Urban safety and security: Lessons from the last two decades and emergent issues

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The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) established the Global Safer Cities Programme in 1996. Twenty years later, holistic approaches to urban safety and security have become an ongoing activity not only of UN agencies and national and local governments, but also criminal justice institutions, civil society organisations, academic experts and research institutions. For the first time, a Special Session on Safer Cities will take place at the third meeting of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat III) in Quito. What has been established during the last two decades as to research- and programme-driven lessons for promoting urban safety and security? What too of emergent issues, and the new challenges and opportunities these will present for work on urban safety and security?

For the purposes of this report, urban safety and security is defined as the identification and remediation of threats and vulnerabilities from a people-centred vs a state-centric perspective. In addition to addressing the prevention of crime and violence, urban safety also includes the enhancement of individual rights including the physical, social and psychological integrity of a person. As such, urban safety is a complementary concept to crime prevention, as it starts from the observation that inadequate urban development and local governance and social and territorial exclusion patterns encourage crime and violence. In this perspective, urban safety adopts a citywide and participatory process to address the risk factors, and above all, protection factors of insecurity in cities, creating the conditions for more sustainable, inclusive, cohesive and just cities. At issue too are chronic vulnerabilities for city dwellers arising from basic needs (including food, shelter, and health); contextual vulnerabilities created via social, economic and political processes; and the vulnerabilities generated by disasters, whether natural or man-made (UN-Habitat 2007). While the report touches on chronic and extreme vulnerabilities, the main focus is on contextual threats to people in cities, especially those involving violence and crime.

‘We have accumulated significant proven and evidence based knowledge about what are the risk factors for violence and what has been effective and cost effective for stopping interpersonal violence’ (Waller 2016). So what next? One answer is that governments and intergovernmental agencies need to invest more to scale up what works.

The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is a joint project of four institutions:
The United States is estimated to lose 3.5% of its GDP to criminal activity; the regional estimate for Central America is 8%.

The last two decades have seen increasing recognition of the inequalities of life conditions and opportunities of men and women. Research shows that street harassment and violence against women and girls are prevalent in all regions, while varying in relation with the levels of violence against men. Everywhere, men are killed violently more frequently than women (globally approximately five times more). Where more men die, more women are also attacked and killed (although most femicides take place in domestic contexts) (GDS 2011). Women frequently do not feel safe in cities; their insecurity limits their ability to work and have careers, let alone reach their potential as game changers for economic growth (UN Women 2015).

As urban areas have become increasingly larger and more densely populated with poorly planned urbanization trends, armed conflicts are increasingly being fought in cities. This brings with it not only the direct effects of displacement, injury and death, but also cumulative and long-term impacts on essential services, with consequences for people’s health, education, livelihoods and dignity (ICRC 2016). Terrorism and the radicalization of young people are also increasingly urban-centred today. Many of those who commit terrorist acts are being radicalized in their local urban communities; the concentration of populations in urban areas also makes cities attractive targets for terrorist attacks.

Together, these developments and trends demonstrate why we need to make it a priority to engage more systematically and effectively for urban safety with particular attention to the systems of urban planning, legislation, governance and the socio-economy of urban centres. This engagement needs to be delivered at the level of neighbourhoods with people at the centre of land, housing, infrastructure and basic service provision. The present report synthesizes some of the most important lessons to date for work in the area, including the following:

- make prevention a priority
- recognize the importance of public space
- realize that without municipal leadership, crime, conflict and violence reduction and prevention plans cannot succeed
- create multi-sectoral partnerships for change within government structures
- work with civil society actors as co-producers of security for all
- support better data-collection and analysis, research, and exchange of promising practices
Looking forward, the report also discusses the following emergent issues:

- The need to scale up urban safety interventions, and what this implies for local government
- Violence against women and girls and the need to work on legal frameworks and their implementation as well as on social norms
- The politicization of migrant flows, especially refugees, the need for better understanding of urban crime, conflict and violence by migrants and towards them, and the opportunity for innovative partnerships with humanitarian organizations and others in the peacebuilding community
- Land tenure as one of the drivers of urban crime, conflict and violence by and towards migrants, and the need to look further at the nature of governance, and at city and elite responses to land-based conflict and violence, to better understand the land tenure-urban conflict and violence nexus.

Overarching these emergent issues is that making cities safer is a prerequisite to their liveability, the right to the city for all, and sustainable development in general. There cannot be much advance on the Sustainable Development Goals and the New Urban Agenda without tackling urban crime and safety challenges.

**Lessons learned from 20 years of urban safety work addressing violence and criminality**

The following are some of the most important outcomes to date of global research and practice to counter urban violence and crime:

**Make prevention a priority**

This is perhaps the top lesson of two decades of urban safety interventions. It does not mean leaving violent acts to go unpunished. Rather, it means realizing that crime and violence reduction measures alone will not succeed, or will not succeed for long, unless they are accompanied by long-term investments in prevention. Effective prevention programming, identified for all regions of the world, has been shown to include:

- Urban design for safety and creating a physical environment in which people feel secure and can move freely (see below);
- Institutional crime and violence prevention (e.g., promoting the role of local government in providing safety and security for their inhabitants and encouraging community and problem-oriented policing);
- Alternative forms of justice and bringing justice closer to the people (e.g. tribunals and traditional community conflict mediation mechanisms); and
- Social crime prevention, focusing on youth at risk and the safety of women and girls.

Democracy International Inc. makes the point that violence is “sticky”, clustering in specific places, among specific people, and around specific behaviours. It follows that interventions
focusing on the highest risk places, people and behaviours generate the strongest effects, whether relating to policing, gang interventions, youth violence prevention, etc. (2016: 27).

Waller (2016) highlights how many governments and inter-governmental agencies have yet to invest significantly in violence prevention, despite the proof that now exists of its effectiveness. The priority of prevention needs to be brought home to policymakers, not as a replacement for violence reduction but as a necessary accompaniment. This includes in times of states of emergency due to terrorism; radicalization will not be addressed through police and military repression alone.

**Recognize the importance of public space**

A positive vision of cities views them as societies of interconnected neighbourhoods, each offering elements of social integration and cohesion and providing public spaces as centres for an acculturation of citizenship values and living together in security. The hyper-urbanization marking our era, however, has too often been unplanned and unmanaged, with public services trailing behind, or failing to reach, many areas of urban sprawl. Public spaces may not exist, or may have been taken over by different groups through legal means or threats and the use of violence. This concentration of disadvantages vis-à-vis public spaces correlates strongly with income inequality and with some forms of violence.

Yet favelas and barrios and other areas of disadvantage do not have to have such impoverished social connectivity, as cities such as Medellín in Colombia have demonstrated. Urban associational life can be fostered – and violence reduced – through (re)creating working public spaces. This can mean libraries and cultural centres where people are connected to educational resources, or plazas, parks, promenades and the like which bring inhabitants together informally. Police stations may be redesigned to create public access, or new facilities built. Public escalators may be installed in steeply sloped slums to improve mobility and also security (Geisinger n.d.; UN-Habitat 2015).

Of note in these remediation processes is the integration of community safety and perceptions of security into land use planning, a relatively recent and welcome movement for urban planning (Prevention Institute 2015). Related directly to this is the role of community members. The most successful urban safety plans draw not only on people with technical knowledge, but also (in dialogue and exchange with technical experts) on locals of different ages and backgrounds who speak about their experiences, envision safer streets, and help build neighbourhood consensus. The collaborations generated show how the social capital of marginalized communities can be developed around public spaces, enabling the co-production of safety for all (see below for more on the latter point).

**Realize that without engaged municipal leadership, violence reduction and prevention plans cannot succeed**

Not all local governments today can be or are engaged in helping lead violence reduction and prevention efforts. They may not be given a mandate to participate actively (for example, when national governments conduct “mano dura” centralized gang elimination strategies). It may also be that the local authorities themselves do not want to spend the time, money, and
political capital to engage, or they consider it is for the police (not for them) to create and direct strategies for violence reduction.

Yet initiatives like those of Guadalajara and Corregidora in Mexico, and Abijan-Attercoube, Cote d’Ivoire, show how engaged municipal governments can advance an urban safety agenda and improve the quality of life of city inhabitants. Recent research on Asian Pacific crime prevention programmes adds to the now-substantial case learning on this point by demonstrating that a successful launch of a crime prevention programme needs a ‘three-stage rocket’ of the national government to give context and direction, state and regional authorities to help guide and mediate, and cities and local governments, as the locus where everything happens and coordination must be grounded. As much as 65% of the effectiveness of an intervention is estimated to rest on action or inaction at the local level (UN-Habitat 2016).

Three reasons stand out for why local governments are so crucial. The first is accountability: when public pressure does matter, it generally matters most directly at the local level. Local business leaders usually know better how to reach city vs national officials to insist on their security needs; ward constituents are generally more easily heard by their local representatives than by someone representing their region or state. Homel and Fuller call this the subsidiarity principle, ‘that matters ought to be handled by the smallest (or the lowest) competent authority…only when a particular task cannot be undertaken adequately by a low level of government will it be handed up to a higher level’ (2015: 11).

Second, multi-sectoral partnerships for change are usually needed within government structures for violence reduction interventions or prevention programming to gain traction. City leadership is often crucial to advancing multi-sectoral strategies and to breaking down administrative silos to foster working collaborations across relevant departments and institutions.

Third, local authorities may be the best able to encourage and support partnerships with diverse civil society partners which (beyond the administrative partnerships) are needed to reduce insecurity and promote working coalitions for safer cities.

The institutional and civil society experiences are sufficiently rich and complex today that they deserve to be broken out here, as distinct learning clusters for urban safety.

**Create multi-sectoral partnerships for change within government structures**

We know that the causes of urban violence are complex and multi-faceted. A lack of jobs and high alcohol outlet density, for example, both facilitate violence, while quality schools and clean public spaces work to protect against it. Complex social problems create the need for multi-dimensional responses. Strategies with both short- and long-term horizons are required; discrete measures need to be accompanied by actions to address structural drivers like persistent inequality and youth unemployment (Prevention Institute 2014; Muggah et al 2016).

In practical terms, this means that different government agencies will need to work together to improve urban safety. Police forces alone cannot achieve sustainable reductions in criminal violence in high-risk neighbourhoods. Working in tandem with social, public health and public
Calls for comprehensive programming require some nuance; it may be better for programmatic and institutional success alike to target indicated and selected populations.

While it only makes sense to seek to tackle violence problems on more than one front, calls for comprehensive programming require some nuance. It has been shown that crime reduction interventions have more success when they bring multiple programmatic levers to bear on high-risk areas, actors, and actions (Democracy International Inc. 2016). Given the prevalence of young men (15-25 years old) as both the perpetrators and the victims of deadly violence, there is often a strong argument for a youth focus.

Work on indicated and selected populations (in public health parlance) is also relevant to which government agencies need to be brought together in multi-sectoral institutional partnerships. It takes organization and commitment to create institutional partnerships. Even with the best will in the world, it may not be realistic to do this comprehensively, across all sectors and levels of government. At issue are the coordination problems which arise all too regularly in the implementation phase of interventions, if not already in the agenda-setting period. The best approach may be to select institutional partners, seeking to bring together only key organizational stakeholders. In this way, diverse expertise can still be leveraged, while administratively fewer silos have to be broken down and implementation capacities may be improved (Kania and Kramer 2011).

**Work with civil society actors as co-producers of security**

The urban safety community has by no means perfected methods and approaches to involve civil society actors in anti-violence interventions. There have been clear gains over the last two decades in this area, though, starting with participatory approaches to defining safety goals.

Participatory tools have come to urban safety from the development community, where methods to gather information by, about and with local people have been in use since the 1970s. Local information-gathering for urban security work can be organized as town hall meetings and focus group discussions; it can also involve safety walks and other interactive, on-the-ground methods from participatory toolkits (see, for example, Social Development Direct 2013). Through such techniques the experiences of insecurity in the community can be traced out and better understood as a necessary preliminary to finding workable solutions. This is particularly relevant to women and girls, or to the elderly, or members of the LGBT community, for example, all groups which are often not disaggregated in crime and violence statistics and which may have differential experiences of public space and access to public services and distinct security needs and concerns (Women in Cities International 2016). It may also be difficult to successfully intervene in violence-ridden communities with strong and competing local interest groups. Participatory consultations are a good way to seek to establish some agreed goals with local power-holders (Homel and Masson 2016).

Participatory information-gathering gives voice to communities in the creation of urban safety initiatives. A further step in community empowerment is to involve civil society leaders and
groups in anti-violence interventions. One good example of the latter, which has achieved measurable reductions in violence, involves violence interrupters (Skogan et al 2009).

Violence interrupters are leaders in a local community with standing with those who have been or are likely next to be violent, e.g., ex-drug runners or gang members and their families. They are trained in group facilitation and mediation techniques so that when there is a crisis they can step in to speak with the families and friends of those killed, to try to convince them not to retaliate, and with the groups involved to seek to calm the violence. The aims are immediately to prevent retaliation and to reduce tensions, and then if possible to seek to create a normality of less violence. Thus the larger vision is one of supporting community resilience and restoring communities as part of a co-production of security.

Violence interrupters are an illustration of local leaders delivering projects the police likely cannot, due to their lack of credibility with the communities in question. Co-production can also mean local leaders seeking informal advice from the police, or partnerships between authorities and local leaders such as the UK’s Muslim Contact Unit and Prevent programmes, or the anti-terrorist community engagement programmes of US cities like Los Angeles, Minneapolis or Boston.

In all of these instances a co-production approach can be challenging, among other reasons because of the intricate local knowledge needed to establish trust and identify the “shot callers” with the true voice and status to speak for a community. Community interventions of this kind may also take years to reach fruition, as they involve engaging with marginalized youth and seeking to change the social norms favouring violence.

**Support better data collection, research and exchange of best practices**

Participatory data-gathering and the disaggregation of data it enables are part of a learning core about urban safety research established in the last two decades. The overarching conclusion is that effective interventions require a fine-grained (granular and localized) understanding of how individuals, households, local groups and communities are imbricated in the production of violence, and how violence dynamics work in a particular area and with the particular communities and groups in question. Interventions that draw on local data have a higher chance of effectiveness than those which operate with outside understandings and ‘one size fits all’ programmes (Wennmann and Ganson 2016).

Localizing data is tricky, however, in many of the contexts of interest for urban safety work. This is not only because information can be hard to come by if there are no systems in place to collect it (though that is often true). Information is also power, and local interest groups know this and will often seek to shape the data collected to suit their agendas (or prevent it from being collected if that is not possible).

One promising means to address this is through creating institutionalized knowledge networks, or observatories, to share responsibilities for monitoring local contexts. The observatories (of which there are dozens today at the international, national and city levels) are data aggregators, making available qualitative and quantitative data and studies to the different partners. Beyond
this, observatories may encourage data comparability through partner agreements on definitions and methods of collection (as with the Inter-American Development Bank’s Citizen Security and Justice observatories programme). Via training and technical meetings, the observatories may play an important role in improving data collection and supporting learning exchanges. They may also enable different actors to gather around a study to challenge one another’s perspectives, and in this way play a part in the politics of setting urban safety policies.

**Looking towards the next twenty years**

The how-to lessons discussed above enable urban safety practitioners to say that ‘we have accumulated significant proven and evidence based knowledge about what are the risk factors for violence and what has been effective and cost effective for stopping interpersonal violence’ (Waller 2016). There is guidance on acquiring the knowledge needed to stage successful interventions, and imperatives identified for involving local authorities and adopting participatory approaches.

So what next? One answer is that governments and inter-governmental agencies need to invest more to scale up what works. That will surely be one of the issues on the urban safety agenda for the next two decades. Others will include research and programming to better address violence against women and migrants and refugees, and to engage with the land tenure-violence nexus.

**Scaling up urban safety interventions**

Where once, it would have been nearly impossible to propose urban violence reduction programmes to development agencies, there is now an increasing acceptance that not only are cities ‘the new frontier’ of international development (DFID 2010), ‘taking action against violence is a development imperative’ (World Bank 2016). This opening to urban safety does not represent a massive flood of newly available funds, but it does indicate some new bilateral and multilateral finance for this work. There could be more from national governments, too, if there was broader recognition of the staggering costs of urban violence and the significant negative long-term consequences for economic, social, human and sustainable development. One of the urban safety goals of Habitat-III is to contribute to this recognition, and to institutionalizing prospects for engagement within the UN system.

For urban safety interventions to be successfully scaled up, local authorities will need great powers, financial and otherwise. Many may also require capacity-building if not political suasion.

A linked goal is to advance the role of local authorities in a future process of scaling up. As demonstrated in the Habitat-III process, municipal leaders are increasingly recognized as credible interlocutors for consultations on urban safety and security questions. They are still not fully integrated into national and international urban security networks, however. Policy and financial decisions are still largely vested at national levels, while it is national representatives who have official standing in UN processes such as Habitat-III.

The corollary of subsidiarity in operations – local authorities coordinating urban safety programmes – is legislative subsidiarity – local authorities having the powers, including financial, to take on coordinating roles. In some countries this may require changes to existing legislation.
to decentralize resources and responsibilities. Even without the regulatory challenges implied, there are bound to be issues of will and capacity.

It has been shown repeatedly that a visionary and dedicated mayor can succeed in leading efforts to bring about sustained changes in urban violence (e.g., Cali in Colombia or Diadema in the Brazilian state of Sao Paulo; see World Bank 2016). Yet such successes also imply their opposite: that some local authorities do not have the authority, or strong enough political interests, to take action. Or they may lack the leadership and organizational capacities to be the locus where “everything happens”. Some of these governance issues can be addressed through networking processes like the observatories, the European Forum for Urban Security, or the Global Network on Safer Cities of UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities Programme (to name a few networks only). There will still be considerable capacity-building required, though, if not processes of political suasion or even contestation.

**Violence against women and girls**

A safer cities for women movement began to emerge in the 1970s with the ‘take back the night’ protest marches. While urban safety researchers soon conducted some studies of women’s insecurities, urban gender analyses and programmes have trailed behind the ‘right to the city’ social movement (Taylor 2011). Today this is shifting; there is a stronger commitment to work in this area emerging signalled by the inclusion of gender throughout Sustainable Development Goals and the draft commitments of Habitat-III.

One practical means to advance women’s safety is through thoughtful renovation of public space to create “positive social control” of harassment opportunities. For example, on transportation networks cities are experimenting with measures like adjusting lighting and adapting waiting area spaces, limiting waiting times, segregating buses or trains, and installing easily accessed systems to seek help and report incidents (World Bank 2014).

Such measures, while undoubtedly of value, will need to be accompanied by work on legal frameworks and their implementation as well as on social norms. Comparative field work on violence against women in public spaces shows that women must face sexual attacks at or in the vicinity of their workplaces; they may be accosted or robbed at informal markets or schools and universities; everywhere, they are subject to verbal and physical harassment which threatens them and limits their freedom of movement. In many countries, some of these aggressions are not illegal (e.g., street harassment), or there are laws on the books but they are not enforced (World Bank 2014).

When laws work, it is because the majority of the population follows them as normal and correct. This makes changing social norms a crucial goal. The prevalent normalization of gender stereotypes and attitudes permits disrespectful, discriminatory and violent treatment of women and girls. Even in countries like Canada or Sweden, where sexual assault laws were ‘modernized’ thirty years ago, still judges may come under review today for drawing on old stereotypes of sexual assault victims (Fine 2016).
Organizations like Promundo are undertaking interesting and relevant work with men and boys to seek to transform harmful gender norms and unequal power dynamics in high-violence settings. The projects (including advocacy campaigns, community mobilization, and group education and therapy) are not explicitly labelled as urban, but they are still largely interventions in “sticky” urban violence areas. Of general importance is the move in this work to treat violence against women and girls not as a ‘women’s issue,’ but as everyone’s concern.

Migrants and refugees

Migration is driving humanity’s urbanization. Meanwhile, migrant flows are increasingly politicized, with some of the most charged topics the links between immigration and cultural, crime and sexual violence. Interwoven in this is that refugees are increasingly ending up in cities instead of rural camps, and this for the global South and North alike.

On a knowledge production level, there is still work to be done to clarify how and by whom immigrant crime and violence trends are generated. Developed country studies generally show that immigration tends to reduce, not raise, crime rates. For the children of migrants, however, there is often an increase in crime. We do not have a clear theoretical account of how this happens in the second generation, although a lack of social and economic integration are clearly risk factors (Bucerius 2014).

In developing countries rising crime rates are linked by many to first-generation migrants. But this is not well-established statistically nor well-explored for risk factors. Non-hukou, or temporary immigration in China, for example, is officially associated with rapidly rising rates of urban crime (Hu 2012). A recent study of Shanghai, though, found that the congregation of non-hukou migrants had no significant influence on urban safety (Tan and Ren 2015). Others have noted that for the same behaviours the Chinese police arrest and imprison migrants, particularly young migrants, far more than other urban residents (Economist 2013).

Migrant victimization, the other face of immigration and violence, also deserves more attention than it has received. In global Southern cities the continuous arrival of large numbers of migrants puts further pressure on already-stressed urban environments and may lead to or exacerbate social tensions. In the North and the South alike, religious and ethnic differences play into prejudices and contribute to acts of discrimination.

What needs work is when and how this is translated into overt violence against migrants, and how to prevent this? The topic has immediate policy relevance: just as attacks on migrants are at record levels in European cities, so too in Southern cities migrants are frequently the targets of violence. Particularly at risk are refugees and internally-displaced persons, and children and young people, women, and those with disabilities or lesbian, gay or transsexual gender identities (ICRC 2016).

International organizations like United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have begun operating in cities in conditions of urban armed conflict and extreme urban violence alike. They have important messages to convey, including the duty (too often not understood or ignored) for combatants to follow the international humanitarian principles of proportionality, distinction and precaution (ICRC 2016).

The land tenure–urban violence nexus

Most migrants to Southern cities are poor. If they are pushed to move by environmental degradation and a lack of opportunities in the countryside, they are pulled by the economic magnetism of cities and the promise of better life conditions. Most find themselves living not in well-planned and well-serviced and well-policing neighbourhoods, but in “informal settlements,” shantytowns with few public services, little social capital, and ambiguous or no political recognition or interest.

This raises the issue of insecure land tenure, recognized already in the 2007 UN-Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements as a key challenge for our urban future. Habitat III articulates the importance of securing land rights for all, including women’s access, ownership, inheritance and control, and of promoting resilience to disaster and climate threats. Researchers have also documented how forced evictions and threats of displacement and resettlement fuel instability and encourage local clientalism, while the imposition of property rights can divide communities and push those without title to depend further on local power brokers (Davis 2012). The land tenure-violence nexus is still under-studied, though, and this despite how land is a long-recognized and well-studied source of conflict in rural areas.

Moser and Rodgers’ innovative (2013) research suggests some avenues worth pursuing. Cities are inherently conflictual spaces in their framework, with the pivot being whether conflicts are managed or resolved, or ‘tip over’ into violence. The case studies Moser and Rodgers undertake of Patna, Dili and Nairobi demonstrate how different forms of dysfunctional land tenure systems are closely associated with tipping points. Santiago, in contrast, has an unambiguous land tenure system operating; there, housing quality is more contested, with less violence.

Intertwined with how land is regulated are issues of the nature of governance. What are the multiple and competing forms of authority in a given city, and how does this play into ‘violence chains’? Is governance more inclusive or is it more exclusionary, closing out particular social groups? Also at issue is whether city and elite responses to violence concentrate on increasing security or reducing violence. In all of the cities in Moser and Rodgers’ study, a security-first approach is identified as aggravating violence and generating new conflicts.

Conclusion

The emergent issues presented in this report1 – how to scale up urban safety interventions, improve the public safety of women and girls, better understand and prevent migrant-related

1 Two other consequential issues not discussed here are urban terrorism and the radicalization of urban youth, and what “smart cities” technologies will mean for urban safety for individuals and urban systems and territories. So far, both are more surveillance- and securitization-oriented, see Macmillan 2015 and Muggah 2016b.
violence and crime, and engage with the land tenure-violence nexus – are all complex and unlikely to be resolved quickly or easily. But meeting these challenges is essential if we truly wish to advance a people-centred urban safety agenda for everyone, and not just for the fortunate few. They also signal how the emerging urban agenda is of direct relevance to the international community’s Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 11 of sustainable cities and communities, goal 5 of gender equality, goal 10 of reduced inequalities, and goal 16 of peace, justice and strong institutions.

Urban safety practitioners will find that they are not alone in their next-generation efforts. Among others there are development experts, political scientists and humanitarians, many of whom are part of the broader peacebuilding community, who are eager to dialogue and who have relevant insights and experience to share. Observatories and working groups offer good means to bring people together around a new urban agenda for violence reduction and prevention. It is to be hoped that these partnerships and new ways of working across sectors and institutions will become a leading example of the fulfilment of SDG Goal 17, partnerships for the goals as well as the implementation of the New Urban Agenda.

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About this paper

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For more information about the conference see http://www.gpplatform.ch/reviewing-states-safety-world-cities-geneva-6-8-july-2016.

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