreciation for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy framework.[118] The EU's largely normative, anti-hegemony role in International Affairs has also fit well with Sweden's own perception of its role abroad.[119]

[112] Carl Johan Blydal, "Foreign–Policy Discussions In Sweden After 1990: From Neutrality To NATO?" (Rep.), *Konrad Adenauer.,* (2012)., p.20.
[113] Ann-Sofie Dahl, "Sweden, Finland and NATO: Security partners and security producers," in *Nordic-Baltic Security in the 21st Century: The Regional Agenda and the Global Role*, (2011)., p.6.
[114] Christine Nissen, & Peter Albrecht, "The Willing, the Hesitant and the Late-Comer: Converging stabilisation efforts" *Danish Institute for International Studies* (2018).
[115] Interview with a member of the Swedish Society of International Affairs, conducted by the authors, September 18, 2020
[116] Klaas Van Walraven, "Conflict Policy in Some Western Countries: Some Explorative Notes," *Clingendael Institute* (1999)., p.15-16.
[117] Christine Nissen, & Peter Albrecht, "The Willing, the Hesitant and the Late-Comer: Converging stabilisation efforts" *Danish Institute for International Studies* (2018).
[118] Douglas Brommesson, "Non-allied states in a changing Europe: Sweden and its bilateral relationship with Finland in a new security context" *Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI)* (2016).
[119] Klaas Van Walraven, "Conflict Policy in Some Western Countries: Some Explorative Notes," *Clingendael Institute* (1999)., p.13.

Figure 8 - NORDEFCO's Permanent Secretaries in front of a Saab JAS 39 Gripen in the Swedish Military base of Luleå, Source: Government of Sweden, Ministry of Defense (Report): https://cutt.ly/FglQ25S

At the beginning of the 21st century, Sweden was actively involved in peacekeeping and state-building efforts, particularly the U.S. and NATO-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Presently, Sweden, and Nordic nations more generally, see a resurgent Russia actively threatening their sovereignty, as their primary security concern. This has forced Sweden to change its security approach to one that is 'inside-out'.[120] Within its immediate neighborhood, cooperation with Finland, Denmark and Norway is being increased, in particular, a security trifecta of Finland-Norway-Sweden is emerging. This is facilitated through a bilateral military interoperability treaty with Finland, and NORDEFCO, a Nordic multilateral sub-regional military forum.[121] While NORDEFCO remains an important forum, there are no illusions about its ability to replace NATO or the EU as the primary security provider for the region.[122] Through our interviews, we also understood the role NORDEFCO plays for "bridging missions between the EU and NATO."[123] Russia remains the preliminary threat in the minds of Swedish security experts. The Russian air-force operates close to the Swedish border and Russian bombers frequently enter Swedish airspace. An incident in 2013 rapidly escalated into almost hot war, with NATO reinforcements being requested by the Swedes. Actions of this nature have forced Sweden to rethink their cold-war non-alignment policy. According to the Swedish expert we interviewed, "There are regional considerations that Sweden has. The main one being its relationship with Finland. Sweden will not join NATO, if Finland doesn't. Because that would make Finland isolated regionally, and Sweden would not want that." [124]

[120] Ian Anthony and Carrie Weintraub, *NATO Defense College* (2018)., p. 2.
[121] Douglas Brommesson, "Non-allied states in a changing Europe: Sweden and its bilateral relationship with Finland in a new security context" *Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI)* (2016).
[122] Interview with a member of the Swedish Society of International Affairs, September 18, 2020
[123] *Ibid.*
[124] *Ibid.*

Meanwhile, the international perception of Sweden continues to be that of a net-provider of peace and humanitarianism, with it being portrayed as a normative Nordic "powerhouses of human rights."[125] Conversely, its rapidly expanding civil-military sector has made this claim contentious. Swedish companies like Saab, increasingly produce modern military equipment and sell these systems to oppressive regimes like the one in the Philippines.[126] The challenge for Sweden, is how it maintains its normative position, while simultaneously strengthening multilateral military cooperation to address pressing national security challenges.[127]

Ukraine

Ukraine is arguably the most visible example of a threat to European "peace" and "security", being an active war zone with both local and international actors involved in the crisis. The beginning of 2014 saw the country in a precarious situation, the fallout of the Euromaidan revolution left Ukraine in a weak position politically, with the departure of the former President Yanukovych and Russia's quick seizure and integration of the Crimea. By April 2014, violence in Eastern Ukraine would break out by Russian fighters and activists in Donetsk leading to two votes of succession in May subsequently creating the Donetsk People's Party (DNR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR). The votes were recognized by no state or international body.[128]

Since the beginning of the conflict, Ukraine and Western governments have believed that Russia has played a critical role in supporting and maintaining these rebellions, with some Ukrainian sources estimating nearly USD$3 billion in aid, financed out of the official state budget. Russia's intervention does not simply include financial investments but also critically large supplies of weapons and soldiers to the region in 2014.[129] This facet of the conflict is critical to its distinguishing nature as compared to other breakaway regions in the post-Soviet space such as Cyprus, Transdniestria, Abkhazia and others. [130]

Since the outbreak of violence, there have been two significant opportunities for peace with the two Minsk agreements. Since the signing of the Minsk II agreement in 2015, in consultation

[125] Elise Carlson-Rainer, "Sweden Is A World Leader In Peace, Security, And Human Rights". *World Affairs* 180, no. 4 (2017): p.79-85.
[126] Sebastian Larsson, "The Civil Paradox: Swedish Arms Production and Export and the Role of Emerging Technologies", *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies* (2020)., p.20.
[127] Anthony and Weintraub, *NATO Defense College*, p.15.
[128] Thomas de Waal. "Uncertain Ground: Engaging with Europe's de facto States and Breakaway Territories", *Carnegie Europe,* (2018)., p.62-63
[129] *Ibid.,* p.63-64.
[130] *Ibid.*, p.61-62.

with the 'Normandy Four' and mediation by the OSCE, fighting has reduced, but it has failed to induce a peaceful end to the conflict.[131] The region today has devolved into an uneasy stalemate with frequent skirmishes and shelling within Eastern Ukraine that has caused an estimated 10,000 civilian fatalities and left 1.5 million individuals internally displaced.[132] An estimated 6 million individuals lived in Donetsk and Luhansk before violence ensued however, now roughly only 3 million live in non-Ukrainian government controlled territories. Nearly 200,000 individuals also live within 10 kilometers of the Line of Contact between Ukraine and the separatist republics, leaving them particularly vulnerable to violence.[133]

Figure 9 - Civilians crossing the Stanytsia Luganska pedestrian bridge in eastern Ukraine, 2016. Source: International Crisis Group, https://cutt.ly/FglQ6fc

These numbers, though stunning, are oftentimes incapable of expressing the sheer magnitude of demographic change and in particular the quality of life of those who have been affected by this violence. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in particular serve as a dramatic cleavage in Ukrainian society post 2014. The exacerbation of IDPs difficult situation partially stands as a consequence of the lack of definitive and authoritative qualitative analysis from the state or other actors as well as the Ukrainian state's inability to provide adequate support for IDPs according to international standards.[134] This inadequate support has been enhanced by the coronavirus pandemic and subsequent confinement announced in March, 2020. As of November 21, Ukraine has confirmed 612,665 cases of COVID-19 with 10,813 deaths[135]

[131] Olexsiy Haran and Petro Burkovsky, "Ukraine after the Minsk agreements," in *What Does Ukraine Think*, ed. Andrew Wilson (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017): p.17-24.

[132]"Conflict in Ukraine," Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), accessed on June 18, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukrainehttps://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine

[133] Thomas de Waal. "Uncertain Ground: Engaging with Europe's de facto States and Breakaway Territories", *Carnegie Europe,* (2018)., p.62-64

[134] Marina Nesterova et al., "IDPs: Life Before and During the Coronavirus: External online study of the needs of internally displaced persons during the COVID-19 full quarantine and easing process", *Stabilization Support Services*, (2020)., p.4.

[135] Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. *Coronavirus in Ukraine* (November 21, 2020), Accessed on November 21, 2020. https://covid19.gov.ua/en

however, the DNR and LNR have not released reliable statistics on these numbers.[136] The Ukrainian government, in trying to stop the spread of the virus, closed the border between the Republics, inhibiting organizations such as the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission to properly report on the state of the ceasefire and could potentially damage an already tenuous peace process.[137] This global health crisis and policies during COVID-19 leave the 1,446,881 registered IDPs as of April, 2020 even more vulnerable especially related to challenges of housing, systemic barriers to basic services related to their legal status, and financial security.[138]

A great challenge to IDPs is the lack of government infrastructure to effectively resettle individuals or provide knowledge and access to government support.[139] For newly displaced persons, one of the first tasks is to find appropriate housing, oftentimes at inflated prices due to their IDP status.[140] This however, is an incomplete solution as social housing often limits their social contacts with the greater population, further complicating the integration process.[141] Access to social and medical care also remains a challenge for IDPs, a precarious situation made worse by the global pandemic. Lack of coherent information communicated to IDPs and their communities, structural disparities rooted in their legal status that make it difficult to receive medical care in government and non-government controlled areas, and the potential for them to compete with limited public health facilities marginalizes these communities further.[142] COVID-19 has unfortunately perpetuated the vulnerability of these groups with some estimates claiming 55% of IDP workers being in trades extraordinarily susceptible to spreading the virus.[143] There are also estimates that a third of IDPs work in the informal sector, and are thus more vulnerable to losing their jobs due to quarantine restrictions and economic recession.[144]

[136] Tyler Jess Thompson, "Searching for COVID-19 Ceasefires: Conflict Zone Impacts, Needs, and Opportunities", *United States Institute of Peace*, (2020)., p.8.
[137] *Ibid.,* p.8-9.
[138] Marina Nesterova et al., "IDPs: Life Before and During the Coronavirus: External online study of the needs of internally displaced persons during the COVID-19 full quarantine and easing process", *Stabilization Support Services*, (2020)., p.4.
[139] Lauren Von Metre et al., "Ukraine's Internally Displaced Persons Hold a Key to Peace." *Atlantic Council*, (2017)., p.2.
[140] Marina Nesterova et al., "IDPs: Life Before and During the Coronavirus: External online study of the needs of internally displaced persons during the COVID-19 full quarantine and easing process", *Stabilization Support Services*, (2020)., p.14
[141] *Ibid.*
[142] *Ibid.*, p.4
[143] *Ibid.*
[144] *Ibid.*

The socio-economic and political problems that plague Ukraine leave IDPs susceptible to prejudice, discrimination, and intolerance from host communities.[145] IDPs living in government-controlled Ukraine are still often perceived by host communities as second-class citizens, despite similar ethnic and linguistic identity. This discrepancy must be resolved to create an inclusive peace for a future Ukraine, and it must come both with mutual understanding and concrete distribution of social, civil, and medical rights.[146]



Figure 10 - Problems that will be most acute for IDPs After the End of Quarantine. Source: Humanitarian response, Embassy of the U.S. in Ukraine, https://cutt.ly/gglWu5C

IDPs should be engaged with to act as peacebuilders within their own host communities and with the nation at large. A general framework for this engagement can be found within the SDG16, which is able to merge issues of inclusive state and civil society while promoting sustainable development.[147] In doing so it engages with the international community, allowing for exchange in expertise and providing key concrete goals to be applied in the Ukrainian context. Specifically, IDPs can and should be included in multi-track peace initiatives, track-one being in discussions with top leadership, track-two being at the civil society level, and track-three being grassroots initiatives.[148] The government of Ukraine has included IDP representatives to the Minsk

[145] Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik, "The Social Challenge of Internal Displacement in Ukraine: The Host Community's Perspective." *Migration and the Ukraine Crisis: A Two-Country Perspective*, edited by Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Greta Uehling, E-International Relations, 2017, p. 27.
[146] *Ibid.,* p.42-43.
[147] "United Nations. "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development." Accessed on October 14, 2020. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld
[148] Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2007, "Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peace-Building'", *The Brookings Institution, Washington DC*., (2007)., p.19-23.

Contact Group[149], an important and timely step, but much can still be done at the track-three level to support conditions for peace-processes and people-to-people dialogue.[150] Through sustained support from local organizations or local governments, IDPs could have the appropriate training and platform to inhabit leadership spaces and train other IDPs in such tactics, contributing to the enhanced safety and understanding of IDPs while setting the ground for their potential return.[151] However, this must also be met with peacebuilders advocating for IDP issues to be addressed during peace negotiations as well as defining and securing the legal rights of IDPs to relevant parties to enhance a more holistic approach to a future peace.

Understanding the unique challenges that face Ukrainian IDPs expands the notions of what peace constitutes in the country and for Europe at large. By viewing the conflict through this lens, can one see that long-term peace for Ukraine will not only include an end to violence but also the care of its people and the tackling of the social issues associated with their condition. Through interviews with Dialogue Facilitators, Project Managers, and other Peace Builders in the area, our team was able to discover the vast architecture of negotiation and aid in Ukraine.[152] With President Zelensky's relatively new government being open to collaborating with and engaging with IDPs there exists a crucial window for which to act.[153] By addressing the needs of IDPs and by normalizing IDP issues in peace negotiations, peacebuilders can find lasting means to prevent displacement or re-displacement in the future while also helping to address root causes of violence.[154]

United Kingdom

The most pressing challenges for the British security establishment today are similar to those it faced immediately following WWII. According to "the Problem of British Security", Britain has desired to establish a "permanent system of general security", ever since the end of WWII.[155] The desire for security cooperation should be understood in relation to the decline of the British

[149] Vladimir Socor, "Ukraine designates legitimate representatives of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Minsk Process (Part One)," (June 22, 2020), Accessed on October 17, 2020. https://112.international/politics/ukraine-designates-legitimate-representatives-of-donetsk-and-luhansk-in-the-minsk-process-part-one-52409.html

[150] Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2007, "Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peace-Building'", *The Brookings Institution, Washington DC*., (2007)., p. 23.

[151] *Ibid.,* p.24.

[152] Interview with a member of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, conducted by authors, October 14, 2020.

[153] *Ibid.*

[154] Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2007, "Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peace-Building'", *The Brookings Institution, Washington DC*., (2007)., p. 43.

[155] "The Problem of British Security", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 20*(3), (1944). p.390-401.

Empire, and its relinquishing the role of the leader of the west.[156] In the 1970s this meant cooperation within the British Commonwealth, in the 1980s it was NATO and in the 1990s the EU. The threat that has historically featured heavily in British security reviews has come both internally from secession movements and externally, from state and non-state actors.[157] The United Kingdom, along with the U.S. played an important role in shaping the current security world order, based on two planks: U.S. Security presence and denationalisation of European security.[158] That being said, contemporary trends of asymmetric warfare (terrorism, urban conflict, domestic instability) also pose a significant challenge to British security.[159]

The guiding document for British security policy and practices is the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).[160] Highlighting the emerging risks for Britain, Prime Minister Boris Johnson declared in February that the 2020 SDSR would be "the largest review of the UK's foreign, defence and security policy since the end of the Cold War."[161] This simultaneously at a time where Dominic Cummings, the Chief Advisor to Johnson, has indicated a desire to reduce the procurement costs of the British armed forces by implementing "technological innovations."[162] Britain has historically not shied away from foreign deployment, previous SDSRs have actively advocated the desire to deploy abroad.[163] Balancing multiple constraints and threats originating abroad, the British are relying on a two-pronged approach of multinational cooperation and remote warfare.[164]

Contemporary discourses within the British security establishment constantly mention the re-emergence of "state-based threats," particularly in "operations below the threshold for armed conflict."[165] With a resurgent Russian state, active in the Baltic and Balkan regions, Britain once again sees its security under threat from its old adversary. Many security analysts argue

[156] Interview with the advisor to the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, September 2020.
[157] David E. Johnson et al. “The United Kingdom” in. Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries: The Cases of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom.”, *RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA,* (2009).
[158] Interview with an advisor to the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, September 2020.
[159] Richard Shirreff et al. “THE UNITED KINGDOM: Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defense in an Age of Turbulence and Competition”. *Atlantic Council.*, (2016)., p.15.
[160] Interview with a member of the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), conducted by the authors, July 28, 2020.
[161] Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street. “PM Outlines New Review to Define Britain's Place in the World.” GOV.UK. (2020)
[162] Abigail Watson. “The Integrated Review: Lessons Learned From Remote Warfare.” Oxford Research Group, (2020).
[163] Paul Cornish, & Andrew E. Dorman, “Breaking the mould: The United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review 2010.” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 86*(2), (2010): p.395-410.
[164] Abigail Watson. “The Integrated Review: Lessons Learned From Remote Warfare.” Oxford Research Group, (2020).
[165] *Ibid.*

that the British are more hawkish about Russia than the Germans or the French, although this is difficult to measure empirically.[166] Significantly, the 2015 SDSR mentions Russia multiple times and calls its behaviour, "aggressive, nationalist and authoritarian, increasingly driven by its opposition to the West."[167] As a response to this, the UK re-doubles on its commitment to NATO and the creation of a readiness action plan for the defence of NATO allies.[168] The 2015 SDSR also called for joint exercises and increased cooperation between itself, Germany, France and the rest of the EU.[169]

Since Brexit, the relationship with the EU has become far more complicated. While the arguments for the British withdrawal from the EU were economic, migration related or sovereignty related, the decision is having important security consequences.[170] While Brexiteers argued that NATO was the sole security arrangement that Britain would require, many experts argue that the EU serves a “soft” power dimension, through economic sanctions and foreign aid.[171]. The most important role that the EU played, was in facilitating the Good Friday Agreement (1998) between Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The EU has provided a platform for reconciliation between the Republicans and the Unionists.[172] Further, the guarantee provided by the European Convention on Human Rights to Irish Republicans as minorities in Northern Ireland has permitted a temporary but peaceful coexistence. The open borders and shared citizenship on the island, facilitated by the EU, has also provided for an equilibrium for the preferences of both sides. Brexit, ostensibly, nullifies the peace achieved through these measures.[173] The aggressive posturing in Brexit negotiations by PM Boris Johnson has rattled both the Republicans and the Unionists. In September 2020, Johnson presented an Internal Market Bill to the Parliament that would reimpose a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.[174] There is simmering discontent and conflict brewing right under the surface which could reignite potentially violent conflict on the island.[175]

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[166] Interview with the advisor to the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, conducted by the authors, September 15, 2020.
[167] *National Security Strategy And Strategic Defence Review 2015*. HM Government, (2015) p.18-20.
[168] *Ibid.*
[169] *Ibid.*
[170] Bernhard Moltmann. "*Northern Ireland: The End of the Story?: The Peace Process and the Brexit*." Report. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, (2017). p.11-15.
[171] Anand Menon, “British Security Policy: the EU or the U.S.? Choose Your Partners.” *The World Today, 66*(7), (2010): p. 22-25.
[172] Bernhard Moltmann. "*Northern Ireland: The End of the Story?: The Peace Process and the Brexit*." Report. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, (2017).
[173] *Ibid.*
[174] Sebastian Payne. “UK Plan to Undermine Withdrawal Treaty Puts Brexit Talks at Risk.” Financial Times, (2020).
[175] Bernhard Moltmann. "*Northern Ireland: The End of the Story?: The Peace Process and the Brexit*." Report. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, (2017).

Figure 11 - Deployment abroad: British soldiers of the Battalion Yorkshire 3 Rifles exercising in the Lithuanian swamps during NATO's Baltic Operation 49 (BALTOPS 2020) in June 2020. Source: Yorkshire Post, https://cutt.ly/gglWfdc

The election of President Donald Trump in 2016, and his rhetoric about the very existence of NATO and its Article 5, worries the UK, in an era where Britain desires a pivotal and leading role in NATO.[176] The British have since the late 1990's desired closer relations with the Americans often at the expense of European partnerships.[177] This divergence was most clearly visible in the 2003 Iraq War, where Britain's European allies chose not to intervene, but the Blair administration stood by the U.S. However, the experts interviewed here argue that the "American withdrawal/decline" is quite overblown, that while the world is no longer unipolar, a multipolar world can still count on a strong American presence.[178] Even so, there is considerable interest within the British security establishment about the results of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Elections. "Trump doesn't care about the traditional democratic alliance in Europe, a President Biden might be different."[179]

Yet, isolation is simply not a viable policy position for Britain, despite the withdrawal from the European Union. British intelligence, policing, border control, and foreign deployment capabilities all rely on significant collaboration with mainland Europeans.[180] British SDSRs also consistently refer to Germans and French as their exceptional and essential allies.[181] British security establishment places a strong emphasis on this E3 cooperation. One example of this

[176] Fabrice Potier, and Alexander Vershbow. "*NATO and Trump: The Case for a New Transatlantic Bargain*." Report. Atlantic Council, (2017). p.1-4.
[177] Richard Shirreff et al. "THE UNITED KINGDOM: Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defense in an Age of Turbulence and Competition". *Atlantic Council.*, (2016).
[178] Interview with an advisor to the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, conducted by the authors, September 15, 2020.
[179] *Ibid.*
[180] Anand Menon, "British Security Policy: the EU or the U.S.? Choose Your Partners." *The World Today, 66*(7), (2010): p.22-25.
[181] *National Security Strategy And Strategic Defence Review 2015*. HM Government, (2015) p.53-54.

is the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) that was created to facilitate European-Iran trade in 2019 in response to the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.[182] However, this E3 cooperation, widely perceived by European partners as "domination by big powers" puts Britain's European allies like Germany and France in an awkward spot.[183] Thus, the future for British internal and external security looks like a fine balancing act .

V. Conclusion: *Probing possibilities for peacebuilding in 2020 and beyond*

As highlighted previously, when trying to grasp what a general framework of European security would mean, we are facing several limitations. Firstly, there is the question of how to apprehend "Europe" as a unit of analysis, what it means in strategic terms and how such a definition influences the shape of a study. Secondly, this contribution has emphasized the national characteristics of certain European states' security preferences, notably pointing out the importance of particular historical, geographical and domestic contexts. Here, one must recognize that there are also many convergences in the imperatives of these case studies: one can mention the resurgence of a Russian threat deemed pernicious to the British, the Ukrainians and the Swedes; as well as the uncertain developments of the transatlantic alliance. Simply put, the very challenge to understand correctly a general framework of "peace" and "security" in Europe relies on: the result of several national strategies, the intrinsic unclarity about what Europe means and the core of the European project, and the interests that great powers have in this area, namely the United States, Russia, and increasingly China.[184]

Since 2007 and Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference, Russia has taken a turn in its European politics notably by advocating for an "architecture of international security."[185] With this position, the Kremlin sought to initiate a dialogue between the OSCE members, with a clear message: Europe and Russia, despite historical waves, are part of the same continental ensemble and together, they should be able to discuss their security without interference from the U.S.[186] Whether such a negotiation will involve a united European Union

[182] Tytti Erästö. "European Non- Proliferation Diplomacy in the Shadow of Secondary Sanctions." *SIPRI Policy Brief*, (2020).
[183] Interview with the advisor to the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, conducted by the authors, September 15, 2020.
[184] Interview with a Professor of the Graduate Institute, conducted by the authors, August 20, 2020.
[185] Stanislav Tkachenko, "The Project of a European Security Treaty in Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy." *Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali*, vol. 77, no. 4 (308), (2010): p.515–523.
[186] Viatcheslav Morozov, "Russia's Changing Attitude toward the OSCE: Contradictions and Continuity." *Sicherheit Und Frieden (S F) / Security and Peace*, vol. 23, no. 2, (2005): p.69–73.

or only the strongest European states remains to be determined. The necessity to remain pragmatic when analysing Russia's behaviour in Eastern Europe is also a necessity: as certain scholars argue, the only option for an endangered power is to take the initiative in international affairs, even more when its traditional zone of influence (Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan) is under the pressure of internal turmoil.[187] A Russia in need of recognition of its "Great power status" is rhetorically aggressive but prepared to cooperate.[188]

Washington wants both to remain politically influential in Europe through NATO, and to appear as a benign hegemon towards Brussels, in order to influence its traditional allies in the same way as to diminish the possible economic and political competitiveness of an overly united EU.[189] But, in many ways, there are reasons to argue that " [...] Washington is still trying to keep Russia out of Europe and challenging Russia's security, political and economic interests towards CIS[190] members."[191] On the other hand, the very *raison d'être* of NATO is being challenged by the development of the current world order, notably with an increasing Sino-American competition corollary to the "Pivot to Asia", a geopolitical trend that works at the expense of Europe.[192] As discussed earlier, the case of the EU is complex, encompassing the various interdependent levels of national and supranational powers, but nevertheless giving rise to contradictory wishes. By its attempt to closely tie the CSDP to NATO in terms of capability and division of tasks, Brussels envisions to remain military adjacent to Washington, while assuming overtly to dissociate from it on the diplomatic matters, notably on the willingness of its most influential members (particularly so since the departure of Britain), France and Germany, to ease tensions with Russia.[193]

- **Germany**'s growing "soft security" ambition is one of an economic great power that, for historical and political reasons, has until today refused to assume its role of Europe's *fleuron*. Yet, Germany works intensively to rethink its strategy by seeking to

[187] Henry Foy. "Russia's neighbourhood in flames". *The Financial Times* (October 07, 2020). Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/84ec2707-e829-4bc6-b81c-e19453883354
[188] Stephen Holmes and Ivan Krastev. *The Light That Failed: Why the West Is Losing the Fight for Democracy*, (New York: Pegasus Books, 2020).
[189] Sam Winter-Levy, & Nikita Lalwani, "Will America's Alliances Survive the Trump Era?"*, Foreign Policy,* https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/14/will-america-alliance-system-survive-trump-era-pandemic-rapp-hooper-shields-republic-review/ (2020).
[190] Commonwealth of Independent States, a group of ten ancient Soviet states and protectorates trying to pursue a certain level of common foreign policy
[191] Stanislav Tkachenko, "The Project of a European Security Treaty in Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy." *Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali*, vol. 77, no. 4 (308), (2010)., p.519.
[192] Douglas Barrie and al.,*European Defence Policy in an Era of Renewed Great-Power Competition.* International Institute for Strategies Studies (IISS), Research Paper, (17 February 2020)., p.2
[193] Jolyon Howorth, "Security and Defence Policy in the European Union" (2), The European Union Series. *Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan*, (2014)., p130.

keep a balance between Washington and Moscow, by incorporating "human security" dimensions such as the SDGs and by collaborating closely with France in the creation of a European Defense Force.

- **France** is unlikely to change its posture, especially in the current state of the transatlantic alliance. It will certainly continue to advocate for Europeanization while giving priority to its national interests, by affirming its "great power" status in using its expeditionary capacity in the MENA and the Mediterranean regions. Paris will probably bet on the "human security" dimensions to attain its objective in the foreseeable future, by pushing for a Green Deal for example.
- **Sweden** planned in October 2020 to increase its defence spending by 40% citing the Russian threat in the Baltic Sea.[194] Russia seems bound to continue to loom large as a threat for Swedish national security, thereby pushing Sweden to act in coordination with its allies in Europe. While Sweden seems to dislike France's autonomous way of functioning, it seems intent on disregarding these for the time being.
- **Spain**, like other European countries, will have to tackle the multifaceted challenges of international migration. The EU's new plan for the redistribution of asylum seekers and funding for host countries continues to securitize migration in Europe with calls for increased border security. The fate of this newly released scheme is still uncertain, due to member states opposition to forced allocation of refugees.[195] However, what is certain, is that bold leadership to change the narrative and perception of migration will need to be taken for any meaningful policy that is migrant-centered.
- **Ukraine** will most likely continue to be enmeshed in violence however, the work to include IDPs and those affected by the conflict in dialogue, can create a meaningful difference in the "hearts and minds" of the population. This tactic should be researched further in the Ukrainian case so that effective means of dialogue can be adapted to other such cases. Tools and strategies can and should be shared across these cases to facilitate peace processes. Multilateral formats such as the Normandy Format will be of great importance for a resolution of the conflict.
- **The United Kingdom** will finalise its exit from the EU by 2021, having always been a reluctant member of the union. While Britain desires a world order where it can act on its own, practical conditions persist that prevent that, thereby forcing the British to act in cooperation with the very union it chose to leave. This might entail coordinating on foreign deployments and military actions, as well as, on financial sanctions. Arguably,

[194] David Nikel. *Sweden To Increase Defense Spending By 40% Amid Russia Fears.* Forbes, (2020).

[195] "EU plans tougher controls in migration policy overhaul": *Die Deutsche Welle.* September 23, 2020, (Accessed on October 20, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/eu-plans-tougher-controls-in-migration-policy-overhaul/a-55024569

the UK might also be forced to turn inwards for a few years to deal with the security challenges, mentioned before, that emerge in the aftermath of Brexit. Reliance on the U.S. and NATO is also bound to grow in the short run.

Additionally, the current trends of security are highly affecting the way we understand, and the way these frameworks function. Notions of cyber warfare, terrorism, shared intelligence challenges, racism and migrations issues are all factors that contribute in complexifying the field of European "peace" and "security". Add to this the ongoing crisis of COVID-19, and you really see a strain on European collective action institutions and on its ideals of cooperation.[196]

History will perhaps record the 2020 decade as the one which saw the resurgence of direct conflict within Europe. In such a case, scholars will be in a hurry to point out the political factors underlying such a state of affairs: an increasingly isolationist U.S., gradually moving away from its historic responsibility to ensure the security of Western democracies; a Russia that is assertive again and that ogles its past Tsarist zones of influence in Eastern Europe, and that interferes in the domestic politics of the European states to divide them; a European Union that is politically fragmented by its institutional overstretching, its economic crisis and by social turmoil making it unable to reach compromise on a common path to follow. If social scientists are always wiser after the facts have unfolded, they will also have to remember the relative stability of Europe at the beginning of the 2020s: the lack of threat of inter-state conflict between its main members and the ongoing political and economic integration of these powers; the successfulness of Europe's security institutions such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE; the desirability of its model of governance, that is plebiscited worldwide. Without attempting to pretentiously anticipate the work of these scholars, we can place ourselves in the middle of these trends and seek, in the whirlwind of actuality, to gain a better understanding of what is shaping the Europe of "peace" and "security" at the present time.

[196] Interview with a member of the foundation Initiatives of Changes Switzerland, conducted by the authors, July 7, 2020.

Figures:

Figure 1 - Visual representation of the logic of securitisation based on (In)Security and the Production of International Relations: The Politics of Securitisation in Europe by Hagmann (2015). *Source: Ibid., see page 3* *3*

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Interviews :

1. Interview with a Swiss diplomat, conducted by the authors, June 12, 2020.

2. Interview with a Swiss diplomat, conducted by the authors, June 30, 2020.

3. Interview with a member of the foundation Initiatives of Changes Switzerland, conducted by the authors, July 7, 2020.

4. Interview with a member of the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), conducted by the authors, July 28, 2020

5. Interview with a Professor of the Graduate Institute, conducted by the authors, August 20, 2020.

6. Interview with a Professor of the Graduate Institute, conducted by the authors, August 21, 2020.

7. Interview with a member of the Swedish Society of International Affairs, September 18, 2020.

8. Interview with an advisor to the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, September 15, 2020.

9. Interview with a member of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, conducted by authors, October 14, 2020.