The Programme Conjoint de Renforcement de la Sécurité Urbaine in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso: Lessons Learned

Paper Series of the Technical Working Group on the Confluence of Urban Safety and Peacebuilding Practice

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In the face of rapid urbanisation and growing trends of urban insecurity, the Government of Burkina Faso and the Municipality of Ouagadougou initiated the Programme Conjoint de Renforcement de la Sécurité Urbaine (PCRSU) with the technical support of UN-Habitat and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The overall objective of this programme was to provide an integrated approach to urban insecurity and public safety. Specifically, the programme had the objectives:

- To fully operationalise the programme by actors in the Municipality of Ouagadougou and by local and national urban policy-makers in general;
- To develop a robust participatory approach to urban insecurity prevention; and
- To decrease the use and presence of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

This programme was part of the good governance components of the Strategy For Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) which replaced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2011. Between July 2010 and October 2013 UNDP provided the bulk of the funding (USD 2,865,000) with UN-Habitat providing in-kind contribution equivalent to USD 285,000. The Prime Minister’s Office, the Ouagadougou Municipality, the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Security Ministry were the main implementing partners. The PCRSU was the first systematic prevention programme in Burkina Faso.
This paper is a contribution of the Technical Working Group on the Confluence of Urban Safety and Peacebuilding (TWG).¹ As part of the TWG’s objective to expand the evidence base of practice at the nexus of urban safety and peacebuilding, this case study focuses on the PCRSU in Ouagadougou and especially its first implementation phase from July 2010 to October 2013. This paper is a synthesis of key reports and evaluations documenting the progress and achievements of the PCRSU provided by the Municipal Police of Ouagadougou.² This paper reflects a desk review of these documents that can serve as an input to more detailed future field research. By publishing the analysis in English, this paper also wants to bring the Ouagadougou experience to the attention of a broader policy community.

The paper first presents an overview of the PCRSU before providing an analysis of the programme’s four main projects. The paper also highlights practical lessons that emerge from the reports and evaluations of the PCRSU’s implementation. Overall, the paper concludes that due to extensive documentation about this programme, Ouagadougou could become an important pilot case for an integrated approach to urban safety and peacebuilding.

1. Overview of the PCRSU

Burkina Faso ranks 181st on the Human Development Index, has the fifth largest birth rate in the world, and 34.5% of its population is 14 or younger.³ The total urban population has increased by 11% since 2000 with, in 2014, 29% of the total population living in urban settings.⁴ Rapid urbanisation was accompanied by significant housing and insecurity challenges which needed better urban planning especially in terms of public security. According to a survey conducted by the PCRSU, 89.5% of offences were not reported to the police. The same study also found that only 30% of the population perceived the police to be efficient exposing a significant trust gap between the population and the municipal and national police.⁵ These survey results, strong urbanization trends, and a lack of police legitimacy constituted the start-up context of the PCRSU. The aim of this programme was to find an integrated response to urban insecurity and foster the inclusion of security concerns in urban planning. It also aimed to upgrade Burkina Faso’s policing capacity by enhancing expertise and technical capabilities, and implementing community policing strategies. Through a participative approach, the objective was to develop relationships between the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) and civilians for better policing as well as enhanced legitimacy of municipal and national police.

¹ The TWG brings together focal points on urban safety with practitioners from the community of peacebuilding, peace mediation and conflict prevention in order to help craft solutions to the rapidly increasing risk of conflict and insecurity in urban settings. See also http://www.gpplatform.ch/pb-city.
forces. An underlying aim of the programme was to ensure sustainability through appropriation by local and national actors. This was supposed to guarantee long-lasting effects of PCRSU both in Ouagadougou and potentially at a national level, too.

The programme was executed via four components. The first three addressed the aforementioned programme objectives while the last was concerned with the managerial aspect of the PCRSU. Figure 1 summarises the far-reaching scope of the programme. PCRSU conducted multiple types of activities varying in size and purpose. The reports and evaluations reviewed for this paper reveal a convergence of the view that four projects constituted the main outcomes of the PCRSU. These were

1. The Observatoire de Sécurité de la Commune de Ouagadougou (OSCO);
2. The Unité pour Femmes et Mineurs (UFM);
3. The Comités Locaux de Sécurité (CLS); and
4. The Volontaires Communaux pour la Sécurité Routière (VCSR).

This paper limits its analysis to these 4 projects because of the most systematically available data. For instance, data was not available to assess activities under component 3 since they did not receive any external evaluation.

Figure 1: PCRSU’s formal structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Desired outcomes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Security dimension effectively integrated in urban policies (Implementing structure: Municipal Police)</td>
<td>1.1. Diagnostic of Ouagadougou insecurity and elaboration/implementation of prevention strategy for urban insecurity 1.2. Strengthening of local capacities to collect/analyse information: OSCO 1.3 Local/National actors are made aware of insecurity problems 1.4 Strengthening of Municipal Police capacities: UFM+VCSR 1.5 Security-focussed design and upgrade of urban sites and spaces of leisure 1.6 Addressing road safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Implementation of participative approach to prevention of urban insecurity (Implementing structure: Direction de la Police de Proximité, the national community policing structure)</td>
<td>2.1. Institutional mechanism of concertation for developing and putting in place such strategy 2.2. Awareness/training of locals and nationals 2.3 Operationalisation of concept: CLS</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Decrease of presence and use of Small Arms and Lights Weapons (Implementing structure: Prime Minister via the Commission Nationale de Lutte contre les Armes Légères)</td>
<td>3.1. Collect and analysis of information on Small Arms and Light Weapons 3.2. Reinforcement of mechanisms of control and investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Programme management (Implementing structure: PCRSU)</td>
<td>4.1. Strategy implemented to mobilise resources for sustainability of programme 4.2. Communication and awareness strategy is elaborated and implemented 4.3. The monitoring mechanism is implemented and documented 4.4. Administrative and financial management is ensured</td>
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2. Assessment

This part assesses the PCRSU according to the four major projects that we identified. Each section briefly explains the key characteristics of the projects and provides a brief assessment synthesized from key reports and evaluation of the PCRSU.

Observatoire de Sécurité de la Commune de Ouagadougou (OSCO)

Overview

Established by decree in June 2011, this observatory serves the overarching purpose of implementing a culture of practice based on an evidence-based approach. The structure would in turn contribute to informed decision-making when addressing urban safety issues. The OSCO is led by the Mayor of Ouagadougou, Prosecutor of the Faso, Chief of staff of the Gendarmerie Nationale, the Director General of the National Police, the Commander of the National Firefighter Brigade and the Director General of the Municipal Police. The Mayor is the final authority when it comes to strategic decisions. The OSCO Management Unit is the operational arm and consists of a Head of Unit, data controller, computer scientist, collecting agents and the secretary. They produce the different outputs which are then validated by the project’s leadership. While the founding legal documents mandated the OSCO to address the whole spectrum of insecurity, the PCRSU concentrated its efforts on road safety, a particular issue in the capital. The decision was motivated by the rationale that it was important to secure the basics of the evidence-based methodology before any further expansion to other fields. The observatory’s objectives were to collect data to provide analysis of the causes/consequences of traffic accidents; to produce assessments/proposals to inform decision-makers; and to serve as a framework for the exchange of experiences and skills amongst security professionals.

Achievements

“One of the major successes of the PCRSU was... the Observatoire de la Commune de Ouagadougou.”6 Despite a relative lack of knowledge of the existence of the OSCO, the authorities and public have recognised the relevance of this structure. Decision-makers have taken concrete actions based on the analysis produced by the observatory7. Moreover, local authorities felt a sense of ownership of the project given their central role in its implementation. When it comes to the outcomes produced in comparison to the objectives and activities, the evaluation found the OSCO to be efficient as the objectives were met and most of the activities were undertaken. The observatory also collaborated with the police and the UFM to map out insecurity zones for women and minors as well as the deployment layout of the security forces.

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7 This was mainly the case for the deployment of the VCSR to the most accident-prone crossroads or the upgrading of road safety via the installation of road circulation instruments. Cabinet de Recherche et d’appui en développement (2013) Évaluation participative de l’Observatoire de Sécurité de la Commune de Ouagadougou. PCRSU, p 36.
Challenges

One of the main challenges has been limited network integration to other relevant public services important for urban safety. While OSCO established working relations with the Brigade Nationale des Sapeurs Pompiers and the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Yalgado Ouédraogo for data collection, no such relationship existed with the national police and the Gendarmerie Nationale. This may not be a problem at first, as traffic accidents may pertain only to municipal police, but it could impede the OSCO’s expansion to other security threats. Another key challenge was a lack of adequate human and material resources which in turn prevented the OSCO from achieving its projected results. The Municipal Police only seconded few human resources and many were ill-equipped to contribute to the technical nature of the OSCO. In addition the OSCO also faced a lack of standardisation of data collection methodologies amongst governmental entities which greatly complicated the compilation phases. Ultimately, the lack of financial incentives for the OSCO’s collaborators was a factor that the evaluation found to have affected the quality of the outcomes produced by the OSCO.

Unité pour Femmes et Mineurs (UFM)

Overview

The objective of this unit is to increase the quality and capacities of the Municipal police to address the issue of women and youth insecurity. Created in February 2011 by municipal decree, it constitutes the sixth branch of the Direction Générale of the Municipal Police and is composed of two main bodies: the Management Committee and the Monitoring Cell. The former comprises a Coordinator and two Municipal police officers and a member of the Direction of Social Development of the Municipality of Ouagadougou. Working relations with the Ministère de l’Action Sociale et de la Solidarité Nationale take place as well with the latter delegating a specialist in social affairs. The Monitoring Cell is the operational arm of the unit with the purpose to respond to help-calls and dispatch intervention teams if need be. The unit’s objectives were: to support women and minors suffering from violence and social deprivation; to enhance the Municipal police capacities through research on women and youth insecurity and specific training to handle such cases; and to serve as a networking platform for professionals in governmental structures, NGOs, or associations addressing women and youth insecurity.

Achievements

The UFM is considered as successfully implemented and well appropriated by the Ouagadougou administration. It has achieved concrete results in terms of protecting women and youth: 152 children and 36 women were saved from the streets. Specific forums incorporating women were set up to assess and discuss the needs in each district. The UFM’s awareness campaigns for the general public, via public debates (“causeries”) or night visits to homeless children, reached 159 717 individuals. Alongside the victim population focus, other themes were discussed such as the role of the municipal police which may influence participation in limiting urban insecurity. The police forces were also beneficiaries from the project as the UFM developed and held sessions on a course entitled “Amélioration des relations entre les policiers municipaux, femmes et mineurs”. Its employees participated in exchanges

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with specialists from the Municipal Police of Montreal and the Institute of Public Security of Catalonia. Research was conducted on women and minors insecurity in the city which informed police work. Finally, and most importantly, the UFM was able to establish an extensive network with governmental (from the Ministry of justice to the social service of the Palais de Justice) and non-governmental actors (le Réseau de protection de l’enfance de la ville de Ouagadougou etc.). This networking was based on information sharing and working partnerships which allowed the UFM to assert itself in the wider network invested in women and minor protection.

Challenges

The UFM does not possess a programme of activities or an action plan. This explains the fact that, according to the evaluation, all the objectives were met but none of the activities described in the decree were completed. It prevents any structured evaluation by external consultants or by the UFM’s own team. The lack of such documents renders the unit more reactive than preventive. The individuals interviewed by the evaluation also deplored a lack of visibility despite the awareness campaigns. What is more, the evaluator believes that the police, the third target-population of the initiative, is not sufficiently addressed in the activities. It also notes that even though the Direction of Social Development is present on the Managing Committee, it seems that relations are weak despite the relevance of this municipal organ. In addition, the evaluation underlined that the lack of financial, material and human capital plagues the UFM. Staff is insufficient and not qualified enough to tackle certain aspects of the unit’s work. This is coupled with a lack of vehicles, a facility for victims to rest and general finances.

Comités Locaux de Sécurité (CLS)

Overview

The CLS are the main operationalised feature of community policing and the participative approach that Burkina Faso is implementing since the adoption of the 2003 legal framework. The aim is to foster dialogue between officials and the populations by bringing together key actors at the local level. The members share practices, discuss key issues and implement common strategies. As such, the committees are composed of local and religious leaders, associations, Forces de Défense et de Sécurité and administrative officials. PCRSU conducted, in a collaborative effort, a stocktaking study of the law’s 2005 action plan to inform the 2011-2015 action plan.

Achievements

The PCRSU then proceeded to operationalise the 47 CLS present in Ouagadougou’s villages and sectors. The sectors’ and villages’ committees are respectively made up 10 and 20 members.

Challenges

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10 Ibid, p. 20.
11 Ibid, p. 23.
The evaluations underline that many CLS members do not know their mandate. PCRSU’s victims of crime survey depict the same trend for the general public. Despite 74% of support for such initiatives, only 3% were aware that a CLS was present in their sector or village. The concept of community participation is also not understood by the public. There is thus a clear lack of training and awareness for both the public and CLS members. There was also a shortage of motivation from the CLS members which can be explained by a lack of financial return from their work and a shortage of means. In an organisational perspective the evaluation deplored the absence of a programme of activities or action plan. In the absence of even a basic agenda of work, the structures failed to provide follow-up documents or reports.

**Volontaires Communaux pour la Sécurité Routière (VCSR)**

**Overview**

This project enables the strategic redeployment of police personnel by establishing a pool of volunteers in charge of road safety. The employed youth are paid USD 80/ per month to conduct traffic control duties, raise awareness on the hazards of dangerous driving and participate in the city’s maintenance by reporting dilapidated infrastructure. The structure was implemented in September 2010 by municipal decree with an initial number of a 100 volunteers. This PCRSU initiative was established as part of the Direction Générale of the Municipal police with a supervising team. The latter’s prerogatives are to provide supervision and guidance to the volunteers, and to collect and report on data regarding road safety. With the guidance of the OSCO reports on road insecurity, the volunteers were dispatched to the 18 most accident-prone crossroads. The coverage was extended to 81 crossroads by 2013.

**Achievements**

The evaluations suggest that the VCRSU initiative was a successful project. It contributed to a better image of the police. The municipal police redeployed its forces by, for example, conducting an awareness campaign to 3022 households on sanitation and insalubrity regulations. The initiative also contributed to broader economic and social issues. The volunteers were provided with training, a year-long experience and financial income. The same youth also participated in public awareness raising on civil participation by sharing their experience with their social circle. Finally, and connected to the previous outcomes, the project gained considerable support from the government and the general public. The government’s enthusiasm for the PCRSU’s project may have to do with its economic and social impacts. The initial number of volunteers was increased to 690 by mid-2013 and a legal reform was initiated, the Volontaires Adjoints de la Sécurité, that is scheduled to employ 3000. The government is assessing this project as an option to address youth unemployment. The public also welcomed the volunteers: 96% of the interviewed noticed the volunteers’ presence, 98.2% believe that the volunteers positively affect the fluidity of traffic while 97.7% believe that VCRS decrease accidents.

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Challenges

The project mainly suffers from organisational and procedural shortcomings. It does not have any programme of activity or action plan inhibiting any form of result-oriented management\textsuperscript{14}. Furthermore, there are no rules of recruitment which may lead to perverse effects. As noted by the evaluation, the contracts were usually renewed which limited the positive social outcomes\textsuperscript{15}. Indeed, with increased staff turnover, more citizens would be trained and made aware of urban insecurity problems. This would in turn contribute to increased collaboration and trust between civilians and the police forces. What is more, the evaluations again underline the limited human, material and financial capital available to implement the project\textsuperscript{16}. There are not enough supervisors and the equipment is of bad quality. Furthermore, the lack of finances may jeopardize the overall project. Indeed, the sums of money necessary are significant seeing that 690 volunteers cost FCFA 309,960 000 (USD 522,252) per year, the nationalisation of the same initiative would cost FCFA 1,394,820,000 (USD 2.4 million)\textsuperscript{17}.

3. Practical lessons

These core projects and their results show that PCRSU generated positive outcomes and has laid strong foundations. However, more instructively, we have identified common challenges which, if correctly addressed, could provide guidance for a second phase.

- A lack of adequate financial, human and material capital undermined key programme objectives: this is the case of the majority of the initiatives and greatly limits their output. Most of the projects lacked the proper human resources to fulfil its activities due to insufficient numbers or competences. In 2011, the budget was substantially diminished as the initial resources planned totalled USD 4.02 million whereas the allocated budget numbered only USD 2.86 million\textsuperscript{18}. This forced the management team to review their activities and focus on core projects hence affecting the outcomes\textsuperscript{19}. The OSCO’s limited scope may be linked to that.
- Investments in better communication strategies about the programmes maximize programme effectiveness. A survey showed that only 3% of the population were aware of a CLS in their sector or village while the evaluation showed that even the committee members were not aware of their mandates\textsuperscript{20}. This is a major challenge with regards to fostering public participation.

\textsuperscript{17} The amounts cited were calculated manually according to the numbers given at: Ibid, p 24
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p. 19.
• **Make action plans mandatory for programme implementation.** Without such organisational tools, it is difficult to implement result-based management to effectively monitor such projects and ensure efficiency. While the PCRSU defined clear objectives and activities to be completed, the coordinator deplored a lack of a distinctly defined monitoring strategy. Clearly established objectives and activities would also curtail inactivity as it was the case with CLS or would have prevented the UFM from putting on hold its prevention activities for more reactive tasks.\(^{21}\)

• **Provide financial incentives for building and retaining staff more seriously.** The personal themselves and their working partnerships underlined the need for financial incentives. In the case of the OSCO, “Our data collection agents find it difficult to get them [data] for free especially since those who are responsible for putting them at their disposal find that this exercise requests additional working time.”\(^{22}\) Increased financial incentives could solve the situation in a short term basis even though the ideal outcome would be a moral commitment to the idea of public service and volunteering. This change of mentality is difficult and could be achieved in time through tailored management practices.

• **The need for sustainable financing.** The evaluations stress the necessity for both the OSCO and the UFM to make necessary legal changes to be included in municipal and national budgets\(^ {23}\). This solution would address the dependency of external sponsors and provide a more predictable funding base. Additional financing should be secured via local entrepreneurs who would benefit from a more predictable and stable security situation.

### Conclusion

The main lesson of this report is the necessity for context-specific programmes that are aware of the principal local challenges. Context sensitive planning and implementation is a key connector across urban safety and peacebuilding sectors. Yet there is opportunity to articulate clearer guidance on context-sensitive programme design. In the case of Ouagadougou, the implementation of the PCRSU became part of and was limited by the “fragile” context Burkina Faso represents. Specifically this led to a gap between the structures created by PCRSU (such as the OSCO) that did not necessarily converge with the available level of technical expertise and capacities as well as local financing to ensure the programme to become self-sufficient and absorbed locally over time. While substantial developments have been achieved in the realms of community policing and public participation, the main challenges are the finances and the technical capacities to ensure the programmes sustainability.

The second phase of the PCRSU is scheduled to take place in 2016. The extensive documentation at our disposal about this programme and the major findings underlined in this case study provides a significant evidence base to formulate concrete recommendations. Ouagadougou could therefore become an important pilot case for an integrated approach to urban safety and peacebuilding.

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\(^{22}\) Translated by Ayméric Parent « Nos agents collecteurs des données éprouvent des difficultés à les obtenir gratuitement d’autant plus que ceux qui sont chargés de les mettre à leur disposition trouvent que cet exercice leur demande du temps supplémentaire de travail. », Cabinet de Recherche et d’appui en développement (2013) Evaluation participative de l’Observatoire de Sécurité de la Commune de Ouagadougou. PCRSU, p. 27.

About the author

Aymeric Parent completed a Master’s at Sciences Po Bordeaux in risk management and has previously completed a Master’s in international security at the University of Edinburgh.

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About the Technical Working Group

The Technical Working Group on the Confluence of Urban Safety and Peacebuilding Practice brings together focal points on urban safety of cities with peacebuilding, peace mediation and conflict prevention practitioners in order to help craft solutions to the rapidly increasing risk of conflict & insecurity in urban settings. It is co-facilitated by the United Nations Office at Geneva, UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities Programme and the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform. For more information, see: http://www.gpplatform.ch/pb-city.

About the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform

The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is an inter-agency network that connects the critical mass of peacebuilding actors, resources, and expertise in Geneva and worldwide. Founded in 2008, the Platform has a mandate to facilitate interaction on peacebuilding between different institutions and sectors, and to advance new knowledge and understanding of peacebuilding issues and contexts. It also plays a creative role in building bridges between International Geneva, the United Nations peacebuilding architecture in New York, and peacebuilding activities in the field. The Platform’s network comprises more than 4,000 peacebuilding professionals and over 60 institutions working on peacebuilding directly or indirectly.

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