Case Studies on Urban Safety and Peacebuilding: Lagos, Beirut, Mitrovica, Treichville and Johannesburg

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This paper highlights best practices and key challenges in urban safety practice with the aim of clarifying potential deeper cooperation between peacebuilding and urban safety practitioners. The five cases studies are Lagos (Nigeria), Beirut (Lebanon), Mitrovica (Kosovo), Treichville, Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) and Johannesburg (South Africa). They are based on analysis of academic, policy and practitioner literatures, as well as expert interviews and fieldwork in Beirut and Mitrovica. The key messages of the case studies are as follows.

- **Lagos:** Consistent leadership, improved transparency, coherent urban planning and the inclusion of a broad range of actors within decision-making has allowed the Lagos State to improve living conditions and security. There is a clear focus on improving environmental security through infrastructural improvements and partnership-building with the private sector, to reduce the strain on federal reserves. Despite the success of numerous projects, however, evidence from the housing sector development suggests that improvements are not reaching the poorest communities where population density is rapidly increasing.

- **Beirut:** A prominent issue for urban safety is the creation, use and disappearance of urban public space. Additionally, increasing securitization and privatization have made the exchange between different communities in the city even more difficult, especially for the lower social classes. Also, urban planning could be helpful in increasing real and perceived security, mostly through the provision of basic services such as electricity, water or public transportation.

The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is a joint project of four institutions:
The paper concludes with a comparative analysis of the cases that highlight cross cutting issues such as cooperation, space management, urban planning, private-public partnership (PPP), and practical and conceptual barriers. Overall, the case studies highlight the heterogeneous nature of urban violence and the importance of cooperation between all relevant actors at the local level, in line with a demand for bottom-up approaches to issues of urban conflict. In cases, in which ‘peacebuilding’ is understood as a state-centric, externally-imposed process well-meaning intervention can have significantly counterproductive consequences for urban safety.

1. Lagos, Nigeria

Lagos is the economic hub of Nigeria and the largest city in West Africa. It accounts for over 30% of Nigerian GDP (and 62% national non-oil GDP), and according to estimates contains around 20 million of Nigeria’s 180 million citizens (Akiyode 2012: 77; Lagos State 2013: 1). Despite the size of the city’s economy, unemployment and underemployment is rife. There is a large black-market sector and high levels of poverty, and the economy is sensitive to external pressures such as volatile oil prices.

Urban safety in Lagos is related to the quality of urban life and the living environment. The city’s infrastructure was largely neglected between 1967 and 1999. Within this time frame, rapid population growth which started in the 1980s was accompanied by poor land-use planning. In absence of sufficient infrastructure or economic opportunities, population growth entailed widespread unemployment, overcrowding, the expansion of slums, congestion, and environmental degradation in poorer areas. Consequently, these areas suffer disproportionately from urban violence issues. Oduwaye (2007) describes a vicious cycle in which poverty causes environmental stress, leading citizens to act unsustainably and engage in the informal sector, perpetuating more poverty and further reducing overall safety. Indeed, there are many safety concerns in Lagos due to the large amount of unemployed and marginalized youths, men and girls, who live in slums or in extreme poverty. Due to these factors, there is a belief that job creation and environmental security are key to peaceful and sustainable development in Lagos (Akiyode 2012: 79).

Indeed, since 1999, the Lagos State administrations of Bola Tinubu and Babatunde Fashola have promoted a common development vision for the city, which advocates cooperation between
all sectors of society and has brought about heavy investment in the city’s infrastructure for the improvement of the living environment. The aim of the Lagos State Development Strategy (LSDP) is that by 2025 the city will become “Africa's Model Megacity and Global, Economic and Financial Hub that is Safe, Secure, Functional and Productive” (Lagos State 2013: 1). Although levels of poverty and unemployment remain high, there have been some significant improvements in environmental security and employment opportunities, contributing positively to urban safety.

A principal factor in improving living conditions in Lagos has been the increased transparency and consistent governance that characterized the administrations of Tinubu and Fashola. Importantly, both administrations encouraged participation and inputs from various sectors in all sectors of development. The Lagos State now considers civil society actors as equal in decision-making for development projects (Lagos State 2013: 19). On many occasions, town hall meetings and meetings with various stakeholders have been used to draft bylaws, for example on land-use and annual budget preparations (Filani 2012: 31). The inclusion of various actors has fostered a wider representation of interests, improving the relationship between citizen and state, and increasing the legitimacy of development projects that have economic and infrastructural implications for poorer communities.

In terms of safety policy, the state has developed a State Security Trust Fund in partnership with important private sector donors, the funds from which have helped provide streetlights, call centers, neighborhood watch schemes, new patrol vehicles, police equipment and security education in school. In addition, private security forces in support of the police force are being used to tackle the issue of Lagos' burgeoning population. Current police force numbers are not adequate to deal with the city’s expected growth (Ogunleye 2015). Security strategies are broader than simply increasing police presence, reflecting the belief that improving infrastructure and involving the community play a large role in establishing urban safety and in creating confidence in state-led schemes.

In fact, the approach of the Lagos State government appears to prioritize infrastructural and economic improvements to achieve safety. In particular, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been extensively used and promoted as a means of funding large-scale infrastructure developments, allowing for important urban renovations with significantly reduced pressure on federal government funds (Filani 2012: 21). Examples of such projects include the Lekki-Epe Expressway Toll Road, constructed in partnership with Aurecon to alleviate prevailing traffic problems in Lagos, in turn increasing citizen mobility and economic activity (Aurecon 2015). New infrastructural projects are also accompanied by the installation of CCTV cameras, in an attempt to improving monitoring possibilities (Ogunleye 2015). On a smaller scale, private sector redevelopment projects have turned many existing slum residences into three-to-four story apartment buildings. This has been done without displacing current residents and with prior consultation of locals, in order to establish their priorities and contribute to improved land-use (Filani 2012: 36). In addition, the municipal government has established an integrated mass transit system (LAMATA), which has entailed the provision and improvement of roads, bus lanes and junctions for traffic relief. The state’s waste management project (LAWMA), seeks to build PPPs for investments, and has also aimed at teaching school children the importance of recycling (Lagos State 2013: 6). Importantly, environmental beautification projects have engaged so-called ‘area boys’, known to be marginalized actors and perpetrators of violence. There are also examples of vocational training for youths, including for ‘area boys’ (Filani 2012: 39).
Moreover, legislative and administrative reform aimed at increasing transparency and accountability, as well as the establishment of a robust taxpayer database, has greatly increased internally generated revenues. This has mobilized resources for projects and created a favorable environment for private sector investment. Improving living conditions and therefore citizen safety is a key element in establishing this positive environment for business. An improved business environment can promote enterprise, allowing key sectors to flourish and jobs to be created (Lagos State 2013: 9). Furthermore, microfinance collateral-free loan schemes have been made available for youths and women looking to start businesses (Filani 2012: 39). The economic empowerment of women and youths is linked to safety, as these actors can find themselves in situations of dependence characterized by violence.

The scope of the projects is thus not only broad, but also inclusive. They have promoted the role of civil society and the private sector in improving living conditions. Significant progress has been made in maintaining clean highways and neighborhoods, which contributes to increased environmental security. Moreover, they have created employment opportunities targeted at marginalized actors whose economic dependency often leads to insecurity.

Despite these notable progressions, some serious challenges in maintaining safety remain. Firstly, the city must contend with population growth rates ten times higher than that of New York or Los Angeles (Akiyode 2012: 76). Given Lagos’ limited room for expansion due to its coastal location, there are serious questions concerning the population density of slums, areas in which violence issues are already pronounced. The financing of mass housing for the poor and the maintenance of a livable environment is vital, yet there is a worry that development projects with the private sector may primarily benefit middle-class and richer citizens. For instance, the Eko Atlantic project, a PPP which aims to construct a new financial district with vast amounts of housing using land reclaimed from the sea, has been criticized for causing flooding, displacement and not engaging the local population (Okeowo 2013). It is unclear if or how the upmarket project aims to provide housing for the poor, with the expectation that the 250,000 housing places will be filled with wealthy Nigerians and foreigners (Okeowo 2013). Indeed, the PPP approach has come under some criticism regarding housing schemes. Furthermore, without tackling issues of density in slum environments, response times to crimes and injuries will remain critically slow, and the establishment of effective monitoring procedures will be impeded (Ogunleye 2015).

Iben (2011: 34) argues that there is little empirical evidence to back up the assumption that PPPs enhance multi-sectoral participation and increase efficiency in public governance and service delivery. In fact, PPP housing projects, in which the government provides land subsidies for private sector construction, have thus far not significantly contributed to housing provision for the poor (Iben 2011: 133). This is possibly due to the lack of a coordinating agency. Moreover, water management currently remains an issue linked to crime, with adequate water supply only covering around 35% of residents in 2012, and the poor suffering disproportionately from low supplies (Lagos State 2013: 3-5; Akiyode 2012: 80). In slum areas, there is a reliance on streams for water supply, which has led to conflicts over water access (Ogunleye 2015). Power supply in slums is also intermittent, increasing marginalization and creating many dark areas that can breed criminality.

Without remedying these issues, Lagos risks becoming a city of slums and wealthy suburbs. As we have already established, economic inequality is a stronger driver of violence than just poverty,
therefore the expected population boom is worrying considering current practices in housing provision.

What kind of implications does this case have for the confluence of urban safety and peacebuilding? Firstly, Lagos is a concrete example of the necessity of multi-level cooperation. The city is so large that many decisions are taken at the Lagos State level, and not just the municipal level. The city’s economic importance means that the national government and other regional governments have an interest in maintaining stability. Thus there is incentive for international and regional peacebuilding projects, and deeper cooperation between state and urban governments, as well as regional governments.

Secondly, Lagos epitomizes the idea that citizen safety is linked to the living environment. The main lesson for peacebuilding practitioners is that the provision of urban safety is not only down to improving security forces, but can be more to do with the development of adequate infrastructure, including transport, waste, water and power. The fact that the development process is participatory, and leadership is consistent, increases public confidence in the State’s efforts. The infrastructural and employment-based nature of these efforts may be somewhat unfamiliar to peacebuilders, which perhaps explains why traditional peacebuilding practice has not been greatly involved in the city. However, many peacebuilders have experience in statebuilding and institutional development, and therefore could provide technical and financial assistance to internally led development efforts. Peacebuilding experience in areas such as transparency, monitoring and accountability, could further benefit efforts to establish tax databases and improve participatory decision-making mechanisms. Such approaches could particularly be important when considering how a coordinating agency for PPP housing projects could benefit the financing of housing for the poor. To inform this goal, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with experience working with the private sector could share experiences with municipal governments who seek to improve investment coordination to the benefit of the poor.

2. Beirut, Lebanon

The Lebanese civil war left not only the capital Beirut with physical and psychological marks, but also affected its inhabitants and their relationships towards each other. While the war is over, the conflict remains unresolved and segregation is a reality. Additionally, due to ongoing tensions and frequent outbursts of violence and terror attacks even after the war, securitization is both high and extremely visible. The twin blast on Thursday 12th November 2015 was the latest of these events and another round of securitization processes does not seem far-fetched at this moment.

One place which is representative of this development is the famous Green Line, the division between the mostly Christian East Beirut and the mostly Muslim West Beirut. This line manifests the physical segregation between different parts of the city. Also, it is a highly securitized area, both due to its history and the fact that several important institutions of the Lebanese state are located along its course. It clearly shows how public space is perceived in the city of Beirut: as a security threat (either towards the state or its political leadership) that needs to be dealt with. Or rather, as an Al Jazeera journalist aptly describes: “In short, you would be forgiven for thinking you’re still in a war zone” (Fernandez 2015). This does not only concern the green line, but especially the newly renovated Beirut Central District, often called Solidere. This name comes from the corresponding private development company, that is responsible for most of the
renovation work in the city center. But, Solidere also stands for the increasing privatization within its area of influence, which means expanding along the coastline of the capital.

There are hardly any open public spaces where people from different parts of society can meet and have an open exchange. The little open space that exists is often controlled by a significant amount of security forces, both private and from the state, or appears to be public, but is indeed privatized. In short, there are almost no physical places in Beirut that could serve as a forum for more exchange between the people of the city. One of the last big chunks of public land was Dalieh, a green spot at the sea where Beirutis from all over the city would meet, yet it has recently been privatized and is slowly being closed off from the public. Abir Saksouk-Sasso, an urban planner, sees Dalieh and other open spaces not as public in a classic way - being associated with and controlled by the nation-state - but rather in the sense of “space for the public” (Saksouk-Sasso 2015a: 300). She also mentions the importance of space during and after the civil war, when spatial segregation served as a buffer between the different warring parties (Saksouk-Sasso 2015a: 301).

The civil war and the turbulent years since then led to a securitization and militarization of the public sphere. In a mapping project, Mona Fawaz, Mona Harb and Ahmad Gharbieh illustrate the prevalence of security forces in the city center of Beirut (Fawaz et al. 2009). This display of security goes hand in hand with the rhetoric of officials justifying the absence of public spaces, as Saksouk-Sasso describes in the introduction of her paper, by deeming the citizens as ‘not ready’ for public space. Springer (2010: 543) states: “to remove passion from public space, the state attempts to create spaces based on a desire for security more than interaction and for entertainment, more than democratic politics - the end of public space”. There are a few private and citizen initiatives which try to counter the disappearance of public space. Yet Solidere and other developers are increasing their activity, with Beirut being “subject to the globalizing forces of consumerism, privatization, and regulation” (Larkin 2010: 415).

Securitization of public spaces also does not affect the different parts of community in the same way. Saksouk-Sasso (2015b) explains it as follows: “Meaning, the lower-income groups (or minority groups) are the ones who feel mostly intimidated by security, because they are the ones who have experienced the most forms of discrimination based on their looks. Such measures create a harsh class divide, and hence definitely harm any process at building peace, in the broader sense of the term.” This is something that peacebuilding and the urban safety practitioners have to keep in mind, as addressing one group (class, ethnic or religious) has the potential to marginalize other groups. In this case, the securitization of the streets and public spaces of Beirut benefit the upper class, while posing an annoyance or a threat to the lower class and minorities. Also, with regards to privatization of public space, it can exacerbate an already existing tension between the different groups.

For Beirut, we have to keep in mind the influence of sectarianism on local (and national) politics. In order to not upset each other and to not undermine their own power, the elite is hesitant to contribute to public debate and opening-up public spaces. For Saksouk-Sasso, this is influencing the closure of public spaces such as Horch Beirut, a large green space in the city. She describes the park as follows: “Located along three sectarian areas each dominated by a faction, the regime does not know how to “divide” this place among themselves. So they prefer to keep it closed” (Saksouk-Sasso 2015b).
While public space is a dire issue in Beirut, a small village in the south of Lebanon gives an example of how peacebuilders can participate actively in the creation of public spaces and the establishing of a physical forum for interaction in the community. In the beginning of November 2015, a small public park in the little village of Hallusiyat was inaugurated. Members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) helped to bring the project to a successful conclusion, with the aim of giving “the entire community a public space for social and recreational events” (UNIFIL 2015). We must keep in mind that this is a small village in the more homogenous rural part of the country and is hardly representative of Lebanon as a whole. Yet still, this example shows that the interests of international peacebuilders can indeed coincide with those of the local community in calling for public space. Seeing that UNIFIL had both the funds as well as the man-power to build the infrastructure, and the municipal leadership was committed to installing a public space in its midst, the international peacebuilding mission and the local population show the potential of cooperation between the two communities. Additionally, this shows the possibility of using smaller communities as examples for bigger projects.

In Beirut, urban planning could contribute to urban safety through the provision of services, such as electricity, infrastructure or water. As discussed above, this can contribute decisively to amelioration of safety in a city. Abir Saksouk-Sasso (2015b) argues along similar lines: “The basic management of the city and the provision of basic services would heavily ameliorate life in the city and consequently contribute to safety. Public transportation as well as the maintenance of public space would also contribute to that”.

To sum up, Beirut is a case where the issue of public space contributes to the ongoing conflict, instead of offering possible solutions. Urban planning does not allow for much public space, and the small number of places that are accessible are highly securitized and surveilled. Instead of fostering a climate for exchange, this stimulates further segregation, similar to the situation described in the entry point section on public spaces above. The urban safety and the peacebuilding community have yet to come up with sustainable approaches. On the other hand, the local community has found informal ways of creating public space for themselves, which provides opportunities for formal actors to learn from them.

3. Mitrovica, Kosovo

The city of Mitrovica in Northern Kosovo is composed of 49 villages, with a total of 100 000 inhabitants, of which 75% are Albanian, 22% Serbian and 3% other minorities, including an important contingent of Roma people (Frediskild 2014). These numbers make Mitrovica the largest city of Serbian population in Kosovo, as well as the most divided one, prone to ethnic clashes and violence on a regular basis.

The geographical division of the city makes it an interesting setting for the study of urban safety and peacebuilding practices. The River Ibar splits Mitrovica. The north is Serbian, using Dinar as its currency and Serbian as its main language, whereas the south is Kosovar-Albanian. The south is under the administration of the Kosovar government, using the Euro as currency and speaking Albanian as its main language. It is noteworthy that before the war, Serbians and Albanians lived on both sides of the river, used to go to the same schools and share the same public spaces. However, this situation was rather a coexistence than an actual peaceful existence. Since the war divided the city in two, both sides suffer with internally displaced persons (IDPs). According
to the UNHCR Statistical Overview report of 2014, more than 80% of the 17,400 IDPs of Kosovo were in the region of Mitrovica (UNHCR 2014).

Thus, one of the major problems in the city is a lack of public spaces to promote social interaction between the different communities. The bridge over the Ibar river has been a symbol of this division and of a lack of common spaces. Having been blocked by debris for years, it was later revitalized into a small green, and renovated again in August 2015. Within the scope of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, it was agreed by both governments that the bridge would finally be open to traffic in June 2016 (EEAE 2015). This dialogue process covers two different municipalities, one Northern Serbian and one Southern Albanian, with different election calendars. However, the foreseen establishment of this arrangement might not actually contribute to the development of a local ‘multiethnic society’, but rather deepen the ethnic divisions between Albanian and Serbs and institutional separation between the municipalities that form Mitrovica. Peacebuilding and urban safety practitioners should thus question the validity of such an approach when thinking about process design for interventions (Kryeziu 2015).

Nonetheless, the renovation and occupation of public spaces presents an opportunity for both urban safety and peacebuilding practitioners to work together to tackle various issues related to ethnic division in an urban environment. This ranges from violence and clashes to reconciliation and memory. In Mitrovica, violence prevention efforts are found at the grassroots level within community-based organizations. One of the most prominent organizations is Community Building Mitrovica (CBM), a local NGO that aims to encourage reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs, and address the different needs of both populations, through mechanisms such as coexistence, dialogue, social training, educational programs and cultural activities with a depoliticized approach. The organization has offices on both sides of the Ibar River, allowing both communities to participate, integrate and share different experiences from their own side of the city. Excursions to both sides are organized so that Serbs and Albanians discover (or even rediscover) parts of the city that seem forbidden and dangerous for them. Other projects aim to improve government accountability, women’s roles in peacebuilding, minority issues and governance, as well as a rock music school for youths during the summer.

Opportunities for reform are also presented within the framework of SSR, with local police training and interaction with other local actors. Urban safety practitioners in Mitrovica have actually had quite limited contact with the wider public, their efforts being concentrated on cooperation between local and international security forces and the promotion of the rule of law (Kryeziu 2015).

Regarding policing in Mitrovica, Civil Protection (CP) units have worked as informal structures and have operated mainly in the northern part of the city, as well as in three other northern Serbian municipalities in Kosovo (Leposavic, Zvecan and Zubin Potok). These units have not been operating within Kosovo’s legal framework, and as a result the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue agreement reached in April 2013 led to the dissolution of these informal Serbian security structures. One important issue is that Kosovo institutions and communities have regarded civil protection units differently. The Kosovo government, together with international institutions operating in Kosovo, perceives them as an illegal paramilitary structure that has to be dissolved as soon as possible, whereas the Serbian community perceives civil protection units as a civilian structure with the purpose of providing assistance to civilians in emergency situations. Here, the line between community policing and illegal security structures in Mitrovica is blurred, and clearly there is no consensus. The intended formal role of CP units was to assist the civilian
population in emergency situations, although these units frequently performed other tasks, such as road maintenance, bridge repairs and securing buildings. However, the activities of some CP members have included destabilizing and illegal activities. Such actions include political protests, political violence, as well as organized crime. A number of them do not have a background in security, and thus their abilities to assist in protection and rescue tasks are questionable. Moreover, there are individuals with military backgrounds (former military officers) who have been involved in criminal activities (Kryeziu 2015).

Mitrovica thus presents an opportunity for both fields to interact and promote better practices in a number of areas, from SSR to process design, and from community-based public space occupation to reconciliation. However, we also have to keep in mind the constraints related to peacebuilding while talking about an ethnically-divided society. Indeed, some authors have pointed to a friction between global, local and urban peacebuilding. Mitrovica certainly demonstrates the intensity of rivalries found within a small space, characterized by disagreements. Peacebuilding professionals should therefore be cautious of externally imposed programs which aim at fostering cooperation between actors in such tense situations, as small disagreements may lead to political paralysis and sharing governance may simply just reproduce existing cleavages and power struggles.

On a final note, it is important to highlight that many experts in Kosovo do not refer to current international communities based in the country as ‘peacebuilders’ (Kryeziu 2015).

4. Treichville (Abidjan), Côte d’Ivoire

Abidjan is the largest city and economic capital of the Ivory Coast, with almost five million inhabitants. Residing within this population are practically all of the actors related to sociopolitical violent tensions, which have affected the country for over a decade (Interpeace 2015: 6). The city thus experiences high levels of violence and urban insecurity, stemming from a few key issues. Mass migrations since Ivorian decolonization has increased the sensitivity surrounding the political economy of social diversity, with many native Ivorians feeling aggrieved by the economic outcomes of migration; this tension has intensified violence between ethnicities (Interpeace 2015: 6). The deterioration of education services and raised school fees has entailed low enrolment rates, and political actors use schools as channels to spread political ideologies and recruit youths for political violence (UN-Habitat 2012: 7). Violence is commonplace in schools. The lack of education opportunities, combined with a weakening of the fathership role within Ivorian society, mean that many youths turn to petty crime or the transport industry as a means of making a living. The latter is a fairly lawless sector characterized by syndicate rivalries and machete attacks, often supported by former military heads. Violence is thus characterized by petty thefts, muggings, knife crime, inter-syndicate violence and increasingly by cyber-criminality.

The Ivorian nation has been in a state of political volatility since it returned to democracy in 2000, and the political crisis following the 2010 elections transformed into widespread violence and homicide in Abidjan. With many municipalities having faced serious budget cuts post-2002, police responses to such crises are often insufficient (UN-Habitat 2012: 7). Moreover, policing in Abidjan tends to privilege deterrence over violence prevention. Consequently, citizens have little confidence in their police forces, reducing perceptions of safety.
Yet in the face of the 2010 post-electoral crisis, Treichville, a municipality with around 200,000 citizens, was able to weather the storm with far fewer outbreaks of violence and killings. The municipality has a reputation for being the safest commune of Abidjan.

The reasons for Treichville’s comparative success in violence prevention hold some valuable lessons for both peacebuilding and urban safety practitioners. Before highlighting these lessons, one must first understand the relative strength of Treichville’s social fabric. Many families have lived in Treichville for multiple generations, creating a continuity of population in a cosmopolitan municipality (54% non-Ivorians). This continuity helps mitigate social tensions and puts Treichville in a favorable position vis-à-vis other municipalities in terms of violence prevention. Yet to conclude that this population continuity is the key factor to achieve urban safety would omit a large part of the picture.

In fact, the measures that helped Treichville weather the 2010 crisis had already commenced in the late 1990s. The key to success has been the strategy of the Conseil Municipal, which aims to foster participation between all sectors of society in maintaining urban safety. The consistent leadership of mayor François Albert Amichia, who has held his position for almost 20 years, has allowed the concept of social cohesion and unity around development to flower (Boah 2013). This concept is dubbed “N’Zassa”, meaning ‘cosmopolitan society’ in local language Akan, and is shared and used widely in the community to emphasize social continuity, foster inclusion and minimize violence, in some ways serving as a conceptual platform for cooperation (Boah 2015).

The Conseil Municipal has also taken practical steps to improving safety. In 1996, for example, a surveillance brigade entitled Treichville Sécurité Vigilance (TSV) was founded. The brigade recruited its members from violent areas, the idea being to give the perpetrators of urban insecurity the responsibility to prevent it (Milliken 2013: 5). Following the TSV’s initiation, Treichville experienced a remarkable reduction in petty thefts, knife crime and other violence attacks. Simultaneously many young delinquents were able to reenter society and gangs began to gradually disperse (Boah 2015). However, the group is now disbanded.

In 1998, a push by elected locals from the Ivorian Forum for Urban Security (FISU) resulted in the implementation of a violence prevention project, entitled Projet d’Appui de la Sécurité Urbaine (PASU). This initiative aimed to use micro-prevention projects to reduce insecurity and perceptions of insecurity, leading to the creation of the Comité Communnal de Sécurité (CCS), which still operates today (Boah 2013). The committee is a multi-sectoral coalition including the mayor of Treichville, municipal representatives, traditional leaders and wisemen, education representatives, the private sector, youth associations, women’s groups and religious representatives. These groups work together to discuss means of reducing urban violence. The prevention actions of the PASU also aim at institutional capacity building, as well as creating economic and leisure activities for risk groups, and facilitating workshops between different stakeholders (Boah 2013).

The participation of various actors means that safety is constructed collectively in Treichville. Citizens’ perceptions of safety are thus improved and participation allows the municipality to cope better with the social issues of a cosmopolitan population. In Treichville, the community is not a consumer of safety, but has a leadership role in its construction.

Thus during the 2010 crisis, the existence of a multitude of cooperating, low-level security actors was the key factor in preventing violence. Particularly the CCS played an important mediation
and preventative role, discretely intercepting protagonists of tensions before they could spread violence (Boah 2015). Moreover, the concept of N’Zassa was utilized to emphasize social continuity within Treichville and thus minimize violence.

This analysis suggests that Treichville has developed resources for urban violence prevention relevant to the peacebuilding and urban safety nexus. In particular, local participation, multi-stakeholder cooperation, legitimate local leadership with a clear vision and capacity-building programs for youths and delinquents must be highlighted. Thus even if a project is locally-led, peacebuilders should be aware that it may also need to be anchored within a development policy in line with the population’s preferences, as well as within a participative decision-making system. The case of Treichville suggests that it is harmonious development that guarantees security, and that peace is a lasting tranquility fostered by maintaining security and a feeling of safety in the daily lives of citizens - this requires participation.

In this context, international peacebuilding interventions must be prudent not to impose changes which do not fit with the values of the local population. Given the relative success and local acceptance of Treichville’s community security forces in maintaining peace, there may not actually be a demand for the direct involvement of the peacebuilders, which could directly compete with local actors’ roles. However, there are areas where financial and technical assistance from the peacebuilding community has been beneficial. For example, the PASU benefited from technical assistance provided by Belgian peacebuilding organizations, and the municipalities’ efforts in general have been aided by funding and advice from UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities program and changes in Ivorian law (Milliken 2013: 5). Clearly then, peacebuilding funding and knowledge of good practices should be channeled into successful locally led projects which aim at long-term violence prevention brought about by group cooperation. A problem, however, is that the successes of locally-led initiatives often remain unheard, as actors may not have the resources to publish their results; this has been the case in Treichville (Boah 2015). Perhaps the academic weight of the peacebuilding community could be used to publish successful local initiatives and fund publications, so that other municipal governments are able to learn from the experiences. Finally, the involvement of relevant actors in joint-learning programs and research projects, as seen from the above-mentioned Interpeace study, can be a good means for peacebuilding expertise to be shared in an environment which encourages local leadership. Allowing residents to participate also improves their perceptions of safety, consequently improving the general safety situations.

5. Johannesburg, South Africa

Johannesburg, the capital of South Africa, is one of the partner cities of the Technical Working Group, and has developed the ‘Jo’burg City Safety Strategy’ (JCSS), founded in 2003. It has its roots in the Jo’burg 2030 Economic Development Strategy, and is closely related to the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) from 1996 and the White Paper on Safety and Security from 1998 (Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery, Human Sciences Research Council 2015: x). The goal of the JCSS is: “to define a common approach to dealing with crime, violence and safety and security in Johannesburg” (City of Johannesburg 2003: 2). The focus is on an integrated and multidisciplinary approach, involving all relevant departments at the city level as well as the necessary regional and national actors.

This is meant to be achieved by creating safe zones and public spaces, where residents, visitors and especially businesses can feel secure. Instead of the increased militarization encountered in
Latin American cities, this securitization is conducted through increased visible policing, surveillance, and collaboration between the police and community. Regarding the notion of community policing, it is interesting to look at the Safety Leaflet found on the Johannesburg website, where it states: “you are the eyes and ears of the City” (City of Johannesburg 2007).

Seeing as the JCSS was developed by the economic division of the city government, it is noteworthy that the goal is to tackle ‘priority crimes’, meaning those “that were believed to have the most significant impact on business confidence and investment decision-making” (Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery, Human Sciences Research Council 2015: 1). This more profit-oriented approach to safety shows the diversity of underlying motivations to overcome conflict in different cities. Even though there is an economic reason, the program also takes into account the importance of including marginalized inhabitants, and especially young inhabitants, of the poorer areas of the city (Human Sciences Research Council 2015: 11). Still, a failure to address issues such as the unequal distribution of resources and income omits the dimension of structural violence. Thus, the approach focuses on opportunities (the situational prevention measures), such as urban planning and the lack of enforcement of bylaws.

The Johannesburg case is also interesting in terms of the distinction (or rather non-distinction) between the reality of crime and the perception and fear of crime, which primarily leads practitioners to address the fears of crime (in a short-term strategy), and then tackle the actual crime rate through mid- and long-term strategies (City of Johannesburg 2003: 2).

Also, the JCSS uses a focused (geographic) approach. This idea is drawn from the experience that “if the City attempts to take on too many priorities and if the strategy is too complicated, it will be unsuccessful” (City of Johannesburg 2003: 9). This trend occurs because of budget and also personnel restrictions, and shows the possibility of having districts as labs for bigger geographic areas.

A new angle we have not encountered before, which seems interesting and needs to be further developed, is the focus of liquor-induced or liquor-related crimes and the subsequent strategies to tackle them (Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery, Human Sciences Research Council 2015: 3).

Of the difficulties mentioned in the evaluation of the program (Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery, Human Sciences Research Council 2015: 4-10), those regarding ownership and the multi-agency approach are especially relevant to our research. The issues Johannesburg has faced demonstrates the difficulties that top-down approaches can encounter when implemented at the local level. The evaluation stresses the significant role that city mayors assume regarding ownership, as well as the importance of clarity regarding responsibilities for the different cornerstones of a project. In absence of these factors, ownership remains unclear and implementation difficult (Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery, Human Sciences Research Council 2015: 7/8). Regarding a multi-agency approach, the evaluation shows the organizational struggles that come with including various stakeholders into one project, especially in a context of transition, as is the case in South Africa (Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery, Human Sciences Research Council 2015: 9). Obstacles to successful cooperation included a lack of resources for careful coordination, unclear mandates of the involved agencies, insufficient accountability for full implementation, and a general lack of suiting structures for a collective approach (Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery, Human Sciences Research Council 2015: 10). This wide range of issues shows clearly, that
cooperation between different actors demands a huge coordination effort and additional resources, which can not always be found.

In conclusion, the JCSS is an interesting approach to improving urban safety. The evaluation shows numerous challenges which we have also established in our research. These are the necessity of local ownership, the difficulty of implementing international strategies at the city level, the importance of horizontal (between departments) and vertical (between the local, regional and national level) cooperation, and the constraints that many cities of the Global South face (budget, resources, time which are scarce).

6. Comparative analysis

The case studies highlight the heterogeneous nature of urban violence and the importance of cooperation between all relevant actors at the local level, in line with a demand for bottom-up approaches to issues of urban conflict. Yet they also bring to light further interesting theme pertaining to the debate on urban safety and peacebuilding practice.

Cooperation

Cooperation implies that not only different actors who are involved in peacebuilding and urban safety must coordinate, but also that collaboration between practitioners and the community in the city is vital. More controversially, it also implies the inclusion of the perpetrators urban violence in the solution process. The case of Treichville demonstrates the transformation of young delinquents into agents of security in violence prevention schemes. Furthermore, Treichville presents an example of the importance a shared vision of safety and development at the community level, institutionalized through non-state community organizations, as a means of creating lasting peace.

Yet practically, multi-level cooperation can be complex and time-consuming, as it requires collaboration between different departments of city administrations (horizontal) as well as between local, regional and national security services (vertical). Coordination of the Jo’burg City Safety Strategy (JCSS) highlights the complexity and the financial burden that horizontal cooperation between actors can entail, thus emphasizing the opportunities of local and regional cooperation, community policing and informal initiatives. Peacebuilders have rich experience in financing projects, and our cases show that well-targeted funding of local initiatives has proved successful. However, actors often lack access to the local community. Although urban safety practitioners typically have tighter budgets, they enjoy local legitimacy and thus privileged access. This status quo provides an opportunity for deeper cooperation.

Space management

The studies on Beirut and Mitrovica underline that space plays an important role in urban conflict. When urban space becomes scarce with increasing population density or restrictive government measures, it may turn into a factor of the conflict or hinder a resolution. This makes urban planning a necessary and strategic endeavor. In these divided societies, public space is also connoted with contested memories. The destroyed and subsequently rebuilt downtown area in the Lebanese capital represents both the new trend of privatization as well as the de-politicization of a former battleground. Moreover, when public space is reduced, the importance of informally governed spaces grows. Spaces which are created by the local community provide both peacebuilders and urban safety actors with valuable lessons regarding
the effective management of space. In some cases, the absence of formal structures permits community members to interact with each other and the city more effectively.

**Urban planning**
The case studies also indicate the importance of urban planning in fostering urban safety, something which is largely missing from peacebuilding literature. In Lagos, for example, the state has invested heavily in infrastructural projects to improve the living environment and employment opportunities for marginalized groups. Here, the provision of basic services contributes greatly to perceptions of safety. Ensuring environmental security, particularly in slum areas, is also of vital importance to avoid the unsustainable practices which increase poverty and insecurity. The Lagos study shows that effective water management can reduce conflicts, and effective sewage management increases public health. Cities which invest heavily in public transport and road networks also experience positive impacts concerning citizen mobility, which serves to reduce marginalization and can foster exchange between different parts of the community.

Here it is worth noting that peacebuilders and some national governments have very little to do with urban planning. Regulations, urban development and expansion are often decided by municipal governments and influenced by private sector acts. This poses logistical questions regarding the relevance of peacebuilding cooperation. Experiences from Beirut demonstrate an absence of peacebuilding involvement in urban planning, reflecting a wider pattern of minimal cooperation between the two communities in this area. Yet the broad and long-term nature of urban planning means that it tackles structural causes of violence, which is a fundamental goal of the international peacebuilding community. If peacebuilding professionals would want a greater involvement in urban violence prevention, improving knowledge of urban planning procedures and involving actors such as architects is a necessary starting point.

**Private-public partnerships**
Our research has revealed ambiguous results regarding private sector involvement in urban safety. In Lagos and Johannesburg, PPPs have provided significant alternative funding opportunities for a broad range of initiatives, from infrastructural development to SSR, in turn reducing the strain on state funds. In Johannesburg the involvement of the private sector has incentivized the creation of a favorable business environment, which requires the establishment of safety and fuels entrepreneurship. Microfinance schemes in Lagos have particularly benefited women and youths, who often find themselves in situation of economic dependence characterized by violence.

However, private sector schemes are frequently void of regulation or investment coordination, and rarely include non-profit private sector organizations. Private investors thus tend to invest in areas where there is already capital, which naturally benefits richer communities. The planned construction of the Eko Atlantic Project, a potential new business and banking hub in Lagos, is an example of private contracting in the housing sector with no clear plans to include poorer communities. In Beirut, the lack of public spaces is going hand in hand with further privatization schemes. There is barely any space for different communities to have a healthy exchange outside their separate spheres of influence.

**Practical and conceptual barriers**
Our cases bring to light some practical and conceptual barriers which have prevented deeper cooperation between peacebuilders and urban safety practitioners, and question the feasibility
of such collaboration in certain cases. For example, the traditional mandate of the urban safety community is to provide safety in the city, which could be interpreted as a mandate for international peacebuilding missions at the urban level, making the inclusion of peacebuilders an additional factor that is not always welcome in domestic politics. Saksouk-Sasso (2015b) does not see a lot of potential for involving peacebuilders – especially if they come in the form of a UN peacekeeping contingent – in daily routine security issues in Beirut and stresses that community work requires local agents, not international ones.

In addition, it seems that both the peacebuilding and the urban safety community have attempted to give a specific meaning to the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘urban safety’, respectively even though this does not always reflect the state of practice in these fields. Peacebuilding activities are primarily considered to take place at the macro-level as this term is frequently associated to activities of the UN or foreign donors, in line with state-centered peacebuilding practices. As demonstrated by the case of Treichville, urban safety practices tend to occur at the micro-level (Boah 2015). Thus over time the capacities of the practitioners have been tailored to the specific level of their field, in turn creating practical difficulties for cooperation and coordination.

**Conclusion**

These five cases provide a snapshot of the exciting potential for innovation in ensuring safety at the urban level. It is clear that the involvement of international peacebuilding professionals is not always beneficial in urban settings, and it can indeed be counterproductive if local sensitivities are not taken into account. Yet there is ample evidence within the researched cities to suggest that exploring the potential for deeper cooperation between peacebuilding and urban safety practitioners is a worthwhile endeavor, as long as efforts for cooperation take into account factors such as the inclusion of a diverse range local actors and the importance of bottom-up strategies. As cities continue to grow, the issue of urban safety will increasingly impose itself on national and international security agendas, and thus deeper cooperation between agents of security at the urban level and within the peacebuilding community may well become a necessary venture. Such cooperation should avoid the pitfalls of externally-dictated mandates and one-size-fits-all policy-making.

**Bibliography**


About this paper

This paper has been written as part of a research project on the confluence of urban safety and peacebuilding practice. The project was a collaboration between the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform and the Applied Research Seminar (ARS) of the Graduate Institute. The ARS projects partner students of the Graduate Institute with international organizations, NGOs and the private sector to complete discrete research projects for these organizations and provide students with ‘real world’ research experience. The research project occurred under the supervision of Professor Gilles Carbonnier (Graduate Institute) and Dr. Achim Wennmann (Geneva Peacebuilding Platform).

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About the Technical Working Group


About the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform

The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is an inter-agency network that connects the critical mass of peacebuilding actors, resources, and expertise in Geneva and worldwide. Founded in 2008, the Platform has a mandate to facilitate interaction on peacebuilding between different institutions and sectors, and to advance new knowledge and understanding of peacebuilding issues and contexts. It also plays a creative role in building bridges between International Geneva, the United Nations peacebuilding architecture in New York, and peacebuilding activities in the field. The Platform’s network comprises more than 4,000 peacebuilding professionals and over 60 institutions working on peacebuilding directly or indirectly.

The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is a joint project of four institutions: The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies; the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP); Interpeace; and the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva (QUNO).