Partnerships for Urban Safety in Fragile Contexts: The Intersection of Community Crime Prevention and Security Sector Reform

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Implementing sustainable community safety and security sector reform in highly unstable and conflict-affected contexts is a significant and growing challenge. Donor-led security sector reform (SSR) processes claim to enable transparent, effective and accountable provision of security. Yet, traditional externally driven SSR processes implemented in a top-down manner have been shown to have important shortcomings.

Using the experience of a form of SSR undertaken in the Jenin Governorate in the Palestinian territories, this paper highlights some of these shortcomings, in particular those arising from: (1) a lack of local ownership; (2) the failure to address governance issues; (3) the impact of a co-optation of political and security elites; and (3) the neglect of citizens’ views and needs.

Importantly, the paper describes a viable method for overcoming these shortcomings to produce a more sustainable approach to community safety in extremely difficult circumstances through the use of outcome based local crime prevention planning processes. This means that in contrast to the SSR experience, the Jenin community safety project was a bottom-up, community-based approach that built effective ‘partnerships’ for crime prevention with both formal security providers (e.g. security forces, executive authorities, Parliamentarians, and governors’ offices) and informal security providers (e.g. civil society, media, tribal and business leaders) to produce a viable mechanism by which a safer community with stronger local leadership might be created.

The conduct of effective SSR in fragile contexts requires the identification of key intersection areas with locally led community safety programs. Similarly, bottom-up security initiatives are unlikely to be sustainable if they are not anchored in a nation-wide security transformation process.

The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is a joint project of four institutions:
1. Community safety, crime prevention, peacebuilding and the rule of law

The international community has increasingly recognized the close link between effective crime prevention and fair, transparent and humane criminal justice systems as key elements of the rule of law on the one hand, and the task of state building and achieving sustainable development on the other (UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/188 2013). This means that security and justice are viewed as both enablers of and outcomes of sustainable socio-economic development and the creation of viable states. In other words, societies that enjoy socio-economic equality, good governance and a solid rule of law often demonstrate lower levels of crime, violence and victimization thus making them safer communities. On the other hand, where societies are characterised by high inequality, violence, unemployment and weak social fabric, states often fail their obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights, potentially feeding into a circle of more insecurity and development stagnation, or even losses in development gains (Jackson 2011, UNODC 2010).

In turn, this has led international agencies to increasingly support the use of what are in effect local community safety initiatives to promote human security and state building within unstable contexts (Baker 2010a, Mac Ginty 2015). Recent examples include activities such as decentralized multi-stakeholder public consultations on security in Tunisia (Harzallah and Masson 2014), the promotion of local peace agreements between municipal actors in Libya (PCI 2013), the establishment of local security councils in Kosovo, Nepal and Bangladesh (Saferworld 2013), or even mediation initiatives between criminal gangs and local governance bodies as has occurred in Latin and Central America (Cocayne 2013).

Development agencies will particularly focus on promoting local community safety in countries where state-centred security structures are ineffective. Where the authority of the state and its control over the security forces are weak or contested, it is likely that local communities will suffer from a security vacuum potentially leading to abuses by informal power structures, including warlords or gangs, as has been noted particularly in places like Afghanistan (Sedra 2006) among others (Jackson 2011). Inclusive local community safety programmes aim at providing opportunities for security and justice to be fairly administered by local entities in the absence of a solid-state framework (Gordon 2014).

These sorts of developments are a response to an emerging concern about the ability of the various forms of security sector reform (SSR) models that are used in different contexts to adequately address the complex and apparently at times competing tasks of state building and ensuring the specific security needs of local communities (Hänggi and Scherrer 2008, Sedra 2010a, Donais 2009). However, as Mac Ginty (2015) points out, simply talking in terms of strengthening the focus on localism is not in itself a complete or adequate solution to this tension as the roots of the problems that the SSR process is seeking to address can often be tracked to local communities themselves.

This is one of the reasons that agencies engaged in the peacebuilding process are starting to turn to the tools and processes of developed for use in the crime prevention sector for the specific purpose of addressing local community conflict and to enhance local community safety.

In recent years a rigorous approach to local community crime prevention has emerged, frequently built around the use of highly local governance structures such as local government
authorities (Homel and Faulkner 2015, Morgan et al 2012, Morgan and Homel 2011). These new local community crime prevention approaches have also placed a stronger emphasis on more rigorous strategic planning processes built on ensuring high levels of local governance and community participation as part of a goal to ensure transparency and strong accountability processes through the use of performance measures and outcome based planning (Morgan and Homel 2011).

This paper summarises some of the possible areas of intersection between these newer local community safety initiatives and SSR programmes in fragile and conflict-affected environments by exploring the practical policy implications to be drawn from a case study of the governorate of Jenin in the north of the occupied Palestinian territory of the West Bank. There, a top-down, donor led SSR programme was conducted by major donors between 2008 and 2014. During the same period, the authors of this article were involved in the development of a bottom-up community safety programme sponsored by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the local human rights organization “SHAMS”. A more detailed description of this work can be found in Homel and Masson (2016). However, before proceeding it is important to understand the relationship between community safety and security sector reform processes.

2. Community safety and crime prevention processes

For the United Nations, the notion of ‘community safety’ or ‘community security’ initially implied the protection of threatened ethnic minorities and indigenous communities understood as groups sharing the same identity markers and values (UNDP 1994). More recently, ‘community safety’ has increasingly been associated with the ‘free from fear’ / ‘free from want’ definition of ‘human security’ (UNDP 1994, 22 and 24, Redo 2012). Community safety programmes are people-centred approaches to security that include strengthening local communities’ capacity to respond to armed violence, and crime (‘free from fear’). Local communities are empowered to build stronger partnerships with state authorities and security institutions with a view to tackling a wide range of political, socio-economical, environmental or health security measures (“free from want”). Community safety is also consistent with the United Nations’ promotion of the principle of ‘subsidiarity’. According to this principle, “issues ought to be addressed at the lowest level capable of addressing them”, i.e. at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels, while “reducing the number of issues that need to be tackled at the international and supranational level” (UNCDP 2014, 14).

The process of crime prevention is a fundamental tool for the achievement of the broad concept of community safety. The United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime defines crime prevention as comprising those “strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes” (ECOSOC 2002). What is important about this definition is that crime prevention is clearly differentiated from action intended to simply control crime. Today, international experience has shown that effective crime prevention can maintain and reinforce the social cohesion of communities and assist communities to act collectively to improve their quality of life (Idriss et al. 2010, Sampson 2013).

Crime prevention includes the range of strategies that are implemented by individuals, communities, businesses, non-government organisations and all levels of government, to target the various individual, social and environmental factors that increase the risk of crime, disorder
and victimisation (AIC 2003; ECOSOC 2002; IPC 2008; Van Dijk & de Waard 1991). This includes strategies that modify the physical environment to reduce the opportunities for crime to occur (environmental approaches), and strategies that focus on the underlying social and economic causes of crime and limiting the supply of motivated offenders (social approaches). Crime prevention may have a universal focus through strengthening institutions that support civil society and the rule of law, be directed at the early identification and subsequent intervention in the lives of people or groups at risk of engaging in criminal activity, or be targeted at the prevention of recidivism among those people who have already engaged in offending behaviour (Welsh and Farrington 2012).

There are a range of actions delivered in other sectors (e.g. health, education, housing, human services) which will have an impact on crime levels, especially in the long term, but which may not have the prevention of crime as their primary goal. While this activity does not necessarily fall within a strict definition of crime prevention, it is important that the potential crime prevention benefits of the policies and programmes delivered in these sectors are identified, acknowledged and, wherever possible, enhanced.

3. Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform (SSR) generally refers to a process to reform or rebuild a state’s security sector. It responds to a situation in which a dysfunctional security sector is unable to provide security to the state and its people effectively and under democratic principles. In some cases, the security sector can itself be a source of widespread insecurity due to discriminatory and abusive policies or practices. In this respect, an unreformed or poorly constructed security sector represents a decisive obstacle to the promotion of sustainable development, security and peace. SSR processes therefore seek to enhance the delivery of effective and efficient security and justice services, by security sector institutions that are accountable to the state and its people, and operate within a framework of democratic governance, without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law (Ball 2010).

SSR is both an operational as well as a normative concept. Featuring norms such as good governance, civilian oversight and the rule of law, among its defining characteristics, its inclusion as a necessary component of international policies addressing post-conflict situations is becoming more and more commonplace. As such, SSR can be seen as a branch of an increasing international effort to secure human security (Bryden and Hänggi 2005).

The UN defines SSR as a transformative process aiming to create ‘effective and efficient state security forces, capable of providing security for the state and its people, within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law, and respect for human rights’ (UNDPKO 2012, 2). Research in development affairs establishes a clear link between development and security defined as a basic right alongside other services such as health or education. Comprehensive SSR programmes include reforming democratic oversight institutions such as parliament, the judiciary or the media. This broader approach to SSR supports “sustainable development and poverty reduction” by making security providers more efficient and accountable to the people (OECD DAC 2008, 15). Yet, as section 1 of this article shows, many donors promote a narrower, “train-build-equip” vision of SSR, which does not encompass democratic governance and oversight of the security forces (Ball 2010, Hänggi and Scherrer 2008).

Jenin (population: 260,000) is the northernmost of the eleven Palestinian governorates in the occupied West Bank. Its border to the north and west are with Israel and to the east with Jordan. Since the 1993 Oslo peace agreements, the governorate and the remainder of the West Bank are divided in three administrative and security zones. In Zone A, Palestinian authorities have full control over the services, including security. In Zone B, this control is shared between Palestinian authorities and the Israel Defence Force (IDF). In Zone C, the IDF exerts full security control. Zone C areas cover 60% of the West Bank; they are mostly adjacent to the borders with Israel and to Israeli settlements. 2,300 Israeli settlers live in 5 main settlements within the boundaries of Jenin governorate.

During the Second Intifada (2000-2005), Jenin was at the heart of some of the fiercest battles between the IDF and armed Palestinian factions. After the end of the Second Intifada and following the takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas-affiliated brigades in June 2007, major international donors (the USA, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations, known as the “Quartet”) started a security campaign aimed at reorganizing the scattered Palestinian security apparatus. Initiated in early 2008 in Jenin, this security campaign was called ‘Operation Hope and Smile’. It involved thousands of US-trained Palestinian security officers with the objective of restoring law and order in the governorate. Local and international observers have underlined some of the successes of this campaign. The Israeli press and US praised the “Jenin model” as an opportunity to foster “a bottom-up set of relationships between the Palestinian and the Israeli societies” (Bronner 2008). As it resulted in the arrest of “scores of Hamas members and suspected sympathizers” other observers criticized the campaign for pursuing politically biased “anti-terror” objectives (ICG 2010, 6).

As underlined by Friedrich and Luethold (2009), the international donors misleadingly labelled the security campaigns conducted in the West Bank in 2008 – 2009 such as ‘Hope and Smile’ as “SSR”. As the key shortcomings highlighted here show, these campaigns were inconsistent with the internationally adopted SSR standards of the OECD. These standards imply “the establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability, so that the security forces and the political authorities, which control and oversee them, operate in a manner consistent with democratic norms, and within the rule of law.” (Luethold 2009, 199.)

The so-called “SSR” initiatives in Jenin and in the rest of the West Bank were occurring at the same time as development experts and practitioners were increasingly questioning the sustainability of state-centred SSR programmes in fragile contexts. As observed in contexts such as Lebanon (Larzillière 2012, 15), Kosovo or Timor-Leste (Gordon 2014, 2-3), donor-led, top-down SSR processes are often characterized by the poor integration of citizens’ security needs and expectations, a limited inclusiveness of the strategic decision-making process and a lack of locally-entrenched governance and democratic oversight frameworks.

Research on the security campaigns led by the international community in the Palestinian West Bank also tends to highlight the shortcomings of donor-driven, top-down SSR processes in unstable contexts. The key shortcomings identified in Jenin include:

- **An absence of a shared strategic national security objective.** The donors’ support of a non-inclusive SSR programme for the Palestinian Authority’s security and political apparatus under
military occupation, without a credible long-term strategic objective, has left Palestinian security forces with the unsustainable contradiction of working “with the occupier in providing security for the occupied” (ICG 2011, 40).

- **Lack of a locally-owned reform process.** The externally-led Palestinian SSR programme focused on training, building and equipping Palestinian security forces rather than developing a governance framework for the Palestinian security sector. Donors led a force-to-force technical-tactical “transformation of the security apparatus” involving their military, police and intelligence officials rather than fostering a local reform process which the Palestinians could “own” in view of strengthening their future state structures (Friedrich and Luethold 2009, 199).

- **Failure to address key governance issues.** The blurring and overlapping of mandates between the military-like, US-trained Palestinian National Security Forces (NSF) and the EU-supported Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) remained a key problem throughout the SSR programme. As a Palestinian security officer from Jenin observed in 2009: “the police only should have the right to arrest people. It is inappropriate to have so many security forces carrying out arrests” (DCAF 2009, 3).

- **Authoritarian rather than democratic transformation.** The donors’ support of an “authoritarian transformation” encouraged the development of a security regime in the occupied West Bank rather than promoting a democratic transition based on the transparency and accountability of the security sector (Seyigh 2011, 19).

- **A process of co-optation instead of local empowerment.** The SSR programme in Jenin has furthered the powerful international players’ co-optation of local elites and Palestinian political fragmentation instead of institutionalized rules, permanent laws and a genuine vision of security as a public good (Marten 2014, 181).

5. **Lessons learnt from bottom-up community safety processes in Jenin**

As has already been noted, in developed countries, strategic models for community safety and crime prevention programmes are increasingly adopted to address insecurity, mostly in urban centres (Idriss et al. 2010). Since the 1980s, long before international aid agencies started promoting local community safety programmes in fragile contexts, criminologists had already questioned the efficiency of ‘hard’, top-down responses to address citizens’ insecurity (Walsh and Farrington 2012). While investigating, prosecuting and punishing crime remain important, issues pertaining to health, education and socio-economic factors became increasingly part of community-based crime prevention programmes. Criminologists initiated a widening and deepening of the public authorities’ crime prevention approaches, promoting community participation and local partnerships for tackling insecurity (Homel 2005).

In 2011 for instance, the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) published a model performance framework for community-based crime prevention processes (Morgan and Homel 2011) designed to support Western Australian local authorities in their crime prevention planning. This model offers an overview of how participative strategic community-based crime prevention processes can operate (Morgan and Homel 2011, 28). While essentially a problem solving model in common with other crime prevention planning processes, the AIC model places a strong emphasis on the process for the establishment of clearly defined and agreed goals. This is something that is generally quite challenging in communities with strong and competing interest groups with access to different levels of and forms of power at the local level, regardless of their levels of cohesion and existing capacity. However, experience has shown that in deeply divided communities with access to few resources and little or no crime prevention experience or
capacity, the approach provides a forum for galvanising the development of an at least shared, if not always common purpose. In addition, the model places an emphasis on ensuring that these once these goals are agreed they are linked to well-articulated outcomes for which performance measures are also identified and embedded into the planning process in the early stages of the process. It is made clear that these indicators need not all be purely quantitative measures as frequently quantitative measures are either unavailable or simply not accessible for various reasons (Homel and Fuller 2015, Hulme and Homel 2015). This measurement process, although valuable for accountability purposes, helps to promote a transparent process whereby all stakeholders have access to information about programme performance during implementation.

As such, the Morgan and Homel (2011) model closely reflects the principles for good governance for partnership operation widely employed in the international development sector (Edgar, Marshall and Bassett 2006) and since adapted for use in the development and management of crime prevention partnerships by Homel and Homel (2012). There are five elements to these principles for effective partnerships:

1. **Legitimacy and voice.** A need to ensure that those in power are perceived to have acquired their power legitimately and there is an appropriate voice accorded to those whose interests are affected by decisions;
2. **Direction and strategic vision.** The exercise of power results in a sense of overall direction that serves as a guide to action;
3. **Performance.** Institutions and processes are responsive to the interests of participants, citizens or stakeholders;
4. **Accountability.** There is accountability between those in positions of power and those whose interests they serve, and transparency and openness in the conduct of the work; and
5. **Fairness.** There is conformity with the rule of law and the principle of equity.

It was the capacity of this approach to community-based crime prevention to provide alternatives to ‘hard’ security measures against crime and insecurity that led to the decision to employ the Morgan and Homel (2011) model as the working basis for designing and implementing DCAF and SHAMS’ community safety project in Jenin.

The four phases of the community safety planning processes described in the model (partnership agreement; community safety committee formation; research and public consultation; and developing a plan) proved relevant in Jenin although in different sequences. In Jenin, the process started with public consultations, which led to the formation of a community safety committee whose members agreed on a partnership framework and eventually participated in developing a community safety plan for Jenin (DCAF 2012, 8). This consultative phase of the community safety programme consisted of a multi-stakeholder analysis of local security needs in Jenin. It included:

1. Town hall meetings gathering over 100 Palestinian stakeholders from civil society, executive, legislative and judicial authorities and security officers participated in the meetings under the title: “Delivering Security to the Palestinian People” (DCAF 2009)
2. Focus group discussions with representatives of the Palestinian security forces, civil society and tribal leaders, under the title: “Strengthening the Rule of Law in the Governorate of Jenin” (DCAF 2010a)
3. Focus group discussion with female community representatives, in order to assess the
gender-specific security needs of Palestinian women and girls (DCAF 2010b)

4. Bilateral discussions with key community leaders and representatives of the authorities.

The broad consultations with local stakeholders in Jenin confirmed the gap between the security needs of the Palestinian citizens and the strategic objectives of the top-down, SSR programme conducted by the international community in Jenin. Key inconsistencies and contradictions between the community-level expectations and the objectives of the security campaigns piloted by US and EU trained Palestinian security forces appeared at several levels.

- **At the strategic level.** There were high levels of ambiguity and lack of understanding among the citizens in Jenin about the international SSR programme. As one of them asked: “Are the security forces here to protect Israel or to protect the Palestinian citizens and to establish a state?” (DCAF 2009). Because they were not formally consulted, citizens in Jenin did not see the high-stake political dividend they could draw from cooperating with the donor-sponsored Palestinian security forces in establishing security in Jenin. This gap between the people’s security needs and expectations on the one hand, and the security agenda of the international community on the other, generated mutual mistrust, undermined the reputation of the Palestinian Authority, eroded the credibility of its security forces, and remained the most fundamental obstacle to the SSR programme’s sustainability.

- **At the institutional level.** The participants in the consultations underlined that the donor-driven SSR programme failed to address key governance issues. For instance, there was no credible process for reviewing the legal framework of the Palestinian security forces. The security legislation remained a patchwork of old and new, non-democratic legislation and arbitrary presidential decrees (Freidrich et al. 2008). As a security officer from Jenin put it: “we are in need of better laws in order to have a clear basis for our work” (DCAF 2009). Furthermore, it also appeared that donor-led parallel reforms of the Palestinian judiciary and empowerment of Palestinian civil society organizations were not integrated into the SSR process. Participants in the consultations complained that the Palestinian parliament (which was boycotted by most Quartet members in 2006 after Hamas won the legislative elections), the judiciary or the local media did not exert serious oversight of the Palestinian security forces’ operations. Defining governance aspects of Palestinian citizens’ security was not considered as being part of the Palestinian security agenda.

- **At the operational level.** Operationally the participants expected that measures be taken to curb human rights violations and abuses of power by the Palestinian security forces. They denounced the perpetration of political and extrajudicial arrests and detention by the security forces trained by the international community. The Jenin bottom-up community safety consultative process raised the question of how and to what extent local security needs and expectations can be brought to intersect with top-down SSR processes such as the one described in section 1.

The next section will discuss how relevant the two notions of ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ are for creating such intersection opportunities between community-based crime prevention and top-down SSR processes.

6. Partnerships rather than local ownership?

Enshrined in key development charters such as the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2008, 3) and the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Handbook on Security System Reform (OECD 2007, 64), the principle of local ownership implies that developing countries lead their own development policies and strategies, and integrate them in their own
governance mechanisms (for instance, their national budget document). In relation to SSR specifically, local ownership means in practical terms “that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors” (Nathan 2006, 8).

Yet, the question of the local ownership of peace and security processes is very controversial (Donais 2009, Mac Ginty 2015, Baker 2010a, Gordon 2014). Problematic aspects of the concept of local ownership in relation to SSR include:

- The difficulty inherent in the SSR process to define “what exactly should be ‘owned’ by which ‘locals’” (Mannitz 2014, 274; Mobekk 2010). For instance, the legitimacy of local security stakeholders is often difficult to determine (Richmond 2012).
- The observation that in-depth involvement with local communities in unstable contexts implies dealing with entities such as traditional justice systems that do not fit democratic, human rights and rule-of-law standards (Kritz 2009, Baker 2010b).
- The fact that local actors sometimes do not agree on minimal requisites for coexistence and peace. The absence of local consensus about the long-term objectives of the SSR programmes gives little opportunity for these actors to fully own complex processes such as security reform.
- The fact that high-stake foreign-funded development programming takes place in the donor expert community and de facto establishes a power patron-client relationship between external and local needs and interests, which makes local ownership virtually unpractical (Reich 2006, 4; Byrd 2010).
- Finally, there is sometimes a lack of “capacity within partner governments to assess, design and implement reform processes” (OECD 2007, 14, Mac Ginty 2010).

Following the recommendations of the AIC crime prevention and community safety model, in Jenin the notion of ‘partnership’ was redefined as a more rewarding and less controversial guiding principle for the local, community-based security process. The establishment of a strategic community safety partnership in Jenin was formalized by the creation of a community safety steering committee whose 15 members received training in guiding principles of strategic planning, community safety and the rule of law.

These efforts resulted in:

- **Setting the focus on the interactions between formal and informal security providers.** In other words, rather than focussing on established actors and their roles in the Jenin community, the notion of ‘partnership’ set the focus on the mutual interaction between often contending formal and informal actors (the ‘community safety partners’) who all needed a space for dialogue and exchange of views on security including NGOs, women rights’ centres, the media, tribal elders, security officers, the governor’s office, etc.

- **Reinforcing the security functions of local actors.** This included formalizing partnerships for community safety in Jenin confirmed the importance of conferring “recognition of existing local knowledge, capacities and skills with regards to particular security functions” (Mannitz 2014, 279).

- **Fostering public support for security measures.** This meant that formal security providers such as the police or the established court system in Jenin acknowledged that partnering with informal local stakeholders such as civil society organizations, media institutions or tribal leaders played a key role in enforcing law and order.

- **Enabling of public information sharing on security.** Through the coverage by the local media
of the community safety partners in Jenin, the central-level authorities in Ramallah (Council of Ministers, Office of the President) were informed of the process and eventually endorsed it officially. The process also led to the creating of a space for a working donor – beneficiary relation.

- **Creating a space for working donor-beneficiary relation.** The Jenin community safety partnerships also allowed the open acknowledgement that local communities (as is the case in developed countries such as Australia) do need conceptual and financial assistance in order to contribute to complex endeavours such as SSR or crime prevention programmes.

All of this in turn leads to propositions for practical intersections between community safety and SSR approaches where exchange of information and practices can be mutually reinforcing for bottom-up and the top-down security approaches.

### 7. The practical intersections between community safety and SSR approaches

Community safety initiatives do not only inform SSR processes on citizens’ perceptions of insecurity. SSR processes can benefit from integrating individual partners, groups and existing mechanisms that aim at tackling insecurity at local level (Gordon 2014). Indeed, such an approach is recommended by the UN Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (UNSSR 2012). In order for the outcomes achieved in community-based crime prevention to be integrated into comprehensive national SSR strategies, it is critical to identify areas in which community-based security and key SSR objectives effectively intersect. Three potential intersection areas have been identified by the work in Jenin.

**Strengthening the capacities of key security stakeholders.**

In their functions and behaviour, key “agents of change” serve as transmission belts between the local and the national level. Formal and informal community leaders, representatives of civil society, tribal or religious leaders, local business holders are those in charge of transmitting the security concerns of their communities to central authorities. At the receiving end of national security policies, they are also the ones who will contribute to making these policies understood and accepted by their communities. With a view to integrating local community-based security needs into broader security policies, it is important to create enabling mechanisms for these community leaders to play their role as agents of security transformation. Similar to what was done in Jenin, the integration of local leaders into structured community safety processes is a first, important step towards establishing an effective intersection with top-down SSR policies. This integration process can include:

- Mapping the key local actors and their role in the community in terms of security. In Jenin this included tribal leaders involved in traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms, but also women rights’ advocates, refugee camp committee leaders or village council mayors.
- Organizing consultation sessions in which these key stakeholders express their views about their communities’ security expectations; summarizing and structuring the key discussion points; transmitting them to decision-makers; and providing feedback to the community on the decision-makers opinion for ensuring broad consensus.
- Identifying structured channels for informing central authorities about the contents of these consultations. This can be done either through bilateral talks or through advocacy activities (publications, media coverage), as in Jenin where one of the key partners was a media and advocacy organisation (i.e. SHAMS).
- Training formal and informal security actors at community-level in standards of democratic
SSR processes, including on key principles of the rule of law, conflict sensitivity and conflict resolution mechanisms.

- Involving the community leaders in surveys about the security perceptions of their community, especially with regards to vulnerable groups such as women, refugees or young unemployed people.

**Developing regulatory frameworks for the security sector**

In many unstable contexts, local customs often clash with the official constitutional and legal framework (Mac Ginty 2015). The reform of the legal framework for the provision of security, which is a key element of SSR, may be hampered by persisting with traditional ways of providing security and justice. In Jenin for instance many perceived tribal conflict resolution mechanisms as more efficient than the institutional justice and court system. Other key elements of SSR, like the establishment of an independent judiciary, the conduct of fair criminal justice proceedings or the transparency and accountability of security and justice providers need considerable time and efforts before entrenching in traditional systems.

Community safety initiatives focusing on consultation and ‘partnership’ between formal and informal security and justice providers provide crucial support in transitional periods. Practical steps for achieving this sort of integration can include:

- Providing a space for public dialogue and discussion about prevailing security policies, the roles and responsibilities of state security providers and the vision for national security sponsored by the authorities.
- Providing a ‘learning site’ (Reich 2006, 24) in which key elements of the constitutional and legal framework for security and their implications for local constituencies are presented can be a valuable and viable tool.
- Offering the opportunity for local community representatives to discuss and review these laws and informing the overall security sector legal reform process.
- Providing space for law enforcement agents and traditional justice providers to exchange views on their roles within the society and particularly as custodians of social peace can be a powerful device for promoting closer integration.
- Promoting the integration of local community safety structures into official bylaws, such as the organizational charts of governorate’s offices, ministries and or security agencies.

**Fostering institutional changes to integrate community safety structures**

Community safety initiatives need institutional anchorage in state structures (Homel 2009a, Idris et al. 2010). Whereas they can provide an inspiring model for the nationwide SSR process, successful local community safety successes might also antagonize central-level actors who were not involved in their development and implementation. While the buy-in of local actors into top-down SSR processes is key, central-level decision-makers, politicians or security leaders also need convincing about the relevance of community-based security initiatives. Adopting a local community crime prevention approach to community safety initiatives can foster important institutional changes through:

- Promoting the adoption of organizational changes within state institutions responsible for decentralization or local security governance (ministries of the interior, local governance or justice, the police, etc.).
- Creating community safety structures within a local administration (for instance the
• Developing baseline data collection capacity for crime and insecurity amongst the police and other law enforcement agencies.

• Developing the capacity to provide communities with a method and structure for developing formal citizens’ complaints mechanisms by which abuses by formal and informal security providers can be documented and followed up on. This is an important capacity that the crime prevention planning process can bring to bear in unstable environments with poor rule of law structure. In the case of Jenin, this proved to be a strong device for strengthening trust and promoting confidence that institutional change within the structures of the security environment were possible.

8. Lessons and conclusions

The conduct of effective SSR in fragile contexts requires the identification of key intersection areas with locally led community safety programmes. Similarly, bottom-up security initiatives are unlikely to be sustainable if they are not anchored in a nation-wide security transformation process. Crucial intersection areas between bottom-up and top-down security initiatives can be identified in individual, legal and institutional change processes.

The experience in Jenin demonstrated that when implemented well, the bottom up community based approach to crime prevention can provided significant advantages and strengths. The strategic crime prevention planning process can help to identify and map the security needs and concerns of citizens while at the same time providing a practical approach to involving local stakeholders in shaping decisions for their security.

What the use of modern local community-based crime prevention models shows is that local stakeholders are often in need of external support, technical expertise and funding for developing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating community safety plans (Homel 2009b). In unstable as well as in established countries, strategic partnerships between community-level security actors and state-level decision-makers are crucial for effectively bridging the gaps that define people’s insecurity.

The Jenin experience has demonstrated the process of joining up the top-down and bottom-up approaches to security through the adoption of the key problem solving concepts and techniques of local community crime prevention in combination with a modified SSR model may well provide an important alternative pathway to increased community safety, where the context is amenable.

Bibliography


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The Technical Working Group on the Confluence of Urban Safety and Peacebuilding Practice brings together focal points on urban safety of cities with peacebuilding, peace mediation and conflict prevention practitioners in order to help craft solutions to the rapidly increasing risk of conflict & insecurity in urban settings. It is co-facilitated by the United Nations Office at Geneva, UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities Programme and the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform. For more information, see: http://www.gpplatform.ch/pb-city.

About the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform

The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is an inter-agency network that connects the critical mass of peacebuilding actors, resources, and expertise in Geneva and worldwide. Founded in 2008, the Platform has a mandate to facilitate interaction on peacebuilding between different institutions and sectors, and to advance new knowledge and understanding of peacebuilding issues and contexts. It also plays a creative role in building bridges between International Geneva, the United Nations peacebuilding architecture in New York, and peacebuilding activities in the field. The Platform’s network comprises more than 4,000 peacebuilding professionals and over 60 institutions working on peacebuilding directly or indirectly.

The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is a joint project of four institutions: The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies; the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP); Interpeace; and the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva (QUNO).