EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BROCHURE

The terms of reference for the evaluation were the following:

- Re-evaluate the JCSS to assess whether it still provides a clear statement of how the City should address issues of safety and security
- Re-evaluate the JCSS in light of the 2040 Growth and Development Strategy focus on community safety
- Analyse the implementation of the Strategy to date
- Draw out key lessons

Methodology

- The methodology sought to take into account the complex social, political and policy environment in which strategy is implemented in the South African context. Therefore a qualitative approach was adopted, which could capture these nuances. A total of 15 interviews with key stakeholders identified by the Jo’burg City Safety programme office were conducted as well as two focus groups with stakeholders from the Norwood/Orange Grove and Moroka Geographic Focus Areas. In addition a review of documentary material from the Jo’burg programme office was conducted as well as a literature review of relevant local and international literature.

Background

- The JCSS was initially formulated in response to the Jo’burg 2030 Economic Development Strategy in which fear of crime was identified as major obstacle to investment in the City. The JCSS was subsequently adopted by Council in 2003. The strategy was formulated as a result of a process of consultation and data analysis and was also informed by local and international legislation and policy. In particular the JCSS was a key City level initiative to implement the principles of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1996 and the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) which together introduced a new paradigm for addressing crime and safety in a democratic South Africa.

- The JCSS therefore advocated an integrated approach to crime prevention and safety using a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency approach. In line with the NCPS the JCSS emphasised the key role of local government in crime prevention and foreseen that City leadership would play a critical role in realising a localised approach to crime prevention. This was in line with international “best practice” where city driven initiatives have led to significant reductions in crime and violence in cities with similar socio-economic challenges and high levels of violence as Johannesburg, such as Sao Paulo in Brazil and the Colombian cities of Medellin and Bogota.

Key components and programmes

- The JCSS identified seven key operational programmes to address the priority crimes that had been identified as a result of the crime analysis undertaken during the development of the JCSS. The priority crimes which were identified were those that were believed to have the most significant impact on business confidence and investment decision-making, and the tourism market.

- The programmes were the following:
  - Programme 1: Focused surveillance, including patrols, CCTV and other tools.
  - Programme 2: Winning Back the Streets - Residential and Economic Development.
Programme 3: Creating the orderly city – Better buildings, by-law enforcement and traffic policing.

Programmes 4, 5 and 6: Guns, Organized Crime and Youth.

Programme 7: Armed Robbery.

These programmes sought to introduce a focused, multi-disciplinary approach to specific crime issues. Each of the programs addressed one or more of the elements of crime, through a combination of law enforcement, social development, and situational crime prevention.

Implementation of programmes in GFAs

These programmes were implemented in specific Geographic Focus Areas (GFAs). The geographically focused approach (GFA) was based on consolidating crime reduction in a small number of target areas and gradually widening the boundaries of each area. Geographical areas were identified that were important for the economic development of Johannesburg, either because they were business areas or because they played an important role in forming investor and business perceptions. The GFAs which were initially identified included Norwood/Orange Grove, Moroka in Soweto, Newtown and the Inner City and Ellis Park precinct.

Within each GFA a specific geographically-focused problem solving methodology was implemented that included the development of crime prevention strategies and the implementation of specific crime-prevention activities.

The GFA approach emphasised a local focus and local accountability. It highlighted the need to, “devolve accountability down to managers at every level, including policing sector managers, police station commanders and the managers of city agencies, including the JMPD and service delivery departments” (JCSS: 13) i.e. to implement a localised approach to crime management in order to “win back the streets” in these areas.

It was in the context of the implementation of these programmes in the GFAs that most of the substantive ground-level work to build safety through the methodology and approach proposed in the JCSS, took place.

The focus areas in the GFAs were the following:

Programme 1: Drivers of Crime

Programme 2: Vulnerable groups

Programme 3: Leverage visible policing and surveillance

Programme 4: Creating the orderly city through improved urban management

Programme 5: Safer environmental design

Programme 6: Communications and perception management

Key areas of focused implementation by the Jo’burg City Safety programme office (JCSP).

Liquor

A significant amount of work by the programme office in the GFAS was oriented towards addressing the one of the key identified drivers of social fabric crime, namely liquor.

A variety of multi-agency initiatives and operations were facilitated by the JCSP office in order to address a range of safety issues relating to liquor consumption.

Challenges encountered included difficulties maintaining effective co-operation between the City and the Gauteng Liquor Board, which has a provincial mandate.

While multi-agency operations related to liquor helped to establish the importance of a multi-agency approach to safety challenges in the City and constructive working relations between City departments, it is difficult to determine whether liquor focused operations have led to the reduction of street crimes associated with liquor abuse.
• Part of the problem relates to the lack of adequate data collection systems in the City, which would make it possible to assess the outcome of the liquor programme objectively and empirically.

*Firearms*

• The JCSP office focused on the issue of firearms as another driver of crime in the City. The JCSP office developed a firearm action plan to address the proliferation of firearms in the City and worked with the SAPS to focus on retrieving unlicensed firearms and seeking to tighten the control of licensed firearms.

• The JCSP office succeeded in mainstreaming a focus on firearms in the work of City agencies, particularly in the SAPS and JMPD during routine operations such as roadblocks and searches of night clubs.

• A significant challenge concerned the regulatory difficulties related to declaring Gun Free Zones as initially envisaged in the JCSS.

• There is also inadequate data on the implementation of the firearm action plan to make a decisive assessment of its impact on firearm related violence.

*Organised crime*

• The JCSP office also focused on organized crime which was regarded as a key driver for a range of violent and financial crimes in Johannesburg.

• Part of the JCSP office’s focus on organised crime related to compliance inspections of institutions that potentially trade in the proceeds of organised crime such as panel beaters and spray painters/chop shops, second hand goods dealers etc. Many operations were carried out in the GFAs to target these institutions through the enforcement of relevant by-laws. Operations were conducted with multiple stakeholders including, among others, EMS, City Power and Jo’burg Water.

• The JCSP office focused in particular on cell phone crime. The JCSP office signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the SAPS to focus on organized crime groups which drive vehicle and cell phone theft crimes in Johannesburg’s business areas.

• JCSP office supported an initiative by Business Against Crime (BAC) to blacklist cell phones in the City after an MOU was signed between the SAPS and cellular phone networks to blacklist stolen and lost phones.

• It also partnered with BAC to conduct a study to monitor the impact on cell phone theft of the implementation of the MOU between SAPS and cellular phone networks to black list cell phones.

• However, the study found that most stakeholders, including the SAPS, the insurance companies and the cell phone networks were either not willing or unable to provide the data to make it possible to effectively monitor the implementation of the MOU on blacklisting of phones.

*Youth*

• In terms of vulnerable groups, the JCSP office focused in particular on the youth. The programme ran three youth diversion and youth at risk programme in Alexandra, Soweto and Westbury until 2010. The JCSP office contracted NICRO and KHULISA as service providers to implement these programmes.

• Evaluation reports found that these programmes had been successful but that their sustainability was undermined by a severe lack of infrastructure and resources for young people in the areas where the programmes took place as well as a need to strengthen cooperation between role players.

• The report also emphasised the critical role of the Department of Community Development in coordinating multi-agency responses to youth involvement in criminality.

*CCTV*

• In terms of visible policing and surveillance, the major focus of the JCSP office was on maximising the impact the CCTV network in the City could have and subsequently assisting with the roll-out strategy and plan for the installation of new cameras.
A recent evaluation conducted by the JCSP office of the information collected by the CCTV control room in the City, however, found that the lack of integrity of data collection in the control room meant that this information cannot currently be used effectively to improve City governance as was initially envisaged.

It was also found that a number of role players did not appear to invest in using this data as an urban management tool.

The report found that until all City stakeholders invest in ensuring that data from the CCTV is professionally collected, monitored and analysed, much of the potential of the CCTV system that has been installed will be lost.

**By-law enforcement**

- By-law enforcement in order to create an orderly urban environment became a significant aspect of JCSP office work in each of the GFAs with GFA coordinators centrally involved in coordinating multi-agency operations related to by-law enforcement in relation to a number of issues of urban governance including liquor, firearms and compliance to regulations relating to the occupation of buildings.

- While a substantial amount of effort was expended on these operations, it is unclear to what extent their impact was monitored and evaluated or whether lessons learnt from these operations were compiled in order to inform more effective operations in the future.

- Although reports on these operations were provided at regular intervals in the JCSP quarterly reports and in some instances indicated significant successes, it will be important in future to develop a systematic monitoring and evaluation procedure to ensure that lessons learned are shared and any identified problems escalated.

**Crime prevention through environmental design**

- A central focus of the JCSP office was to introduce the concept of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) into the City of Jo'burg in line with the principles of the National Crime Prevention Strategy.

- CPTED refers to the concept that the environment can be made less conducive to crime through improved environmental design and planning.

- The JCSP office has undertaken numerous initiatives in order to mainstream CPTED principles into various aspects of City governance such as conducting CPTED audits in various parts of the City to describe, identify, analyse and address problems in the urban environment that impact negatively on safety and security, monitoring the implementation of CPTED recommendations, mainstreaming CPTED into the work of urban development agencies such as the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), creating awareness materials around CPTED and working closely with City Parks to create safe public spaces.

- It appears that as a result of this work the JCSP office has been successful in mainstreaming CPTED principles into City planning, particularly with regards to urban regeneration projects undertaken by JDA.

- However, as some of the JCSP office evaluations of the implementation of CPTED design principles note, on-going work needs to be undertaken by City agencies in order to ensure that the gains achieved through the implementation of CPTED principles in urban design are not reversed as a result of the neglect of City functions such as monitoring lighting, littering, vagrancy and other factors that undermine the maintenance of safe space for residents.

**Implementation in the GFAs: Conclusion**

- The identification and implementation of a range of programmes in the GFAs oriented towards addressing safety as a holistic challenge, rather than as a problem simply relating to crime and law enforcement, was critically important in establishing a broader understanding of safety in these GFAs and ultimately in the City as a whole, as well as establishing the need to adopt a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency approach to respond to this broader conception of safety.
It is also evident that many of the issues that became the focus of JCSP work in the GFAs were correctly identified as the key challenges relating to safety, and remain a critical part of the approach to safety in the City’s new Growth and Development Strategy, Jo’burg 2040.

Cross-cutting issues: Lessons learnt

Implementation

- Implementation is not linear; it fluctuates over time according to a variety of factors including competing departmental priorities, shifting understandings of strategy, resource constraints, the role of leaderships and a host of other factors. Some of the factors that impacted on the implementation of the JCSS were the following:

- Translating Western models of crime prevention to the South African context is not always straightforward. The implementation of the JCSS reflects this. The results of policy and strategy transfer, especially to societies in the process of transition, are often unpredictable.

- Therefore ideas developed outside South Africa such as community policing and crime prevention are re-contextualised and re-appropriated by a variety of actors at local and national levels, including communities themselves who interpret these ideas in terms of their own frameworks of understanding.

- Globalised models of policing are therefore subject to processes of local and national “translation”, which may fundamentally transform the meaning and practice of these models in the local context.

- The implementation of the JCSS has therefore been subject to shifts as local processes of interpretation, co-option or resistance to the Strategy, has led to different phases of implementation.

- The first phase involved a focused period of developing and launching the Strategy and beginning to embed it in the work of various City agencies, which took place between 2003 and 2006.

- The second phase involved a period of focused implementation between 2006 and 2010, when the JCSP office was at full capacity and had a significant impact on crime prevention in the City.

- During the last phase of implementation, the JCSP office appears to have been significantly impacted on by a lack of resource allocation through the JMPD, in particular the failure to replace staff members who left the programme office. This left the programme office with only staff member in addition to the coordinator and administrators at the time of writing.

- A number of factors led to shifting levels of implementation of the JCSS. At the highest level, the change of Public Safety MMCs (five over the period that the Strategy was implemented), meant that understandings and interpretations of the Strategy shifted over time as did the emphasis on particular programmes.

- At a lower leadership level, the turnover of station commanders also led to fluctuations in Strategy implementation at station level as new station commanders had to be familiarised with the Strategy.

- In addition the expansion of implementation to new stations in the third phase of implementation as a result of the success of the Strategy in some GFAS, ironically caused problems of sustainability at certain stations who were unable to continue to implement the Strategy effectively without the close involvement of the JCSP office.

- These challenges, however, were indicative of the fact that the Strategy had not been effectively embedded in systems and processes and was dependent on individual drivers.
Another factor that appeared to impact on the implementation of the JCSS in the GFA in the latter period concerned, paradoxically an attempt to implement the principles of the JCSS through the establishment of the urban management structures by the Department of Planning and Urban Management (DPUM) in the seven regions of the City of Johannesburg.

These urban management structures were intended to enhance cooperation between City agencies in order to improve the urban environment.

A key component of these structures was the appointment of Law Enforcement Managers in each of the City’s seven regions to coordinate joint planning and to implement multi-agency operations and cooperation between different stakeholders.

This multi-agency approach was directly in line with the JCSS and provided an opportunity to mainstream this way of working throughout the City.

While initially the JCSP office and Urban Management worked constructively together, over time problems emerged, which appeared to be centrally linked to unclear definition of roles and mandates of Urban Management and the JCSP office respectively.

While the JCSP office saw the establishment of Urban Management as an opportunity to multiply the impact of GFA coordinators, Urban Management Law Enforcement Managers saw the crime prevention role that the JCSP envisaged as outside their job descriptions.

Another important factor impacting on the implementation of the JCSS relates to question of resources. When the JCSS was formulated, it argued that the strategic priorities, budgets and the MTEF (Medium Term Expenditure Framework) of role players in the City should be aligned to the JCSS, however, this only happened to a limited extent.

The lack of dedicated funding for crime prevention has been a significant obstacle to the implementation of crime prevention approaches in South Africa as they require multi-agency cooperation. However, budgets are allocated to individual departments and then to specific line functions within these departments. Each department is individually accountable for their budgets, which tends to discourage them from making funds available for multi-agency cooperation for which departments are not held accountable.

The JCSP does not have a dedicated crime prevention budget but relies on a budget allocation through the JMPD and therefore is vulnerable to shifts in commitment to the Strategy within this organisation.

Mainstreaming the Strategy

The key methodology the JCSP used to mainstream the JCSS was training. The JCSP office engaged in on-going and extensive training of various role players in the City in an attempt to disseminate the methodology of the JCSS and empower stakeholders to implement it.

In 2008 it produced a toolkit in order to “consolidate the good practices and lessons learnt by the JCSP team” as well as developing a train the trainer manual to equip role players in departments to conduct training themselves.

However training and dissemination efforts can only succeed in an enabling institutional environment, which makes it possible for those trained to utilise the methodology in their work.

This was difficult in the absence of the formal alignment of the priorities of various departments and City agencies with the JCSS. Dissemination of the Strategy needed to be driven from within departments themselves as no programme office could do this work for all City departments and agencies.
• JCSS recognised initially that it was critical that the Strategy was effectively communicated to the public and City role players.

• However, the Strategy currently does not have a high public profile. The need to communicate the JCSS more effectively to the general public was identified in the first evaluation of the JCSS in 2006 and as a result a communication strategy was drawn up in 2007.

• However, the JCSP office had to share the City’s Central Communication Unit with other departments and as a result the Strategy was not as effectively communicated as it needed to be.

• This is important to address as international research indicates that knowledge of safety strategies reduces citizens’ levels of fear of crime, independently of fluctuations in actual crime statistics.

• There was also a significant gap between the work done by the JCSP office in implementing the Strategy and the perception of key stakeholders interviewed who are currently responsible for the implementation of critical aspects of the Strategy.

• Only some stakeholders had an in-depth understanding of the Strategy or the work done to implement it.

• While this lack of understanding could be partly attributed to challenges in effectively disseminating knowledge of the Strategy and its implementation by the JCSP office, on the other hand this could also be linked to some of the difficulties related to the internalisation of new ideas and practices, which have win support in environments that have pre-established organisational cultures and practices that may be resistant to change.

• As a result of resistance and/or lack of understanding of the Strategy and its implementation to date, the Strategy was variably integrated into the daily working practices of employees through the strategic direction of the leadership in departments.

Ownership

• A key challenge in terms of the institutionalisation of the JCSS concerned the question of “ownership”.

• It is only when there is individual or collective ownership of a strategy that it is likely that this strategy will be actively driven or led.

• However, it is also important to note that ownership is dynamic and changing; individuals committed to a particular policy or strategy may move on or change their minds over time. Therefore it is an issue which has to be continually addressed in a flexible and on-going manner.

• International examples from Bogota in Colombia to New York in the United States have shown the crucial importance of strategy and policy that is owned and driven by City Mayors in particular.

• In Jo’burg the JCSS was approved by the Mayor. The current Mayor has expressed renewed commitment to the question of safety. However, different Public Safety MMCs each interacted differently with the Strategy, which lead to fluctuating levels of ownership at the City level.

• A number of interviewees argued that the location of the programme office under the JMPD had caused problems of ownership as the Strategy was perceived to be owned by the JMPD by other City stakeholders.

• While the JCSS was initially formulated and developed in the Department of Finance and Economic Development, after the Strategy was accepted by the City Council, a Jo’burg City Safety programme office for the Strategy was established under the auspices of the JMPD who were designated as the lead agency for the implementation of the Strategy. Although the programme office was meant to play a largely
strategic role, it had to account to the JMPD whose focus is operational rather than strategic.

- Paradoxically, while many City agencies perceived the JCSS to be owned by the JMPD, it appears that JMPD has an ambiguous relationship with the Strategy itself. This is reflected particularly in the lack of resources directed towards the implementation of the Strategy in the most recent period of implementation.

**Accountability**

- Unless ownership is linked to concrete forms of accountability, it is unlikely that implementation will be sustained. The JCSS recognised the need for accountability and emphasised the importance of including deliverables relating to the Strategy in the scorecards of senior officials as well as defining a range of indicators that would enable the City to measure progress on the implementation of the Strategy.

- However, it appears that the forms of accountability that were originally envisaged, were to a large extent not put into place or seem to have had little effect in instilling a sense of accountability among different stakeholders about their role in the implementation of the Strategy.

- This has had a significant impact on institutionalisation of the Strategy. Currently City agencies and departments are not being evaluated in terms of the implementation of the Strategy; therefore there is little incentive for them to take the Strategy seriously in their planning and implementation.

- Some interviewees also argued that accountably had been affected by the location of the JCSP office under JMPD in terms of holding departments accountable for non-performance. This applied in particular to provincial and national departments, for example, the Chief of JMPD can’t give instructions to senior police leadership because he is officially at a lower rank. However, changing the location of the programme office alone will not address the question of accountability. This would have to be combined with systems and processes to support accountability.

- Some interviewees suggested that Service Level Agreements (SLAs) be signed between City departments and the JCSP office. While this may help define roles and responsibilities for both parties, SLAs signed in an institutional vacuum will have little effect. It will be crucial to implement SLAs within a clearly defined system of accountability, for example, which specifies whether departments are accountable to the City Manager or to the Jo’burg programme office for the implementation of the JCSS.

**Multi-agency approach**

- The multi-agency approach was a key innovation of the JCSS, however implementing a multi-agency methodology has proved a challenge in organisational environments around the world, including those with significantly higher levels of resources and more stable governance structures than South Africa.

- An evaluation of the Safer Cities programme in the UK, though not directly comparable to the JCSS, revealed many challenges related to the implementation of a multi-agency approach that were also evident in Jo’burg, for example tensions between various partners, perceptions by the police that crime prevention and community safety were secondary to their primary mandate, suspicion within the local authority, resistance to the Safer Cities approach, reluctance to allocate budgets to crime prevention and political controversy.

- In South Africa, there have been particular problems in implementing a multi-agency approach, which are related to the transitional context in the country.

- Therefore at the same time as the National Crime Prevention Strategy was, “calling for a focus on integration and coordination across departments, these very departments were struggling to define and deliver on their core mandates within the new democratic government system” (Rauch, 2002).
This has led some crime analysts to argue that, “crime prevention strategies should focus initially on strengthening basic service delivery in the government departments that are central to crime” (Pelser and Louw, 2002).

Pelser (2002) and Steinberg (2011) also emphasise the danger of drawing in too many issues into crime prevention and the need for a clear focus and prioritisation of issues for implementation.

In this vein the JCSS developed seven programmes to address a range of issues identified as relevant to crime prevention, ranging from youth involvement in crime to crime prevention through environmental design.

This made it difficult for the JCSP to address all of these issues with equal effectiveness. As a result the efforts of the programme were dispersed over a number of areas of focus, which meant that instead of a visible impact being made on one or two strategic priorities, it was often difficult for the public as well as internal and external stakeholders to understand the impact that the programme was having.

The evaluation of the UK Safer Cities programme found that these challenges revealed the crucial importance of City leadership. Without sufficient commitment from leadership, including funding, “new initiatives would struggle to find traction”.

The evaluation also found that multi-agency approaches require on-going full time work dedicated to building and strengthening relationships in support of co-operative approaches.

As a result of the fact that even in context such as the UK policy, strategic and organisational environments are inevitably fluid and changeable, continuous efforts need to be made to maintain and establish relationships within this context, so that there is a continuity of programme implementation.

In this regard, the skills of the local Safer Cities staff were found to be critical in overcoming problems of implementation and joint-operations. They engaged in skilled and continuous relationship management to build and expand networks in order implement the Safer Cities programme.

In Johannesburg while almost all interviewees agreed that a multi-agency approach is desirable in principal, most acknowledged that departments don’t generally “talk to each other” or work together. Some of the challenges to multi-agency cooperation in relation to the JCSS include:

- Lack of accountability for the implementation of the Safety Strategy, which would compel multi-agency work.
- Failure of departments to deliver on their core mandates due to a lack of capacity and resources, which affects the ability of departments to collectively deliver on crime prevention and safety.
- Crime prevention seen as additional to the core mandate of departments and the responsibility of JMPD and/or SAPS.
- Resistance to subordinating departmental priorities to an over-arching goal, for which departments are not accountable.
- An organisational culture that is hierarchical and resistant to collective approaches.
- No incentives for collective approaches or recognition of the need to maintain the status of individual departments.
- Competition for resources between departments.
- Unclear mandates between law enforcement agencies, JMPD and SAPS regarding their role in crime prevention.
- Unclear mandates between City role-players and departments with provincial and national mandates, e.g. SAPS, Department of Home Affairs etc.
The Way Forward

- It is evident that the JCSS made an important breakthrough in moving the City away from an apartheid style law enforcement approach to crime to a modern crime prevention approach to safety, which drew on international best practice.
- The Strategy and the issues it identifies as key focus areas remain relevant. This is evidenced by the fact that, for example, the JCSS methodology has been mainstreamed in the recently launched Joburg 10 plus programme, which utilises the JCSS methodology for working in local environments.
- Moreover many of the key issues and approach of JCSS are incorporated in the City’s new Growth and Development Strategy, Joburg 2040, which was launched in 2011.
- These include a multi-agency approach, a focus on urban design to create a safer and more liveable environment, the importance of urban governance through by-law enforcement, a focus on alcohol abuse, youth and the needs of the vulnerable.
- However, JCSS requires alignment with the current City policy environment and changing urban landscape including the influx of migrants to the City, the growth of informal settlements etc.
- Although an analysis of the latest crime statistics shows that the City of Johannesburg still experiences significant problems of crime, including violent crime and that therefore the issue of safety remains a critical concern for the City, there has been a shift in the approach to and understanding of crime.
- While Jo’burg 2030 primarily focused on the impact of crime on business investment in the City, Jo’burg 2040 looks at crime as a consequence of a range of underlying social ills. It focuses in particular on the impact of a lack of safety on the poor and marginalised and therefore seeks to address all forms of harm and threats to security which marginalised citizens experience such as flooding, fire, overcrowding etc.
- Jo’burg 2040 also emphasises community involvement in achieving a secure and safe city as well as equal access to police services and safety support for all the City’s residents i.e. the approach to crime is firmly located within a developmental paradigm.
- In terms of urban governance Jo’burg 2040 argues for the need to revisit the implementation of by-laws in order to ensure that their enforcement is balanced against citizen’s rights, particularly the rights of poorer citizens, for example the right to housing. The 2040 Strategy also emphasises that the enforcement of by-laws should not unnecessarily undermine residents’ ability to pursue economic opportunities for example through street trading.

Recommendations

- The JCSS did seek to address crime as a holistic social challenge but it will be necessary to assess the extent to which its approach is fully aligned with Jo’burg 2040’s specific focus on the poor and marginalised in the City with regard to by-laws, access to safety, safety hazards, community participation and current social problems related to urbanisation such as overcrowding, xenophobia and homophobic violence.
- While the JCSS envisaged City leadership and in particular the Mayor and City Manager as playing a central role in driving safety initiatives, Jo’burg 2040 argues that the City has a “limited” direct role in community safety but instead sees its “investment in public safety” as essentially relating to creating a liveable urban environment for the City residents, which it implies, will lead to a reduction in crime and fear of crime.
- However, an improvement in living conditions cannot be assumed to automatically lead to a reduction of crime and moreover is a long terms goal.
- International examples indicate that crime and violence can be successfully addressed in the short to medium term even during an economic downturn, as occurred in Bogota Colombia, through innovative safety programmes, which are decisively driven by City leadership.
- Therefore it will be critical to clarify the exact nature of the role that the City and City leadership will play in crime prevention in the City going forward.
• While municipalities have been given more autonomy to take on the responsibility for safety and security, this is not yet very clearly articulated. As a senior City leader asked, “What does crime prevention mean in the municipal context?” This still needs to be properly explored and codified for the City.

• It is within this context that an assessment regarding the appropriate location of an office to drive crime prevention in the City will need to be made, taking into account some of the problems regarding the location of the current JCSP office, which have been outlined.

• One of the critical challenges faced in the implementation of the JCSS was a lack of clear ownership of the Strategy, from the highest levels of the City to station commander level. If any safety strategy is to succeed it will be critical that it is not only “owned” by City leadership but that this ownership is supported with meaningful forms of accountability as well as incentives that actually ensure that the strategy is effectively implemented.

• It will be crucial as a starting point to put into place coherent systems of accountability that explicitly clarify the relationship between Jo’burg 2040, the JCSS and Jo’burg 10 plus. While these strategies and programmes implicitly build on each other, interviews conducted by the HSRC indicate that role players in the City responsible for addressing safety challenges are themselves not clear of the relationship between these strategies and programmes.

• A challenge that has been noted by Pelser (2002) is that extensive consultation in the development of strategies, while important, can lead to the proliferation of focus areas for intervention. It has been noted that the JCSS focused on a number of areas related to crime prevention. Many of these focus areas are reproduced in Jo’burg 2040. While all of these areas are no doubt important, it will be crucial for the City to identify one or two key priorities where energy and resources are focused in order to achieve maximum visible impact on the quality of life of residents, while attending to longer term challenges to safety.

• These focus areas can be addressed to issues of significant public concern such as violence against children or may relate to questions of service delivery that impact on citizens’ daily lives such as improving response times of all City departments to issues ranging from traffic light outages to medical emergencies.

• No modern urban management system can function effectively without systematic collection and analysis of data relating to all aspects of its work.

• At the moment there is no such central information collection system as well as a lack of openness and transparency between City departments and agencies regarding information in general and crime statistics in particular.

• This makes it impossible to empirically assess the extent of challenges which the City faces or to develop evidence based solutions in relation to safety as well as other issues of urban governance. It also makes it very difficult to empirically evaluate the progress of the City in meeting the challenges it faces in relation to safety as well as a range of other areas of concern. These information challenges need to be addressed urgently.

• Firearms do not appear as a specific focus area in Jo’burg 2040. However, international experience in environments such as Bogota indicate that reducing the easy availability of firearms is an important component of creating a safe environment, particularly in contexts that have been previously characterised by violent conflict and where firearms are widely available, as in South Africa. A significant number of homicides and attempted homicides in South Africa are committed with firearms. It is therefore recommended that a focus on firearms is maintained as part of the overall approach to safety in the city.

• While Jo’burg 2040 frequently refers to the importance of gender equality, it does not engage with the extent to which the possibility of gender equality is undermined by violence against women or lack of safety for women. Recent Victims of Crime Survey data indicate that women in Gauteng are
particularly fearful of violence in their environments, with the majority feeling unsafe to walk alone in their areas at night or even during the day (National Victims of Crime Survey, 2012). Clearly if women do not have freedom of movement in the City, it is unlikely that they will be able to realise their full potential as citizens. Therefore any safety strategy which is developed going forward will need to specifically address the safety challenges which women in the City face.
References cited


